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ABSTRACT 
 
1990 is significant as the year in which Glasgow hosted the European City of 
Culture (ECOC), the first UK city and first ‘post-industrial’ city to do so. Glasgow 
has subsequently been regarded as constituting a ‘model’ of culture-led 
regeneration. While much has been written about the impacts of ECOC 1990, 
comparatively little is known about the emergence of cultural policy in Glasgow 
in the decades leading to 1990. With reference to new archival research and oral 
history interviews conducted with some of the key decision-makers, this thesis 
will trace the development of cultural policy in Glasgow during the period 1970 
to 1989. It will examine the key actors, the prompting and facilitating factors, 
critical events and obstacles encountered in the ‘cultural turn’ in Glasgow’s 
policy making during these two decades. Viewing 1986 as a turning point, it will 
investigate in particular the strategies employed by Glasgow in developing its 
ECOC 1990 bid that year. It will examine the decision-making process and 
consider the roles played by key actors in central government which resulted in 
Glasgow winning the competition to be the UK’s nomination for ECOC 1990. 
Taking into account developments such as the concept of the cultural industries, 
this thesis will discuss the extent to which an explicit cultural policy emerged 
which encompassed the production and consumption of culture. It will also 
investigate the extent to which a replicable model of culture-led regeneration 
developed in Glasgow during the years leading to 1990. The thesis will show that 
that in 1970, at the start of the period of study, Glasgow did not have a formal 
cultural policy, nor were the arts and culture explicitly or formally connected to 
aspirations to regenerate the city. Over the course of the 1970s and 1980s, while 
the city faced severe socio-economic problems, a thriving cultural infrastructure 
emerged in Glasgow without an explicit, overarching cultural policy to direct its 
development. In 1986, when the opportunity to bid to host ECOC 1990 arose, the 
lack of an explicit cultural policy in Glasgow created a strategic vacuum in 
Glasgow’s bid, which was filled by the increasingly coherent economic 
development strategies developed for the city in the preceding years. The 
development of cultural policy in Glasgow was led by the development of the 
city economy: rather than culture leading regeneration, regeneration led 
culture.  
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION  
 
This thesis aims to contribute towards a better understanding of the emergence 
of cultural policy in Glasgow in the decades leading to 1990, based on 
documentary research and on oral history interviews with the key surviving 
decision-makers. 
 
In 1990, Glasgow was the first UK city to host the prestigious European City of 
Culture (ECOC) event. As the first post-industrial city in Europe to hold the title, 
following Athens, Florence, Amsterdam, Berlin and Paris, Glasgow was a 
remarkable – and somewhat incongruous – choice. ECOC 1990 has since been 
established as a turning point for Glasgow: a catalyst for a regenerative 
transformation. It marks what is now viewed as the cultural turn in Glasgow’s 
policy-making, a key moment in the city’s use of culture for economic and social 
development. As a result, Glasgow now occupies a prominent position in the 
culture-led regeneration orthodoxy. 
 
Prior to 1990, the ECOC was a fairly modest event and was not associated with 
any aspirations to regenerate the host city. The ECOC was established by the 
European Community (EC) with the first event held in Athens in 1985. The ECOC 
began during the 1980s as an annual title awarded to a city from an EC member 
state, as a means of showcasing the host city’s cultural assets and presenting 
performances and exhibitions from elsewhere in Europe, usually through a 
summer festival. The ECOC has since grown into a collection of annual year-long 
programmes involving multiple host cities and a perception described by Garcia 
(2007: 1) as ‘an attractive catalyst for cultural regeneration, generating 
enormous expectations’.  
 
As will be discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, Glasgow’s approach to ECOC 1990 is 
regarded both in policy and academic literature as pivotal in the direction 
subsequently taken by the ECOC programme (Garcia, 2004b, 2005, 2007; Gold 
and Gold, 2005; Sassatelli, 2009). Sassatelli (2009: 95) has stated that Glasgow 
1990 prompted a shift in the ECOC programme from being a celebration of the 
cultural excellence of major capitals towards becoming an instrument for the 
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regeneration of marginal cities in Europe. Both Sassatelli and Garcia (2005) have 
commented on the influence of Glasgow 1990 on the subsequent ECOC events 
held in Rotterdam, Porto, Genoa, Lille and Liverpool, all of which connected the 
event to regeneration plans.  
 
Glasgow’s approach to ECOC 1990 is also significant in UK policy terms in the 
emergence of culture-led regeneration. In the years since 1990, the idea of 
culture-led regeneration has gained credibility in policy at both a national and 
local government level (Vickery, 2007: 22). It emerged within a cultural policy 
context of growing social and economic instrumentalism, where public 
expenditure in the arts and culture became increasingly justified on the basis of 
its ability to solve entrenched socio-economic problems. This was exemplified 
through such reports as The Creative City (Landry and Bianchini, 1995), The Art 
of Regeneration: Urban Renewal Through Cultural Activity (Landry et al., 1996) 
and Use or Ornament? The Social Impact of the Arts (Matarasso, 1997), later 
followed by the DCMS (Department for Culture, Media and Sport) publication 
Culture at the Heart of Regeneration (2004). Culture-led regeneration 
subsequently became regarded by commentators such as Miles and Paddison as a 
new orthodoxy ‘by which cities seek to enhance their competitive position’ 
(2005: 833).  
 
As Chapter 3 will demonstrate, there are now two established – yet 
contradictory – narratives, both in media and policy terms, which characterise 
Glasgow’s approach to ECOC 1990 and culture-led regeneration as exemplary 
and divisive.  The first narrative characterises Glasgow’s culture-led 
regeneration approach to ECOC 1990 as an unmitigated triumph: pioneering, 
pivotal in the history of the ECOC and socially and economically transformative 
to the city. Glasgow is viewed not only as a remarkable success story but also a 
model to be adopted by other cities. The ‘Glasgow model’ is one in which the 
ability of culture to lead social and economic transformation can be transferred 
and replicated to other cities through such vehicles as the ECOC. For example, 
Glasgow has been held as a model for Liverpool’s approach to ECOC 2008 by the 
proponents of Liverpool’s bid (Garcia, 2005: 4844-4846; Garcia, 2007: 4-6; 
Garcia, 2017: 2 and 4).  
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A contrasting narrative is of ECOC 1990 and culture-led regeneration in Glasgow 
as socially and economically divisive and disastrous for some sections of the city. 
This has been particularly prevalent in some media narratives, which have 
reduced complex geographies to a binary ‘dual city’ narrative in which ECOC 
1990 and culture-led regeneration exacerbated the divide between rich and poor 
in Glasgow (Hall, 2008; Reason and Garcia, 2007), as will be discussed in Chapter 
3. However, Glasgow’s approach to ECOC 1990 also met with academic criticism 
from such critics as Mooney (2004) who has argued that the event did little but 
‘gloss over’ and divert attention away from the city’s major structural problems.   
 
Much has been written about the impacts and legacies of ECOC 1990 on Glasgow, 
other cities – often in relation to attempts to replicate Glasgow’s perceived 
success – and the ECOC initiative itself (Bianchini and Parkinson, 1993; Cox and 
O’Brien, 2012; Crossick and Kaszynska, 2016; Evans and Shaw, 2004; Garcia, 
2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2007, 2017; Gold and Gold, 2005; Gomez, 1998; Johnson, 
2009; Miles and Paddison, 2005; Mittag, 2013; Mooney, 2004; Mooney and 
Danson, 1997;  Myerscough, 1991, 1994; Palmer et al. 2004; Reason, 2006; 
Reason and Garcia, 2007; Sassatelli, 2009; Vickery, 2007). However, despite all 
this academic focus on the legacy, comparatively little is known about the 
emergence of cultural policy in the city in the decades leading to 1990. This 
thesis therefore addresses a major gap in our knowledge and understanding of 
the emergence of cultural policy in Glasgow in the years leading to 1990. In 
doing so, it necessarily questions the perpetuation of what have become 
established mythologies, most notably the idea that Glasgow strategically 
developed an explicit blueprint for culture-led regeneration. As will be shown, it 
is questionable that a model of this kind was actually developed but as noted, 
this has not dented the assumption that there is a kind of tool-kit that makes the 
Glasgow experience replicable. However, this thesis is not concerned with the 
uses later made of Glasgow’s approach to the ECOC and it restricts its focus to 
the period 1970 to 1989. Consequently, it does not investigate the subsequent 
impact of the cultural policy that emerged during this period in Glasgow in the 
years following 1990.  
 
This thesis investigates what and where Glasgow’s cultural policy was during the 
period 1970 to 1989, through six research questions:  
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1. What factors prompted the ‘cultural turn’ in Glasgow’s policy 
making?  
2. What factors facilitated the new policy drive?  
3. Who were the key actors involved?  
4. What were the obstacles encountered? 
5. To what extent can the period from 1979-89 be periodised in terms 
of critical events and how are we to understand the significance 
and influence of these events? 
6. What strategies were employed by Glasgow District Council (GDC) 
in developing its bid to become the ECOC? How did it mobilise the 
requisite expertise? How did it assess the challenge represented by 
its rivals and counter that challenge? 
 
These research questions will be investigated through two main methodological 
strands: archival and documentary research and oral history interviews with the 
key surviving decision-makers.   
 
There is a particular focus in this thesis on GDC and, before local government 
reorganisation in 1975, Glasgow Corporation, as the local authority responsible 
for the city and its (cultural) development. ‘Glasgow’ is therefore used 
throughout the thesis, depending on its context, to mean either the city or its 
local authority.  
 
The thesis will show that in 1970, at the start of the period of study, Glasgow 
did not have a formal cultural policy, nor were the arts and culture explicitly or 
formally connected to aspirations to regenerate the city. Over the course of the 
1970s and 1980s, a thriving cultural infrastructure emerged in Glasgow without 
an explicit, overarching cultural policy to direct its development. This cultural 
infrastructure also developed despite Glasgow facing severe socio-economic 
problems. There had been a sharp decline in manufacturing, which was the base 
of the city economy, with accompanying sharp rises in unemployment. Related 
to this were problems of depopulation, deprivation and urban decay.  
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In the early 1980s, Glasgow was in decline – yet was also in the midst of a 
cultural expansion. Several large-scale capital projects, such as The Burrell 
Collection, were completed or underway. National arts organisations, such as 
Scottish Opera and Scottish Ballet, had become based in the city, alongside 
major companies such as Citizens Theatre and a growing number of smaller arts 
organisations and festivals. Whilst formal plans and policies were developed 
around the city’s top priority of economic development, decision-making on the 
arts and culture within GDC during this period remained largely informal and can 
be described as idiosyncratic. Over the course of the 1980s, the arts and culture 
gradually became incorporated into the city’s economic development plans, 
moving from a peripheral to a more prominent, but by no means central, 
position.  
 
Critical in this process of the arts and culture being absorbed into economic 
development activity was the recognition of the connection between the city’s 
image and its changing economy. Amongst various attempts made to regenerate 
the city economy and create employment in the early to mid-1980s was a new 
focus on the service sector. Glasgow’s service sector was also in decline, but to 
a lesser extent that manufacturing, and it was seen as an area of potential 
growth. The change that was to occur may be illustrated by an excerpt from the 
interview with Michael Kelly, who, between 1980 and 1984 was Lord Provost of 
Glasgow. Discussing Glasgow’s image in 1980, Kelly commented:  
 
It’s difficult to believe how bad it was. Glasgow had a reputation for being 
a very dirty and dismal, dank place plagued by razor gangs and 
hooliganism, multiple deprivation. […] It was a very problematic image for 
Glasgow because it did inhibit economic growth, it inhibited the visitor 
industry, it inhibited attracting key workers to come to Glasgow, and 
generally it was holding Glasgow back, especially as in the 1980s the old 
industries really had disappeared, the old heavy industries, and Glasgow 
was looking for other industries to try and create employment and those 
industries were mainly service-based. […] For service-based industries 
image was very, very important. It didn’t matter so much if it was a coal 
mine or a steelworks or an engineering works, image wasn’t necessarily 
important to make those things happen. But when you’re trying to sell 
much softer services image was vital, and therefore, before we could start 
doing anything on those fronts we really had to try and change the image. 
(Michael Kelly, interview, 23 June 2014) 
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As Michael Kelly commented, it became clear that Glasgow needed to change its 
image to rebuild its economy.  
 
One aspect of the service sector targeted for development was tourism. This was 
accompanied by assertive public relations activity aiming to attract people to 
the city. In the early 1980s, Glasgow was not viewed as a major tourist 
destination in the UK; the Scottish Tourist Board promoted Edinburgh and the 
Highlands but not Glasgow. In 1983, the Greater Glasgow Tourist Board (GGTB) 
was established. As theatres had previously closed over the main tourist seasons, 
GGTB began to work with arts organisations to establish a year-round programme 
of events so that tourists had something to do when they visited the city. This 
was particularly significant with regards to business tourism. The aim was for 
visiting businessmen to see a different side to Glasgow than its entrenched No 
Mean City1 image and tell their influential contacts elsewhere about how the 
city was changing.  
 
Events began to play a more prominent role. The launch of Mayfest and opening 
of The Burrell Collection in 1983 coincided with the launch of the Glasgow’s 
Miles Better public relations campaign and a ‘homecoming’ campaign called 
Welcome Home to Glasgow, to encourage people living overseas with 
connections to the city to visit. Glasgow followed Liverpool and Stoke, both 
similarly suffering from deindustrialisation, in being awarded the 1988 National 
Garden Festival. This provided Glasgow with a major event to act as a focal 
point for urban regeneration.  
 
In the early 1980s, Glasgow’s arts organisations, museums and venues, festivals 
and events were not regarded in terms of their economic impact or contribution 
to the city economy in the way that they are now. However, towards the mid-
1980s this began to change. Glasgow became a case study for John Myerscough’s 
seminal report, The Economic Importance of the Arts in Britain (1988a). A 
particular focus of the Glasgow case study (Myerscough, 1988b) was the 
economic impact of the arts as a consumption activity in the service economy. 
The research for this began in 1985 and was published in 1988.  
                                               
1 The novel, No Mean City (McArthur and Kingsley Long, 1935), tells a tale of gangland violence 
in the slums of the Gorbals. 
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In 1986, while Myerscough’s research was at an early stage, the opportunity 
arose for Glasgow to bid to become the UK’s nomination for ECOC 1990. Whilst 
the first ECOC event was held in 1985, by 1986 the ECOCs for the first five years 
had been selected. The UK decided to take a different approach by selecting its 
nomination via a competition between cities and initially deciding not to provide 
any additional central government funding for its event. 
 
Why, therefore, did Glasgow want to host the event, given there would be no 
central government funding for it and it would consume a large proportion of the 
city’s resources at a time when the city faced severe socio-economic problems?  
 
The ECOC presented Glasgow with the opportunity to align itself with the 
prestigious cities that had previously held the title: Athens, Florence, 
Amsterdam, Berlin and Paris, none of which were seen as declining post-
industrial cities all of which were undisputed European centres of culture. It was 
the prestige of the ECOC which would allow Glasgow to reposition its image and 
thereby support the development of the city’s service sector economy. 
 
However, Glasgow faced the dilemma that, due to the lack of alignment 
between its existing image and that of the previous title holders, it was not in a 
position to win the nomination on reputation alone, and it was competing with 
cities that were. Furthermore, some in Glasgow’s bid coalition anticipated that 
their bid may be met with prejudice on the basis of the city’s entrenched image 
problems. These concerns were proven to be justified, with some ministers in 
the Scottish Office, such as Secretary of State for Scotland, Malcolm Rifkind, 
promoting Edinburgh’s much weaker bid over Glasgow’s. Glasgow being awarded 
the ECOC title was far from inevitable.  
 
In order to compete, Glasgow needed a robust strategy. The strategic vacuum 
presented at this stage by the lack of an explicit cultural policy was filled with 
the city’s increasingly coherent economic development strategies that had 
emerged in the preceding years. The strategy that emerged was based on the 
consumption of culture as a means of supporting existing plans to develop the 
city’s service industries and consumer services. This provided a connecting point 
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between the priorities of GDC, the Scottish Development Agency (SDA) and 
Glasgow Action, a new agency tasked with regenerating the city centre, 
alongside the city’s business community led by Norman Macfarlane.2 Glasgow’s 
bid pragmatically promoted such vehicles as public-private partnerships to show 
how the ECOC could meet the agendas and priorities of both the Labour-led local 
authority and the second Thatcher government. Glasgow’s arts organisations, 
libraries and museums – the cultural constituents of the bid – were not the 
drivers of the bid strategy but rather, the cultural ‘content providers’ that 
would be required for the strategy to succeed.  
 
The period between Glasgow being ratified by the EC as the ECOC 1990 title 
holder in November 1986 and the event taking place, saw a further increase in 
arts and cultural activity in the city. However, by 1990 the arts and culture 
remained strategically fragmented and lacked a co-ordinated approach within 
GDC.  
 
The decades leading to 1990 were a period in which great steps forward were 
made in the growth and development of the city’s arts and cultural 
infrastructure, in connecting the arts and culture to the development of the city 
economy, not least in attempts to use culture to transform the city’s image in 
order to reposition the city and support its economic development – yet in which 
an explicit cultural policy did not quite emerge.  
 
The research findings provide new insights into how Glasgow came to be 
awarded the ECOC title, against expectations, and the nature of the cultural 
policy that emerged in the city in the years leading to 1990. They challenge 
some of the established narratives surrounding Glasgow, the ECOC, culture and 
regeneration. They also challenge the idea that a ‘Glasgow model’ of culture-led 
regeneration, which could be transferred and replicated in other cities, emerged 
in the years leading to 1990. As the thesis will show, developments were based 
mainly on a characteristic pragmatic improvisation and tactical opportunism, 
and relied heavily on the specificity of Glasgow’s context and assets, including 
                                               
2 As well as being chairman of Glasgow Action and a board member of the SDA, Norman 
Macfarlane was, in 1986, both chairman of Guinness (inter alia) and an art enthusiast and 
collector.  
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its key protagonists. A further, perhaps surprising finding is that the ECOC acted 
as an obstacle, as well as a facilitating factor, in the development of a cultural 
policy that encompassed the production of culture as well as its consumption.  
 
Chapter 2 will discuss the city of Glasgow in a range of historical, political and 
socio-economic contexts pertinent to the development of cultural policy in the 
city in the 1970s and 1980s. It will set out Glasgow’s contexts as a Labour-led, 
industrial city; a city facing decline yet with an established cultural 
infrastructure; and a European, British and Scottish city. This broad historical 
framework will be extended in Chapter 3 to encompass the dominant theoretical 
and ideological developments and established narratives framing the emergence 
of cultural policy in Glasgow during the period 1970 to 1989. These include: the 
post-industrial city; neoliberalism; the rise of public relations; the development 
of the concept of the cultural industries; and finally, the culture-led 
regeneration orthodoxy, outlining the established narratives surrounding 
Glasgow, the ECOC and culture-led regeneration, and the idea of cities as 
models of culture-led regeneration, concluding with an overview of current 
debates on the topic.  
 
Chapter 4 will discuss the research methodology for this qualitative study. It will 
set out the theoretical framework, guiding principles and approaches taken to 
archival research and oral history interviews. It will explain a methodological 
approach based on an understanding of cultural policy as potentially implicit or 
explicit, relational and territorial, and intersecting with a broad range of other 
policy areas, such as urban policy and economic policy. It will discuss the public 
and privately-held archive material accessed and the approach taken to the 
available archival material and any unexpected gaps in the archives. It will also 
outline the practical and theoretical factors that shaped the approach taken to 
oral history as a research methodology. It will show that both methodological 
strands have their strength and limitations; that the oral history interviews 
provided valuable qualitative data in some of the areas where the established 
written archives are ‘silent’; and the insights presented by combining archival 
and interview material.   
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The research findings will then be arranged in three chapters. Chapter 5 will 
discuss the key actors, prompting and facilitating factors and obstacles 
encountered in the ‘cultural turn’ in Glasgow’s policy making during the period 
1970-85. It will also examine the critical events, their significance and influence, 
in the period leading up to the turning point of Glasgow’s 1986 ECOC bid, at 
which point a range of emerging strategies began to converge. Chapter 6 will 
examine events in 1985 and 1986 that led to Glasgow being awarded the ECOC 
1990 title. Chapter 7 will consider developments during the period 1987 to 1989: 
the years between Glasgow being awarded the ECOC 1990 title and the event 
taking place. With regards to the development of a cultural policy which 
encompassed both consumption and production, Chapter 7 will compare the role 
of John Myerscough as an expert advisor to Glasgow with that of Nicholas 
Garnham as an advisor to the Greater London Council (GLC) and Greater London 
Enterprise Board (GLEB) on the development of the cultural industries in London 
earlier in the 1980s. Then, within an emerging ‘dual city’ context of increasing 
socio-economic polarisation, Chapter 7 will compare the approaches of GDC and 
the city’s regional authority, Strathclyde Regional Council (SRC), to the arts and 
culture in Glasgow. Finally, Chapter 7 will examine the extent to which an 
emerging model of culture-led regeneration developed in Glasgow during this 
period, including such vehicles as ‘pacing devices’.  
 
Ultimately, this thesis will argue that Glasgow’s approach was not one of 
culture-led regeneration but regeneration-led culture: the development of 
Glasgow’s cultural policy was led by the development of the city’s economy, 
rather than vice versa. 
 
The research presented in this thesis is the result of an AHRC Collaborative 
Doctoral Award project with the University of Glasgow and Glasgow Life, the 
arms-length external organisation established in 2007 to deliver cultural, 
sporting and learning activities on behalf of Glasgow City Council. This thesis 
aims to act as a resource for Glasgow Life, providing it, as well as a broader 
audience of cultural policy makers and researchers, with a better understanding 
of cultural policy formation in Glasgow in the years preceding 1990. In so doing, 
it provides the opportunity to re-assess established narratives and mythologies to 
have developed since 1990, regarding, for example, Glasgow’s position in the 
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culture-led regeneration orthodoxy and the instrumental uses of culture, 
particularly large-scale events. In contributing new historical data and providing 
new perspectives on the recent past, this research aims to help Glasgow Life and 
others shape the cultural policy of the future. It also has implications for a 
broader range of audiences, including academics, policy-makers and 
practitioners working in such fields as the arts and culture, festivals and events, 
cities and urban studies, social and economic development and regeneration, 
urban tourism, destination marketing and public relations. 
 
This research project was driven in part by the opportunity presented by one of 
the main methodological strands: to establish a new archive of oral history 
interviews with the key surviving decision-makers (who are now in their sixties, 
seventies and eighties) in the development of Glasgow’s cultural policy during 
the 1970s and 1980s. Oral history interviews were undertaken with thirteen 
participants, listed in Appendix A, who worked during this period in a broad 
range of fields, including local and central government, the arts and culture, 
economic development, tourism and public relations. The interviews provided an 
opportunity for the key protagonists involved in shaping Glasgow’s emerging 
cultural policy at a significant point in the city’s history to tell their story, which 
will be preserved as a public resource. This thesis is therefore intended to act as 
an entry point to the new oral history archive, which, as allowed by 
interviewees, will be made publicly accessible. 
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CHAPTER 2 GLASGOW: THE CITY AND ITS CONTEXTS 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter will discuss the city of Glasgow in a range of historical, political and 
socio-economic contexts pertinent to the development of cultural policy in the 
city in the 1970s and 1980s.  
 
It will begin by discussing the relationship between the city’s local authorities3 
and the Labour Party, the dominant political force at a local and regional level 
in Glasgow during the 1970s and 1980s. It will then discuss Glasgow’s history and 
identity as an industrial city in the years leading to the 1980s. In connection to 
this, it will then examine Glasgow as a city facing socio-economic decline. This 
will be followed by a discussion of the development of Glasgow’s cultural 
infrastructure in the decades leading to the 1970s, and the role of Glasgow 
Corporation and other key figures in constructing this cultural landscape.  
 
This chapter will then examine Glasgow’s context as a European, British and 
Scottish city during the 1970s and 1980s. As a European city, this chapter will 
discuss this history of the European Economic Community (EEC) in the period 
prior to Glasgow’s year as ECOC 1990. In its context as a British city, this chapter 
will examine the broad political context surrounding Glasgow as a predominantly 
Labour-led city in the UK and the central government policy process and the 
development of cultural policy in the UK during the 1970s and 1980s. In a final 
section on Glasgow’s context as a Scottish city, this chapter will discuss concepts 
of Scotland as a ‘stateless nation’, as both a region of the UK and a nation in its 
own right, and of ‘Scotland’s culture’. It will also discuss the political context in 
Scotland during the 1970s and 1980s with two specific foci: the decline of the 
Conservative Party in Scotland and the rise and fall of the Scottish National Party 
(SNP). Finally, it will discuss regional and national policy in Scotland, examining 
the Scottish Development Agency (SDA) and Scottish Arts Council (SAC) during 
this period.  
                                               
3 This includes Glasgow Corporation, then from 1975, Glasgow District Council and Strathclyde 
Regional Council. The 1975 local government reorganisation in which Glasgow Corporation was 
abolished will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
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2.2 Glasgow as a Labour-led city     
 
This section will discuss the nature of the relationship between municipal 
Glasgow – namely Glasgow Corporation, Glasgow District Council (GDC) and 
Strathclyde Regional Council (SRC) – and the Labour Party during the 1970s and 
1980s, with reference to the years leading to these decades. 
 
The Labour Party was a dominant political force in Glasgow during the 1970s and 
1980s, and for much of the twentieth century.4 Political opposition in the 
decades prior to 1970 came largely from the Progressives, who occasionally won 
control of Glasgow Corporation for short periods. Writing in 1990, Damer (1990: 
212) described the Labour Party as ‘having a stranglehold on power in both 
Strathclyde Region and Glasgow District’ Councils.   
 
The 1980s were a particularly stable period throughout which Labour led both 
authorities in Glasgow, without being subject to serious challenge from parties 
outwith or entryism within. Unlike Liverpool District Council, and the attempts 
of its Deputy Leader, Derek Hatton, to draw the Labour-led authority further to 
the left,5 the leaderships of neither GDC nor SRC were infiltrated by the 
Trotskyist Militant Tendency.  
 
Research undertaken by Keating (1988) in the late 1980s found the typical 
Glasgow Labour councillor to be ‘a more traditional figure’ than in some English 
cities where the ‘new urban left’ had grown in influence. Only 11% of Glasgow 
Labour councillors were women and fewer than 20% were under 40 years of age. 
Keating concluded from the preliminary findings that ‘Labour councillors in 
Glasgow have succeeded by sticking to traditional Labour values in a city less 
affected by social change than some of its English counterparts’ (1988: 62-63).6 
Traditional Labour values in Glasgow were closely related to trade union values: 
                                               
4 The Labour Party here also refers to the Independent Labour Party (ILP), its predecessor 
organisation in Glasgow earlier in the twentieth century. 
5 This debacle resulted in Hatton being expelled from the Labour Party and destabilised Liverpool 
District Council between 1983 and 1987. 
6 Keating described the ‘new urban left’ of some English cities as having ‘brought in more radical 
policies, a campaigning style including confrontation with central government, decentralisation 
and a break with the bureaucratic style of municipal labourism as well as issues such as 
opportunities for women and minorities, often neglected by Labour in the past’ (1988: 62). 
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finding practical solutions to such problems as poverty and disenfranchisement, 
with a strong focus on jobs, wages and housing. This approach was not one of 
ideologically-driven Marxism.   
 
During the period between 1945 and 1970, a specific relationship had developed 
between Glasgow Corporation and the dominant Labour Party administration. 
Keating has argued:  
 
The ideology of the Labour Party on Glasgow corporation can best be 
summed up as ‘municipal labourism’, a concern with a limited range of 
policy issues with an immediate impact on their constituents – notably 
housing matters – but little consideration of wider policy issues.  
(Keating, 1988: 12) 
 
Carmichael (1995: 203) has argued that Glasgow Corporation ‘pioneered 
municipal involvement in regulating and providing social infrastructure, 
especially housing’, quoting Adams to argue that Glasgow ‘became socialised not 
from any specific political ideology but through the need to rectify urban 
injustices created in the nineteenth century’. 
 
Keating (1988: 59) has recognised that during the 1970s and 1980s, with 
electoral competition relatively unimportant, most of the political conflict 
occurred within the Glasgow Labour Group, in a variety of ways: territorial, in 
the wake of the 1975 transition from a singular Glasgow Corporation to the two 
regional and district tiers; between right and left wings of the party; between 
the group leadership and so-called ‘backbenchers’; between elected councillors 
and the mass party organisation; and regarding the balance of power and 
influence between elected members and permanent paid officials. 
 
Although both GDC and SRC began their existence as Labour-led authorities, 
each followed a different course. SRC remained a stable Labour-controlled 
authority throughout the period between its establishment in 1975 and abolition 
in 1996. Initially, leadership was shared between Geoff Shaw – a Church of 
Scotland minister, highly respected for his community work in Glasgow – and 
Dick Stewart, a Lanarkshire politician. Following Shaw’s death in 1978, Stewart 
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retained the leadership until 1986, when Stewart was succeeded by another 
Lanarkshire councillor, Charles Gray.   
 
In GDC, Dick Dynes’ reign as Leader of the council was short-lived, when in 1977 
he was amongst 25 Labour councillors to be ousted from power by voters 
following a housing allocation scandal. At this point, Jean McFadden, first 
elected to the council in 1971, was promoted to Leader of the Glasgow Labour 
Group and Labour moved into opposition. During the period 1977 to 1979, GDC 
was under no overall control, the Conservative Leader of the council, John 
Young, working in coalition with the SNP through the somewhat chaotic period.  
 
In the years between the Labour Group’s return to power in GDC in 1979 and 
further local government reorganisation in 1996, in which GDC and SRC were 
abolished and Glasgow City Council (GCC) established, Jean McFadden and Pat 
Lally vied for leadership. On the right wing of the party, McFadden led GDC from 
1979 to 1986, and again between 1992 and 1994, taking the role of City 
Treasurer in the intervening period. On the left, and more closely aligned with 
long-serving ‘backbenchers’, having been first elected to Glasgow Corporation in 
1966, Pat Lally led GDC from 1986 to 1992, then acted as Deputy Leader until 
becoming Lord Provost of the new GCC in 1996. 
 
Overall, Labour dominated local government in Glasgow during the 1970s and 
1980s. As will be discussed in section 2.7, Glasgow was one of a number of 
Labour-led cities in the UK during this period, which included the three Thatcher 
governments. However, despite the election of GDC’s first female Leader, the 
city’s councillors remained, on the whole, a more traditional figure than their 
new urban left counterparts in other cities.  
 
2.3  Glasgow as an industrial city  
 
This section will discuss Glasgow’s history and identity as an industrial city in the 
years leading to the 1980s. It will argue that industry acted as a connecting 
factor between the city’s economy and its culture, and that this connection was 
historically rooted in the city well before the 1980s.  
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By 1970, heavy industry, and manufacturing more broadly, occupied a 
fundamental position in Glasgow’s economy. Heavy industry – shipbuilding in 
particular – was also fundamental to historical narratives and myths surrounding 
the city’s contemporary identity.  
 
The rapid growth of industry and population in Glasgow during the eighteenth 
and nineteenth century was directly connected to Britain’s global position as a 
burgeoning power. Glasgow’s self-proclaimed status as the ‘Workshop of the 
World’ and the ‘Second City of the Empire’ emerged during this period (Devine, 
2012: 623).7 By the mid-eighteenth century, Glasgow had become ‘the leading 
tobacco entrepôt in the United Kingdom’ (Devine, 2012: 105), its status as an 
international port city established. Manufacturing developed in the city over the 
course of the following century, the textiles industry, chemical industry and iron 
trade emerging as major sources of employment (Devine, 2012: 105-109; Damer, 
1990: 73). The establishment of shipbuilding in Glasgow was a Victorian 
development. By the end of the nineteenth century, heavy industry formed 
Glasgow’s economic base.  
 
In the years leading to the turn of the century, Glasgow’s industrial prowess and 
its implications for the status of the city were manifested in the architecture 
built and events staged. Devine has commented upon the ‘overwhelming civic 
confidence’ visible at the 1883 foundation ceremony of Glasgow’s City 
Chambers, which were opened by Queen Victoria in 1888:  
 
About 100,000 spectators in George Square watched a ceremonial trades 
march by the skilled workers drawn from the heavy industries which by the 
later nineteenth century had made Glasgow one of the great cities of the 
world. (Devine, 2012: 249) 
 
At a cost of £0.5m, the City Chambers reflected, as Kinchin and Kinchin (1988: 
18) have stated, that ‘the public building of this period aimed to enhance 
Glasgow’s status as a great industrial power rather than to rehouse her poor’. 
 
                                               
7 Tom Devine (2012: 623) has commented that the term ‘Second City of the Empire’ was first 
used as early as 1824. 
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In his influential, The Upas Tree, charting the history of the city through this 
period of growth and prosperity followed by post-war decline, Checkland (1981) 
drew on the international exhibitions of 1888 and 1901 – two internationally 
significant events – as indicators of the ‘great apogee of Glasgow prosperity’. In 
the thirteen-year interval between the exhibitions, Checkland argued, ‘Glasgow 
stood at the peak of her confidence and achievement’ (1981: 9). 
 
Both the 1888 and 1901 exhibitions were founded upon a connection between 
industry, culture and civic pride. The 1888 exhibition, organised by Glasgow’s 
business and professional elite who raised the financial backing, was, Kinchin 
and Kinchin (1988: 18-20) have argued, a ‘bid for a cultural status to match the 
city’s industrial strength’.8 The exhibition, in which manufacturers displayed 
their latest products alongside a fine art section, raised profits of £43,000 
(Kinchin and Kinchin, 1988: 55). This, combined with public subscription, funded 
the initial building of the Kelvingrove Museum and Art Gallery, Glasgow 
Corporation providing the site and completing the build when it exceeded its 
original budget. The opening of the Museum and Art Gallery was celebrated in 
the 1901 international exhibition, which again, displayed the latest in industrial 
developments alongside ‘high art’.  
 
Following the ‘great exhibitions’ of 1888 and 1901, Glasgow hosted the Scottish 
National Exhibition in 1911 and the 1938 Empire Exhibition. The latter, was 
hosted when the British Empire was already a diminished force, and as Kinchin 
and Kinchin (1988: 291) have remarked, was conceived ‘in 1931 at the height of 
the depression in a conscious effort to promote employment and to advertise the 
industries of Scotland’. 
 
The 1888 and 1901 exhibitions, with the opening of the new museum, were 
significant not only as a public display of the city’s confidence and prosperity 
but, as an act of partnership between the city’s professional elite and civic 
authorities. From a twenty-first century perspective, O’Neill (2006: 37 and 31) 
                                               
8 Kinchin and Kinchin (1988: 19) stated that 1888 exhibition’s official aims were ‘to promote and 
foster Science and Art, by exciting the inventive genius of our people’ and ‘to stimulate 
commercial enterprise by inviting all nations to exhibit their products both in the raw and 
finished state’, while unofficially, it aimed to outshine Edinburgh and Manchester’s international 
exhibitions of 1886 and 1887. 
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has commented on both Glasgow’s ‘tradition of expressing civic pride and 
competitiveness through museums’ and the long-standing history of the city 
council ‘working with the private sector to benefit the city’. 
 
These events also reflect the significant position of industrialists in the cultural 
heritage accrued by the city by latter half of the twentieth century. As Nenadic 
has commented, during the Victorian era,  
 
In contrast with some cities, Glasgow had no resident aristocracy and 
businessmen had long commanded most positions of power and prestige. 
(Nenadic, 1991: 72) 
 
Collecting art and donating it to the city offered a means of consolidating such 
power and prestige in posterity. Industrialists such as Archibald McLellan, who 
died in 1854, and William McInnes, who died in 1944 bequeathed their 
considerable art collections to the city. William Burrell, who built his fortune 
through shipping during the Victorian era, bequeathed his extensive collection to 
the City of Glasgow on his death in 1958. The Burrell Collection, built to house 
the bequest, opened some 25 years later in 1983.  
 
O’Neill (2006: 37) has connected the opening of The Burrell Collection in 1983 to 
the great exhibition of 1888, arguing that it ‘drew on a long tradition of the city 
using high culture to project itself onto the UK and the world stages’. 
 
By the opening of The Burrell Collection, Glasgow was no longer ‘Second City of 
the Empire’ but, rather, a city in decline, in the midst of deindustrialisation. 
However, the series of great exhibitions and building of prestigious museums 
through the peaks and troughs in prosperity over the preceding century were 
connected by partnerships between the city’s authorities and its professional 
elite, and by the use of culture to promote Glasgow’s identity as one defined by 
its industrial confidence. 
 
  
  28 
 
2.4 Glasgow as a city in decline      
 
By 1970, Glasgow was a city facing socio-economic decline. Indeed, this period 
in Glasgow has been described by some commentators as an ‘urban crisis’ 
(Keating, 1988: 25). Glasgow’s decline encompassed a range of factors, such as 
deindustrialisation, depopulation, deprivation and urban decay, compounded by 
the perpetuation of its reputation as a city afflicted with gang violence and 
sectarianism.  
 
Deindustrialisation took hold in the city during the 1970s and 1980s, the sharp 
decline in heavy industry mirrored by a sharp rise in unemployment. This is often 
attributed to major global change and the decline of the British Empire following 
the Second World War. However, some commentators argue that Glasgow’s 
decline began long before the 1970s or the post-war period. Both Gibb (1983: 
147) and Checkland (1981: 9-12) have argued that Glasgow’s economic decline 
began before 1914, but was temporarily halted by the ‘artificial’ stimuli 
accompanying both the First and Second World Wars and the interwar and post-
war reconstruction boom.9  
 
Many of the socio-economic problems Glasgow faced by 1970 were entrenched 
rather than a recent development. Checkland has commented on how the wealth 
generated by heavy industry was not spread evenly across the city, even at its 
industrial peak: ‘high prosperity before 1914 did not purge dereliction and 
slums, but left a painful residuum’ (1981: preface). 
 
Whilst the 1919 Addison Act was a watershed in outlining the responsibilities of 
both government and municipal authorities – including Glasgow Corporation – to 
provide decent minimum standards of accommodation, overcrowding persisted 
in Glasgow during the first half of the twentieth century (Gibb, 1983: 154-155). 
By 1945, Glasgow faced a housing crisis; one which remained unresolved due to a 
lack of consensus between authorities on the solution (Keating, 1988: 18). A 
                                               
9 Gibb (1983: 147) has commented: ‘Just as the Great War provided a major stimulus to the 
traditional industries of Clydeside in its demands for wartime supplies, and in the short-lived 
reconstruction boom which followed it, so the Second World War intervened to mask a picture of 
steady decline in industry, and in the fortunes of the people dependent upon it’. 
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1946 report of the Clyde Valley Regional Planning Advisory Committee (CVRPAC) 
involving eighteen local authorities and central government, noted:  
 
Civic pride, so conspicuous in other directions, has lamentably failed to 
maintain even a tolerable standard of town planning. (Keating, 1988: 18) 
 
During this post-war period, the CVRPAC and Glasgow’s city engineer, Robert 
Bruce, proposed opposing solutions, neither of which was fully realised in 
practice. In the resultant approach, Keating has argued, ‘Glasgow got the worst 
of both worlds’ (1988: 21). 
 
By the early 1970s, the dominant policy of comprehensive redevelopment – with 
the purpose of demolishing and rebuilding everything within a designated space – 
had extended to 29 areas of the city. This including dispersing entire 
communities out of decaying Victorian tenements earmarked for demolition in 
such areas as Anderston in the centre of the city, to new estates on the 
periphery. 
 
However, by the early 1970s, it had also become evident that comprehensive 
redevelopment had not had the desired effect of improving the city’s social and 
economic fortunes. The 1974 West Central Scotland Plan, produced by a 
consortium of local authorities and the Scottish Development Department, not 
only highlighted the severe environmental decay that existed within Glasgow but 
recognised that it extended beyond the old inner city slum areas to the newer 
housing schemes (Keating, 1988: 26-28).10  
 
Not unconnected to deindustrialisation and urban deprivation and decay was the 
additional problem of depopulation. Having peaked in 1951 at 1,090,000, 
Glasgow’s population continued to decline throughout the decades leading to 
1990. Outmigration, both voluntary and planned, persisted, with former Glasgow 
residents relocating overseas to countries such as Canada and more locally to 
suburban areas beyond the city boundary and to New Towns in the West of 
Scotland as a result of slum housing clearance (Paddison, 2002: 13). That 
                                               
10 For example, the high-rise housing Hutchesonstown/Gorbals comprehensive redevelopment 
area, designed to replace slum housing, gained notoriety during the 1970s for its poor quality, 
notably problems with damp. The towers were eventually demolished after much political 
wrangling in 1993.   
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outmigration was most prevalent among the professional and skilled working 
classes (Keating, 1988: 27) presented a particular problem to the city. Recent 
research by Walsh et al. (2016: 3) has highlighted the longer-term problems 
caused by the ‘socially selective New Town programme’ in Scottish Office 
regional policy from the late 1950s, which was ‘extended and expedited over the 
ensuing decades despite awareness of the negative consequences (both socio-
economic and also ultimately health-related) for Glasgow’. 
 
In addition to problems related to deindustrialisation and poor housing 
conditions, Glasgow began the 1970s with an unshakeable association with 
violence and bigotry. The ‘new wave of Glasgow hooliganism’ during the mid to 
late 1960s was connected, as Bartie (2010) has noted, to an induced rise of 
‘moral panic’ in the city, with one particular peripheral estate acting as a focal 
point. Bartie has commented that, ‘between 1965 and 1970, Easterhouse 
became – and significantly, remains – a place that has become a byword for the 
so-called “problem community”’, not least due to its connection to the rise of 
youth gang violence in Glasgow (2010: 402). This episode built upon the growing 
folklore of Glasgow gang violence popularised in such novels as McArthur’s 1935 
No Mean City, which was based in the Gorbals and featured ‘Razor King’ Johnnie 
Stark. Glasgow’s violent reputation provided a rich seam to be mined in 
literature emanating from the city throughout the 1970s and 1980s.11  
 
In conclusion, by the 1970s and into the 1980s, Glasgow faced a range of socio-
economic problems, which had arisen due to a range of interconnected factors, 
such as: major global change; the consequences of central and local government 
policy decisions, such as the promotion of New Towns and comprehensive 
redevelopment; and entrenched problems – stretching back to the Victorian era 
and earlier – which stubbornly remained unresolved. 
 
  
                                               
11 William McIlvanney’s Laidlaw trilogy (1977, 1983, 1991) is one example of the emerging ‘tartan 
noir’ genre. 
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2.5  Glasgow as a cultural city  
 
This section will provide a brief overview of Glasgow’s cultural infrastructure in 
the decades leading to the 1970s, and the role of Glasgow Corporation and other 
key figures in constructing this cultural landscape. The difficulties of defining 
what does and does not constitute ‘culture’ are discussed later in this thesis, 
notably in Chapter 7. In this contextual discussion of Glasgow as a ‘cultural city’, 
this section takes a relatively narrow definition of ‘culture’ to mean primarily 
the arts, museums, libraries and film, in connection to discussion of cultural 
policy in section 2.7, rather than a broader, more sociological definition of the 
kind to be discussed in Chapter 7.  
 
Section 2.3 discussed the role of industrialists and partnerships between 
businessmen and Glasgow Corporation in promoting Glasgow’s status as a great 
city of the world through the great exhibitions of 1888, 1901, 1911 and 1938 and 
the building of the Kelvingrove Museum and Art Gallery. This promotion of civic 
confidence through cultural venues and events was also aimed inwards, at the 
population of the city. At Glasgow’s peak of prosperity during the Victorian era, 
museums and galleries, libraries and parks were viewed as municipal services 
and a matter of civic pride. This ethos of civic pride as a basis for Corporation 
support extended throughout the authority’s lifespan from Victorian prosperity, 
through two World Wars and the intervening Depression of the 1930s, over the 
course of the twentieth century into the 1970s. As embodied in the example of 
Kelvingrove Museum and Art Gallery, this ethos saw Glasgow Corporation invest 
in cultural venues on a grand scale. For example, the magnificent Victorian 
venue St Andrew’s Halls was acquired by the Corporation for the city in 1890 and 
hosted large-scale concerts and events before being gutted by fire in 1962. 
Following the fire, the site was eventually incorporated into an extension of the 
equally grand Mitchell Library. First built in the 1870s following tobacco 
merchant Stephen Mitchell’s £70,000 bequest for a large public library for the 
city (and as such another example of the significance of industrialists in the 
construction of Glasgow’s cultural infrastructure), the Mitchell Library moved 
sites twice to accommodate the rapid expansion of its stock, its current building 
dating from 1911. Following extensions during the 1950s and 1970s, the Mitchell 
Library became one of the largest reference libraries in Europe (University of 
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Glasgow, 2017). Other such venues include the People’s Palace Museum and 
Winter Gardens, founded in the predominantly working class East End of the city 
in 1898 and, by 1990, associated with social history and working class culture.  
 
The People’s Palace was built on Glasgow Green, common land which was 
designated a public park in 1857, the first in a series of parks to be constructed 
in what became a Victorian municipal drive (Reed, 1993: 72 and 78). Glasgow’s 
larger parks also hosted many of the city’s significant cultural events and 
buildings in the years during and since the Victorian era: Kelvingrove Park hosted 
the 1888, 1901 and 1911 exhibitions as well as the museum and art gallery; 
Bellahouston Park hosted the 1938 Empire Exhibition and the resultant Palace of 
Art; Pollok Country Park became the site of The Burrell Collection as well as 
Pollok House, the William Adam mansion gifted to the city by the Maxwell 
Macdonald family.  
 
However, Glasgow’s municipal investment in the arts and culture was not just 
driven by an ethos of civic pride but also by the agency of key individuals, Tom 
Honeyman being a particularly prominent example. Dr Honeyman, Director of 
the Kelvingrove Museum and Art Gallery between 1939 and 1954, has been 
credited not only with building what are regarded as considerable strengths in 
the city’s collection of French art but, significantly, with persuading Sir William 
Burrell to donate his collection to the city, and negotiating the purchase for the 
city of Salvador Dali’s 1951 painting, Christ of St John of the Cross, for £8,200, a 
price which Webster (1997: 171) has noted is ‘viewed as an incredible bargain in 
the light of history but [was] by no means regarded as such at the time’. 
 
While Glasgow Corporation (including employees such as Honeyman) and 
Victorian industrialists played an important role in the development of Glasgow’s 
cultural infrastructure, by no means were they the sole drivers of its 
development in the years prior to 1970. Nor did the Corporation fund the 
entirety of the city’s cultural venues. Indeed, many of the theatres and cinemas 
that began to proliferate in the city flourished without Corporation support.12 
The popularity of Britannia Panopticon Music Hall from the nineteenth century to 
                                               
12 Coveney (1990: 7) has noted that between 1862 and 1914, eighteen major theatres were built 
in Glasgow.  
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the 1930s and the Pavilion Theatre, which thrived mid-century with a variety-
based programme, are two such examples whose work provided a contrast to the 
‘high culture’ of, for example, the Corporation-funded Theatre Royal. 
 
In addition, the developmental factor of the individual agency of key actors in 
Glasgow’s growing cultural landscape during the decades leading to the 1970s 
can be found largely outside the Corporation. For example, although the Citizens 
Theatre in the Gorbals received funding from the Corporation at various points 
in its history and is housed in a building owned by the City, it was – and remains 
– an independent company. Founded in 1943 by playwright James Bridie, in its 
initial decades, according to Coveney (1990: 5), Scottish ‘Nationalist idealism 
vied with grass roots political and artistic aspiration’ within the company. A 
1960s slump followed by renewal under the artistic leadership of Giles Havergal 
from 1970 resulted in the theatre being ‘proved profoundly and insidiously 
influential’ in the following decades.  
 
Glasgow developed a strong literary culture, enabled not least during the late 
1960s and 1970s by the agency of Philip Hobsbaum, who, as lecturer in English 
Literature at the University of Glasgow, established a writers’ group which 
included such authors as James Kelman, Alastair Gray and Liz Lochhead.    
 
In the years leading to 1970s, and into the 1970s themselves, a counter-culture 
ethos emerged in Glasgow (as in other UK cities), detached from Corporation 
involvement and in reaction against the ‘establishment’ in general. For example, 
writer and performer Tom McGrath played an important role within Glasgow’s 
counter-culture, founding the Third Eye Centre in 1974 and bringing performers 
such as Allan Ginsberg to Glasgow.   
 
In addition to these three examples concerning theatre, literature and the 
performing and visual arts, Glasgow was no less a part of what might be termed 
‘popular culture’ than other cities in the UK. For example, the music halls of the 
early twentieth century gave way to independent music venues (such as Glasgow 
institution, the Barrowland Ballroom) as a locus of the city’s music scene.  
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McCulloch (2013: 191) has argued that the 1960s were a ‘crucial transition 
decade in the city’s cultural renaissance’ which demonstrated Glasgow ‘could be 
a source of immediate and future innovative artistic achievement in poetry, 
painting and music’. The examples given by McCulloch – conductor Alexander 
Gibson who was ‘at the heart of 1960s reforms’ in revitalising the Scottish 
National Orchestra and driving the establishment of Scottish Opera in 1962; 
William MacLellan, ‘the kind of adventurous cultural publisher Scotland had long 
needed’; Edwin Morgan, a ‘radical and transforming figure in Scottish poetry in 
the second half of the twentieth century’; and painters John Knox and Ian 
McCulloch, two of a group of ‘recent Glasgow School of Art graduates who were 
rebelling against what seemed then to be the dead hand of the city’s arts 
institutions’ (2013: 176-177 and 184) – underline the significance of the role of 
individual key actors in the development of the city’s cultural landscape despite, 
and in reaction against, the Corporation.  
 
By 1970, Glasgow Corporation occupied an important position in the historical 
development of Glasgow’s cultural infrastructure, its investment in the arts, 
museums and libraries a matter of civic pride. However, the agency of key 
actors, many of whom worked outwith the Corporation, was a crucial factor in 
the cultural ecology generated in the city as it moved into the 1970s. 
 
2.6  Glasgow as a European city   
 
As will be discussed in Chapter 6, the connection of Glasgow to the European 
Economic Community’s (EEC) ECOC programme in 1986, when the city competed 
for the UK’s nomination for the 1990 event, was a critical event in the 
development of Glasgow’s emerging cultural policy. The distinctive approaches 
taken by the UK and Glasgow to the ECOC – which will be discussed in Chapter 6 
– had broader ramifications, not only for the future direction of cultural policy in 
Glasgow but also for that of the ECOC programme itself.  
 
This section will provide a brief overview of the rise of the ECOC in the EEC 
during the 1980s, prior to Glasgow’s year to host the event in 1990, as a means 
of establishing the broader EEC context for this critical event. 
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The period of study, 1970 to 1989, encompasses a period of European history 
that saw the end of the Cold War, with the sudden collapse of communism in 
Europe. 1989, the end of the period of study, saw the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
1990, the year Glasgow hosted the ECOC, saw the reunification of Germany.  
 
During the period of study, the EEC was one of three communities that 
constituted the European Community or Communities (EC), the others being the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and Euratom, the European Atomic 
Agency. The period of study also falls into the years before the formal 
establishment of the European Union, the Maastricht Treaty on European Union 
coming into force in 1993, having been signed in 1992. With the Maastricht 
Treaty, the EC became one of the EU’s three pillars, the others being Common 
Foreign and Security Policy, and Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal 
Matters. The 1970s and 1980s, therefore, was a period before the ‘ever-closer 
union’ of European integration formally extended to European citizenship, 
economic and monetary union and – in legal terms – cultural policy.  
 
1970 to 1989 was also a period in which the number of EC member states 
doubled from six to twelve. The six countries to have signed the 1957 Treaty of 
Rome on which the EEC was founded – Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and West Germany – were joined in 1973 by the UK, Ireland and 
Denmark. Greece joined in 1981, followed by Spain and Portugal in 1986. While 
the EC saw an expansion in member states it also saw a rise in the position of 
‘culture’ within the Community, despite, in the years before the Maastricht 
Treaty, maintaining no formal legal competency for culture throughout this 
period. The frequently quoted line attributed to Jean Monnet, one of the 
‘Founding Fathers’ of the EC, that if he could begin European integration anew, 
he would commence with culture, has been revealed by several commentators 
to be something of a myth (Patel, 2013: 1; Sassatelli, 2009: 46). The main 
vehicle for the shifting position of culture in the EC was the initiation of the 
ECOC programme during the 1980s.  
 
That the first informal meeting of EEC Culture Ministers was held in 1983 under 
the Greek Presidency of the European Council is not insignificant, given that the 
ECOC concept was proposed by Greek Culture Minister, Melina Mercouri, and the 
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first ECOC event held in Athens in 1985. Mercouri was the driving force behind 
the establishment of the ECOC, supported by French Culture Minister, Jack Lang. 
In the first official research report to evaluate the European Cities of Culture 
programme, European Cities of Culture and Cultural Months, produced by the 
Policy Studies Institute (PSI) for the Network of Cultural Cities in Europe in 1994, 
John Myerscough has recorded Mercouri as having argued at this meeting: 
 
It is time for our (the Culture Ministers) voice to be heard as loud as that 
of the technocrats. Culture, art and creativity are not less important than 
technology, commerce and the economy. (Myerscough, 1994: 1) 
 
For those Culture Ministers that drove the establishment of the ECOC 
programme, ‘culture, art and creativity’ could be deployed to make political 
gains that could not be achieved by ‘technology, commerce and the economy’ 
alone, including, in part, the project of European integration. Gold and Gold 
have argued that ‘the European Community approached culture in terms of “the 
compatibility of contrasting identities”’, commenting that: 
 
The rise of culture on the political agenda resonated with the belief that 
closer European economic and political integration required associated 
measures to show the cultural affinities between the peoples of Europe. 
(Gold and Gold, 2005: 222) 
 
Furthermore, Gold and Gold have commented on the role and timing of the 
establishment of the ECOC:  
 
Tactically it combined community-level cooperation with the participation 
of regional and local authorities, thereby involving ordinary people in a 
European project at a time when few such projects seemed to have 
relevance for the lives of the public. (Gold and Gold, 2005: 223)  
 
As Calligaro (2013: 109) remarked, the ECOC provided ‘a European space in 
which the diversity of the cultural Europe can be represented in contrast to the 
bureaucratic centre Brussels’. The diversity and contrasting approaches and 
identities of member states were recast through the ECOC not only as a strength 
but as a defining characteristic of an ultimately European identity. Sassatelli 
(2009: 81) has discussed how the ECOC confers a European identity on host 
cities, arguing that the ECOC was ‘a reconceptualization of the cities as 
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European’, the diversity of approaches by cities ‘seen as what makes them 
typically “European”’.  
 
As will be discussed in Chapter 3, Glasgow 1990 is widely regarded as a ‘turning 
point’ in the ECOC programme, particularly in its connecting the ECOC to 
regeneration aims (Sassatelli, 2009: 96; Gold and Gold, 2005: 225; Mittag, 2013: 
43; Garcia, 2007: 4). However, Garcia (2007: 1) has described the ECOC prior to 
its being ‘transformed into what is perceived as an attractive catalyst for 
cultural regeneration, generating enormous expectations in cities’ as ‘a rather 
sanguine EU initiative’. Gold and Gold (2005: 224) have commented that, ‘the 
early events made little impact on the European scene’ and were ‘primarily 
summer events staged for domestic audiences, with little international 
marketing’.  
 
Sassetelli (2009: 95-96) has described the first ECOCs, particularly Athens and 
Florence, as both ‘limited in scope’, connected to an urban cultural policy 
concerned predominantly with ‘the promotion of high culture and of access to 
it’. Calligaro (2013: 96) has argued however, that the ‘centralised yet impulsive’ 
approach Athens took to their event contrasted with that of Florence, in which 
local actors had a real stake. These were followed by the equally divergent 
festivals of Amsterdam 1987, Berlin 1988 and Paris 1989 (the latter being 
overshadowed by the commemoration of the bicentennial of the French 
Revolution).  
 
In the early years of the programme prior to 1990, there was no established 
model for the ECOC, with each city and member state taking their own 
distinctive approach at a time when the arts and culture began to occupy an 
increasingly conspicuous, though by no means dominant or indeed formal, 
position within the EEC.  
 
2.7 Glasgow as a British City  
 
This section will discuss Glasgow’s context as a city in the UK during the 1970s 
and 1980s, providing an outline of the broad political and policy context in 
Britain during an era with a singular central government, prior to Scottish 
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devolution and the establishment of the Scottish Parliament. As a British city, 
Glasgow was subject, until 1975, to the two tiers of local and central 
government, and following local government reorganisation in 1975, to the three 
tiers of local, regional and central government. This section will therefore 
provide an overview of the Heath, Wilson, Callaghan and Thatcher governments, 
touching upon the evolving policy process during this period before briefly 
discussing the development of cultural policy in the UK between 1940 and 1989. 
One significant aspect of Glasgow’s context as a British city – its position within 
the Scottish political landscape – will be discussed in section 2.8.  
 
2.7.1 The Heath, Wilson, Callaghan and Thatcher governments, 1970 to 1989 
 
Politically, the period 1970 to 1989 saw a succession of Labour and Conservative 
governments in the UK led by four prime ministers. Harold Wilson and Labour 
lost the June 1970 general election to the Conservatives, led by Edward Heath, 
only to be returned to power as the Leader of a minority government in the 
aftermath of the February 1974 general election, following Heath’s failed 
attempts to establish a coalition with Jeremy Thorpe and the Liberals. A further 
general election in October 1974 gave Wilson’s Labour Party a slim majority. 
Wilson resigned in office in April 1976, James Callaghan succeeding him as Prime 
Minister. The May 1979 general election brought the first of three Conservative 
governments led by Margaret Thatcher between that year and November 1990, 
when Thatcher was ousted by her party and replaced by John Major as Leader 
and Prime Minister. 
 
The Heath government of the early 1970s is significant for this study in two 
regards: as a time of economic decline and as the point at which the UK joined 
the EEC. As a vocal advocate of the European integration project, Ted Heath 
pushed through the UK’s application to join the Common Market, after the first 
two applications were vetoed by President de Gaulle of France. After joining on 
1 January 1973, the UK’s position within the EEC was subsequently reinforced in 
a UK referendum in 1975.  
 
The UK joined the EEC at a time when its position in the world was changing. 
Britain had long lost its empire and significant global change was a prompting 
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factor in the process of deindustrialisation affecting many British towns and 
cities. This period also began with disputes between trade unions – notably the 
National Union of Miners (NUM) – and the government, which continued without 
definitive resolution into the 1980s. The early 1970s brought strikes, power cuts 
and the three-day week.  
 
With industrial relations a weakness of the Heath government and the country in 
deficit, the Wilson government of 1974 promised a change of direction. Rogers 
has commented that:   
 
The Labour government was elected in 1974 on the basis of manifesto 
commitments that were firmly rooted in the Social Contract, which 
emerged out of the meetings of the TUC/Labour Party Liaison Committee. 
(Rogers, 2009: 638) 
 
The Social Contract promised a redistribution of income and wealth (Rogers, 
2009: 634). However, the Wilson government was dominated by economic 
problems related to ‘stagflation’ – inflation combined with recession – and the 
destabilising influence of the 1973 oil crisis as well as the commitment to public 
spending.  
 
The economic crisis continued throughout the Callaghan era, leading to the 
‘winter of discontent’ in 1979, which saw a series trade union strikes over public 
sector pay. In March 1979, Callaghan, already in the weakened position of 
leading a minority government, lost a vote of no confidence in parliament – the 
SNP aligning with the Conservatives to provide what was the casting vote. The 
early general election that followed in May 1979 resulted in the installation of 
Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister.  
 
The three Thatcher governments can be characterised, amongst other things, by 
the Prime Minister’s preoccupation with ‘the enemy without’ and ‘the enemy 
within’. This was a period which saw the Falklands War; escalation of the 
Troubles in Northern Ireland and IRA attacks on mainland UK; and the Miners’ 
Strike, in which the NUM, led by Arthur Scargill aimed, and failed, to prevent 
colliery closures in the wake of the government’s attempts at trade union 
reform.  
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At an international level, the Thatcher era coincided with the final years of the 
Cold War. On economic policy, Thatcher’s monetarist approach was in tune with 
the contemporary ‘Reaganomics’ of the USA. Both Thatcher and Reagan found 
inspiration in the economics of Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek, which 
veered away from the Keynesian policies of the past. Thatcher led the UK 
through a period of widening inequality, one in which deindustrialisation took 
hold in many towns and cities across the country, with ‘managed decline’13 
considered as a policy option, yet which also saw the financial ‘Big Bang’ with 
the deregulation of the stock exchange, a cornerstone of Thatcherite economic 
reform.  
 
At a national level, the 1980s were a low point for the Labour Party led by Neil 
Kinnock, as it lost the general elections of 1983 and 1987 by considerable 
margins. However, the Labour Party was a dominant force at local government 
level within the major urban areas of the UK. For example, Labour held control 
of Manchester and Sheffield District Councils and the Greater London Council 
(GLC) alongside Strathclyde Regional Council and Glasgow District Council 
throughout the decade. Here the new urban left was an influential factor on 
Labour-led authorities, as opposed to the influence of the new suburban right on 
Conservative local government (Gray, 2000: 168). 
 
The Labour Party’s dominance of major city councils did not go unchallenged, 
from several quarters. In Liverpool, as touched upon in section 2.2, the 
dominance and stability of the Labour Party was undermined by the infiltration 
of the Militant Tendency enabled by the District Council’s Deputy Leader, Derek 
Hatton from 1983. In London, the challenge to the advancement of Thatcherism 
presented by Ken Livingstone’s GLC was brought to an abrupt end in 1986 when 
                                               
13 Dorling (2012) has commented on how the early 1980s government policy of managed decline 
was only made public in 2012 due to the thirty year rule governing the release of Cabinet papers. 
Managed decline was proposed by Chancellor, Geoffrey Howe, as a regional policy option for 
Liverpool following the 1981 Toxteth riots. Cabinet papers state Howe argued the government 
should not ‘waste money’ on regenerating Liverpool, that Liverpool’s decline could not be 
prevented by the government, and that Secretary of State for the Environment, Michael 
Heseltine’s request for a ‘massive injection of additional public spending’ to stabilise the inner 
cities should be rejected. Howe proposed ‘a sustained effort to absorb Liverpool manpower 
elsewhere – for example in nearby towns of which some are developing quite promisingly’ 
(Travis, 2011).       
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the GLC was abolished by central government, alongside six (predominantly 
Labour-led) metropolitan county councils in the Midlands and North of England.14 
 
Thus, politically, Glasgow was one of a number of comparable British cities, 
reliant on heavy industry, undergoing severe socio-economic decline, to be led 
by a Labour Group during the Thatcher era.  
 
It was within this political context that the ‘inner cities’ became a national 
policy concern which grew over the course of the Thatcher era. By the third 
Thatcher government, which began in 1987, the inner city was becoming a 
byword for a multitude of social and economic problems, as the British American 
Arts Association described in a 1988 symposium document:  
 
The term inner city describes not so much a location as a state of economic 
and social decline. It consists of a deadly combination of ills: 
unemployment, poor housing, crime, dereliction, all of which lead to a loss 
of confidence and identity; in short, to a death of the local community. 
(Keans et al., 1989: 9-10) 
 
The 1970s and 1980s in the UK was also a time when the policy process itself 
began to change. The UK during this period has been conceptualised by various 
commentators as both a ‘post-parliamentary democracy’ and a ‘new 
managerialist state’ (Ham and Hill, 1993; Hill, 1997; Saint-Martin, 2004). Ham 
and Hill (1993: 27-28) have charted the evolution of the policy process in Britain 
during this period, noting the arguments of Jordan and Richardson that by the 
late 1980s, Britain had become a ‘“post-parliamentary democracy” in which 
policies are developed in negotiation between government agencies and pressure 
groups organised into policy communities’, with pressure groups influencing 
public policy ‘from the point at which issues emerge on to the agenda to the 
stage of implementation’.  
 
This reflects the growing significance over the course of the late 1970s and 
1980s of government agencies and advisors in policy development as well as 
implementation. As will be discussed in section 2.8, the growing role of agencies 
                                               
14 During this period, however, the two tier system of local and regional government in Glasgow 
remained intact, GDC and SRC remaining in place until SRC was abolished in 1996, when the new 
Glasgow City Council was created.  
  42 
 
coincided with the development of regionalism in policy development in the UK, 
with the SDA combining both factors.  
 
The rise and influence of expert policy advisors in cultural governance in Britain 
has been investigated by Schlesinger (2009a, 2013), who has concluded that:  
 
a small number of actors may act as the effective protagonists of a policy. 
At any one time, there are preferred suppliers of ideas and evidence. 
(Schlesinger, 2009a: 17) 
 
This resonates with the influence of two expert advisors, Nicholas Garnham and 
John Myerscough, regarding emerging cultural policies in London and Glasgow 
respectively, which will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
 
The development of the post-parliamentary democracy coincides with the rise of 
the new managerialist state in the UK. The ‘new managerialism’ is also known in 
the literature as ‘corporate management’, ‘new public management’ or just 
plain ‘managerialism’ (Saint-Martin, 2004: 18-40; Dollery, 2009: 21). Pollitt has 
defined it as:  
 
a set of beliefs and practices, at the core of which burns the seldom-tested 
assumption that better management will prove an effective solvent for a 
wide range of economic and social ills. (Pollitt, 1990: 1)  
 
Writing in 1990, Pollitt (1990: 7) argued that this ‘belief in the potential of 
better management’ arose from ‘the favourable analysis of the achievements of 
the corporate sector during the last half century’. During that period, the 
traditional state bureaucracy was characterised as chronically inefficient, 
insulated from competition and expanding in size and cost without evidence of a 
corresponding growth in productivity (Pollitt, 1990: 7-8). Therefore the new 
managerialism, as Dollery (2009: 21) has argued, represented ‘an attempt to 
distil the principles of management that have evolved in the private sector and 
transplant these principles into a public sector context’. 
 
The new managerialism as an ideology originated in business administration the 
US (Saint-Martin, 2004: 1; McConnell, 2004: 74). Whilst bureaucratic reform was 
a characteristic Thatcherite development during the 1980s, new managerialism 
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was imported into the UK by the first Wilson Labour government in the late 
1960s. Heath subsequently brought in a ‘Businessman Team’ to run the 
government in a more strategic ‘businesslike’ manner with ‘less opportunism and 
short-termism and more rational decision-making’ (Pollitt, 2013: 903). Whilst 
Thatcher’s new ‘Efficiency Unit’ equally positioned private sector allies and 
consultants in a more prominent, advisory role in central government, it aimed 
to ‘roll back the state’, save money and reduce civil service numbers (Pollitt, 
2013: 906). 
 
The introduction of the new managerialism to central government was, as Saint-
Martin (2004: 1) has stated, ‘not simply a matter of minor transformation of 
management style’ but a ‘paradigm shift’. This had profound implications for 
local and regional government during the 1970s and 1980s.  
 
The introduction of the new managerialism into a Scottish local government 
context will be discussed in Chapter 5, in relation to its integration into the new 
GDC during the late 1970s and early-to-mid 1980s. The extent to which the 
emerging cultural policies in both GDC and SRC were influenced by the new 
managerialism during the 1970s and 1980s will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 7. 
 
2.7.2  Cultural policy in the UK, 1940 to 1989 
 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the UK was a state without an explicit cultural 
policy. Unlike some other European states, such as France, the UK did not take a 
centralised approach to the administration and governance of ‘culture’. 
Conversely, any formal attempt to define the state’s culture was resisted and 
areas which might be considered to constitute culture were scattered between a 
variety of different government departments. For example, the arts, museums 
and libraries fell within the remit of the Office of Arts and Libraries (OAL), a 
small office within the Department for Education and Science; historic sites and 
natural heritage, the built environment and local government were the 
responsibility of the Department for the Environment; the Foreign Office was 
concerned with the cultural diplomacy work of the British Council; and the 
Scottish and Welsh Offices concerned with issues affecting their respective 
nations – the one department with a broad overview being the Treasury. This 
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was a period before the establishment of the Department of National Heritage, 
which took place during the John Major era, and which preceded the 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport of the New Labour era.   
 
During this period, decision-making on a variety of cultural areas was devolved 
to a collection of non-departmental public bodies at ‘arms-length’ from 
government, such as: the Arts Council of Great Britain (ACGB) and its associated 
body the Scottish Arts Council (SAC); the Crafts Council, established as the 
Crafts Advisory Council in 1971; the British Film Institute (BFI) and the 
associated Scottish Film Council. The BBC, funded by the licence fee, fell within 
the Home Office during the 1980s. In addition, England and Wales had a network 
of Regional Arts Associations, distinct from both central government and the Arts 
Council, heavily supported by local government. This system was described in a 
1984 Policy Studies Institute report by John Myerscough (1984: 68) as 
‘fragmented’, with a ‘lack of any firm central coordination’. 
 
However, that culture had any position at all in central government was a 
relatively recent development, the reluctance of the state to intervene in 
cultural matters historically entrenched.15 If the post-war period saw the arts, 
museums and libraries move into the political firmament, 1965 brought political 
changes in which they were given a voice in government and began to emerge as 
a policy arena (Gray, 2000: 47-51). That year, Jennie Lee was appointed as the 
first Minister for the Arts and the White Paper, A Policy for the Arts – the first of 
its kind in the UK – was published. Over the course of the late 1960s and into the 
early 1970s, both central and local government spent increasing sums of money 
on the arts and culture, (Gray, 2000: 50-51) affording them an increasingly 
prominent, if still peripheral, position.  
 
Gray (2000: 51) has described the period between 1972 and 1979 as an 
‘interregnum for British public administration’, with the collapse of the post-war 
                                               
15 In his analysis of state management of the arts during the latter half of the twentieth century, 
Gray (2000) commented on the minimal state involvement in the arts prior to 1940 and the 
development of state patronage brought about by the post-war welfare state settlement. The 
Council for the Encouragement of Music and the Arts (CEMA) was created in 1940 ‘to defend 
British culture and the arts against the threat of fascism through financial support for music, 
opera, ballet and drama, and for the purchase of works of art’, whilst ACGB was established in 
1946 as a last act of the wartime coalition government to continue CEMA’s work (2000: 39 and 
41).  
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consensus. Whilst the first Thatcher government from 1979 marked a change of 
direction for the arts and culture, as for public policy more broadly, there was 
also some continuity. The period 1970 to 1989 was one in which successive Arts 
Minsters attempted to increase private support for the arts and culture. While 
the 1980s saw the ‘rebalancing’ of public and private funding for the arts and 
culture, with the initiatives to encourage philanthropy, this built upon 
developments in the previous decade.16 This increasing emphasis on philanthropy 
over the course of the 1970s and 1980s, however, had by no means a rebalancing 
effect on the persistent inequity in public funding between London and the 
regions.17  
 
The period 1970 to 1989 saw the development of the role of local government in 
the arts and culture in the UK. During this period, as today, local authorities in 
the UK were locally-accountable organisations with responsibility for a wide 
range of services. This is described by Gray as resulting in a: 
 
policy mosaic, where a wide range of linkages between discrete policy 
areas serve to establish both intended and unintended consequences for 
the totality that create distinctly different patterns of service provision 
between areas with each local authority forming a distinct political system 
within the overall structure of British politics and administration.  
(Gray, 2000: 159)  
  
Not only did there lie within this ‘policy mosaic’ a tension between the priorities 
of locally-elected representatives and those of central government, but also 
between statutory and non-statutory services. That the arts and culture were a 
non-statutory aspect of local government activity meant that the approaches 
taken by local authorities towards supporting the arts and culture – and their 
                                               
16 The Association of Business Sponsorship of the Arts (ABSA), far from being a Thatcherite 
development, was founded in 1976 during Hugh Jenkins’ stint as Minister for the Arts. Lord 
Redcliffe-Maud, in his report, Support for the Arts in England and Wales, for the Calouste 
Gulbenkian Foundation, went as far as to promote private patronage of the arts as moral 
necessity, arguing that it offered a ‘powerful safeguard’ against a potential ‘state monopoly’ of 
arts patronage, which, should it arise, would ‘mean the loss of individual freedom, both for the 
artist and for us as audiences’ (Redcliffe-Maud, 1976: 26).  
17 This funding imbalance was noted in UNESCO reports on Cultural Policy in Great Britain/the 
United Kingdom in 1970 and 1982, as well as the Arts Council’s 1984 report, The Glory of the 
Garden: the development of the arts in England. In this pre-devolutionary era – as will be 
discussed in section 2.8 – Scotland was regarded in policy terms as both a nation and a region of 
Britain, as London was regarded as both a region and a city. 
  46 
 
reasons for supporting the arts and culture in the first place – varied 
considerably.   
 
The general position of the arts and culture in local government at the end of 
the 1970s has been described by Gray (2000: 162) as ‘weak’, being perceived as 
a ‘minor service area’, something which was exacerbated by central government 
cuts to local authority budgets during the economic crisis of that decade. 
Despite this, the arts and culture gained a new significance as a policy area 
within some local authorities – notably in major urban areas – during the 1980s. 
 
For some though not all local authorities, the arts and culture were included in 
tourism development activity. Murphy and Boyle (2006: 114) have noted the 
failure of Bristol and Liverpool city councils to support tourism development – to 
the extent that ‘Bristol council closed down the Bristol Marketing Bureau since it 
would not support tourism policy’ – in comparison with Glasgow, Bradford and 
Birmingham as cities where strong public support was generated.  
 
Other cities, such as London, developed a focus on the cultural industries, whilst 
cities such as Sheffield designated specific areas of the city as ‘cultural 
quarters’. Sheffield’s pioneering approach to cultural quarters during the early 
1980s was particularly significant in its challenging the role of local government. 
Moss has noted that:    
 
At the time it was a radical shift from traditional servicing roles of local 
government, based on a belief that social and economic change at a local 
level is a process that can be steered, rather than merely observed.  
(Moss, 2002: 212) 
 
This was an approach, Moss (2002: 212) has noted, ‘sufficiently unusual to earn 
Sheffield the epithet “the Socialist Republic of South Yorkshire”’.  
 
Glasgow was therefore one of a number of Labour-dominated cities facing severe 
problems of socio-economic decline to examine the arts and culture as an area 
for development rather than an area to be cut from local government 
expenditure.  
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In conclusion, this section has discussed the political and, specifically, cultural 
policy context surrounding Glasgow as a city in the UK between 1970 and 1989. 
It is a context which is predicated on a number of tensions between central and 
local government during a period of global political and economic change. At 
central government level, the UK was a state without a formal cultural policy, 
where the arts and culture occupied a marginalised position in government. At a 
local government level, approaches to the arts and culture varied between 
authorities, with some commonalities, as well as differences, between major 
urban centres.  
 
The political parties leading Glasgow and the UK rarely aligned between 1970 
and 1989. When the UK was led by Conservative governments, Glasgow was 
dominated by Labour administrations. In the short period in which Labour were 
in opposition in Glasgow District Council – between 1977 and 1979 – James 
Callaghan’s Labour government led the country. However, Glasgow was by no 
means alone as a Labour-led city undergoing deindustrialisation during the 
Thatcher era to invest in the arts and culture.  
 
2.8 Glasgow as a Scottish city    
 
This section will consider the most pertinent aspects of Glasgow’s context as a 
Scottish city during the 1970s and 1980s. It will begin by discussing concepts of 
Scotland’s status as a ‘stateless nation’, of Scotland as both a region of the UK 
and a nation in its own right, and of ‘Scotland’s culture’. It will then discuss the 
political context in Scotland during the 1970s and 1980s, with two specific foci: 
the decline of the Conservative party in Scotland despite the Tories being in 
government for three quarters of this period, and the rise and fall of the Scottish 
National Party (SNP). The 1979 referendum on Scottish devolution will also be 
discussed within this context. Finally, this section will discuss regional policy in 
Scotland, the SDA and SAC during these two decades.  
 
The concept of Scotland as a stateless nation has been debated during and since 
the period 1970 to 1989. David McCrone (2005: 65) has described Scotland as a 
nation with a ‘distinctive national identity’ yet a ‘constitutionally subordinate 
position within the UK’. Scotland’s position as both a nation and a region within 
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a considerably more populous state has been examined by commentators such as 
Murray Pittock (2013), who has discussed the tendency for Scotland to be 
described in UK-wide media as a region of the UK, rather than a distinct nation 
with a collection of regions of its own.18 
 
McCrone (2005: 65) has also argued that Scotland’s position within the UK has 
produced the contradictory assumptions that Scotland is both ‘culture-lite’ and 
‘culture-heavy’: culture-lite being ‘insufficiently different from the rest of the 
UK in terms of cultural markers such as language, religion etc to be “national”’; 
and culture-heavy meaning ‘its cultural iconography is so hegemonic and 
distorted that it generates deformed narratives and discourses’.  
 
Connected to the concept of Scotland as ‘culture-heavy’ is the concept of 
Scotland as an imaginative construct, something which owes much to Sir Walter 
Scott’s romanticised depictions of rural Scotland, which provided a foundation 
for the promotion of Scotland as a tourist destination during the 1970s and 
1980s.19 
 
However, an important argument is that, despite the apparent distinctiveness of 
Scotland as a nation, ‘in modern, pluralistic societies no single “national” 
culture is to be found’ (Meech and Kilborn, 1992: 247). Craig Richardson has 
argued that ‘Scotland’s culture’ is not homogenous, but fragmented and subject 
to distinct regional variations:  
 
Scotland’s internationally received cultural identity is better understood as 
a form of fragments or a palimpsest, a federation of geographic regions 
                                               
18 Pittock (2013: 14) has stated: ‘While events in England are still frequently located in a county, 
“Scotland” and “Wales” are usually used as terms equivalent to English counties: “in Yorkshire… 
in Scotland” is a not infrequent collocation. Seldom, indeed, are events identified as occurring in 
Ceredigion or Stirlingshire on networked news: subliminally, countries are identified with 
counties, or at best regions, of England’.  
19 Gold and Gold (1995) have examined Scotland both as a place and as an imaginative construct 
with particular reference to tourism. In their analysis of materials promoting Scotland as a 
tourist destination, Gold and Gold highlighted the significance of the role played by Sir Walter 
Scott in ‘the invention of modern Scotland’, whose poems and plays ‘created a largely imaginary 
world of chivalrous deeds and noble intent taking place against a backdrop of spectacular, but 
readily identifiable, highland and border settings’, and exerted an influence over audiences 
across western Europe and North America. Gold and Gold found that during the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, the ‘standard representation of Scotland and Scottish life remained centred 
around sentimental and romanticized notions of the Highlands’ (Gold and Gold, 1995: 195-196). 
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with varied landscapes, cultural and political priorities, and languages. 
(Richardson, 2011: 2) 
 
This is significant in positioning Glasgow during the 1970s and 1980s within the 
broader context of Scotland which, as a nation, was by no means homogenous in 
its cultural, social and political priorities. Yet despite the lack of cultural and 
political homogeneity in Scotland, as a nation, Scotland has been described as 
distinctive in its political divergence from the rest of the UK, as discussed above 
(McCrone, 1992: 198). That the political parties leading Glasgow – both at 
district and regional government levels – and the UK at central government level 
rarely aligned between 1970 and 1989 was discussed in section 2.7. A similar 
disconnect extended beyond Glasgow to Scotland during the same period. The 
Labour Party consistently won the most seats in Scotland as a whole in general 
elections throughout these two decades, despite the Conservatives being in 
government for three quarters of this period: something which came to be 
described as the democratic deficit.  
 
2.8.1 The decline of the Conservatives in Scotland, 1970 to 1989 
 
The 1980s in particular are considered to be a period in which support for the 
Conservatives collapsed in Scotland. However, the decline of the Tories as a 
political force in Scotland began in the preceding decades. Hutchison (2001: 98) 
has noted that the trend for electoral politics in Scotland to deviate from the UK 
as a whole began in 1959 and continued for the remainder of the twentieth 
century. Scottish support for the Conservatives peaked in 1955, when they won 
more than 50% of the vote.20 By the 1970 general election, which brought Ted 
Heath to power, the Conservatives won just 23 seats in Scotland to Labour’s 44. 
During the 1970s, the number of Scottish seats held by Labour remained in the 
forties while the Tories lost and regained seats with the rise and fall of the SNP. 
In the 1987 general election – which marked the start of Thatcher’s third term as 
Prime Minister – only ten of Scotland’s 72 constituencies were won by the 
Conservatives. 
 
                                               
20 Hutchison (2001: 71) noted this was ‘the only occasion this century that a party has gained an 
absolute majority of the Scottish popular vote’. 
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In some commentaries, the electoral decline of the Conservatives in Scotland is 
explained via the establishment of a dichotomy between Scotland and England, 
in which Scotland is presented as left-wing and England as right-wing. For 
example, Hutchison (2001: 140) has stated that during the 1980s, ‘the social and 
economic doctrines so ardently espoused in England ran into incomprehension 
and hostility in Scotland’, as if there was no resistance at all to the Thatcher 
governments’ social and economic policies in England. David Stewart (2009: 1) 
has summarised the narrative of the Thatcher years in ‘Scottish popular 
mythology’ as presenting ‘Thatcher as an undemocratic, English nationalist, 
antagonistic towards Scotland’s distinctive collectivist culture, who destroyed 
the nation’s industrial heritage’ and as a result, the mythology goes, ‘Scotland 
suffered economic and social hardship while England prospered’.21 Whilst during 
the 1980s, the Conservative Party thrived in some areas of England, in other 
areas, such as large sections of the Midlands and the North of England – and in 
England’s capital – it met with strong opposition. As discussed in section 2.7, 
Thatcherism was by no means a welcome development in many large centres of 
population in England, such as Liverpool (for whom ‘managed decline’ was 
considered as a central government policy option), Sheffield and London.  
 
In addition, far from being universally left-wing, Scotland was a nation with 
regional and sub-regional political variations. During the 1980s the Conservatives 
became increasingly unpopular in Glasgow, the direction of travel marked in the 
1979 general election when prominent Tory MP Teddy Taylor lost his Cathcart 
seat and became one of a number of MPs to head south to revive their careers in 
safer seats, the Scottish Tories being ‘stripped of their high-flyers’ as a result 
(Hutchison, 2001: 141). However, Tory strongholds remained in the Scottish 
Borders, and in Central and North East Scotland. A direct outcome of the decline 
of the Conservatives in Glasgow was the Scottish Office being populated during 
the 1980s by ministers representing Scottish constituencies outwith the city.22 
This shifting political landscape left Glasgow – as other comparable cities in the 
UK – with a diminishing voice in central government during the 1980s.  
                                               
21 Stewart (2009: 1) has challenged the perception of Thatcher as anti-Scottish or an English 
nationalist and interpreted Thatcherism as ‘a post-imperial mission to restore British greatness 
by removing the preconditions of socialism throughout Britain’. 
22 The Scottish Office was a multi-functioning government department, which during the 1980s 
included departments for Development, Education, Home and Health, Industry, and Agriculture 
and Fisheries. 
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2.8.2 The rise and fall of the SNP 
 
The period 1970 to 1989 also saw the rise and fall of the SNP, within a context in 
which Scotland’s position in the UK was publicly debated. The SNP was formed in 
1934, when the moderate right-wing Scottish Party joined forces with the 
predominantly left-wing National Party of Scotland, taking the economic crisis of 
the Depression as evidence of the redundancy of the union in Scotland and 
promoting the establishment of a Scottish parliament as the solution (Devine, 
2012: 325). In the period between formation and the 1960s, the SNP were largely 
a weak and marginalised party, encompassing dissonant perspectives from left 
and right wings, ‘gradualists’ and ‘fundamentalists’, with a minority of cultural 
nationalists, the ‘Gaelic revolutionary wing’, sitting uneasily alongside 
moderates, a small group of whom, under John MacCormick in 1942, split from 
the SNP to pursue an agenda of Home Rule in a federal UK (Pittock, 2013: 72-
73). 
  
The electoral rise of the SNP is marked by two by-elections in which the party 
won safe Labour seats: Winnie Ewing’s victory in Hamilton in November 1967 and 
Margo Macdonald’s winning Govan in November 1973. Although Macdonald held 
her seat for only a few months before losing it to Labour, the February 1974 
general election saw the SNP gain seven new seats to offset this loss. The SNP’s 
electoral fortunes peaked in the October 1974 general election, where it gained 
eleven seats.  
 
One significant reason for the ascendance of the SNP during the early 1970s was 
the success of the party’s 1973 campaign, It’s Scotland’s Oil, following 
realisation of the scale of North Sea oil reserves (Pittock, 2013: 76). The SNP 
argued that oil revenues should be retained by Scotland, rather than the UK as a 
whole, as a solution to Scotland’s severe structural socio-economic problems, 
thus making Scotland a prosperous nation. The sophistication of this campaign 
was built upon in propaganda and electioneering techniques newly imported 
from the US in the lead up to the 1974 elections (Hutchison, 2001: 123). This 
period also saw the production of a number of publications and journals 
‘exploring progressive issues about Scotland’s politics, culture and place in the 
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world’, which contrasted with what Hassan (2009: 8-9) has termed the historical 
‘lack of intellectual activity and thinking within the SNP’. 
 
However, the SNP’s 1974 peak was followed by a period of electoral decline, the 
failure of the 1979 referendum to lead to Scottish devolution by no means a 
minor factor. During the years leading to 1979, the SNP suffered from a lack of 
cohesion as a party encompassing both left- and right-wing supporters and 
without long-term institutional support, unlike the unions’ support for Labour 
and business support for the Conservatives. While the SNP campaigned for a 
‘yes’ vote in the 1979 referendum on devolution, it was a party beset by 
disagreements on the subject of independence: as earlier in the century, not all 
SNP supporters agreed with Scottish independence and some, though not all, 
argued Home Rule should be pursued (Hutchison, 2001: 124).  
 
The referendum on Scottish devolution took place on 1 March 1979. While the 
parallel referendum on Welsh devolution resulted in a clear majority of 80% 
against, the Scottish results were less decisive. A narrow margin of 51.6% of 
voters were in favour of Scottish devolution. However, the 1978 Scotland Act 
stipulated that 40% of the electorate had to vote ‘yes’ for the Act to be 
implemented, a symptom of the issue of devolution having split the Labour 
Party. As only 32.5% of the electorate as a whole voted in favour of devolution, 
the 1978 Scotland Act was not implemented (Dewdney, 1997: 8-9).  
 
Later in March 1979, the SNP backed the Conservative’s no confidence motion, 
which removed the Callaghan government and led not only to the May 1979 
general election but also to the advent of Thatcherism. It also led to the repeal 
of the Scotland Act in June 1979, one Thatcher’s first actions as Prime Minister 
(Devine, 2012: 600). 
 
The 1979 general election reduced the SNP from eleven to two MPs. The 1980s 
saw a period of regrouping (as well as internal feuding), with the decision driven 
by the 79 Group for the SNP to shift towards socialist policies in an attempt to 
move into Labour’s central belt territory (Devine, 2012: 600; Hutchison, 2001: 
145). However, the SNP would retain no more than three seats in Westminster 
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until the general election of 1997, that brought an end to eighteen years of Tory 
governments, when the SNP doubled its MPs to six.  
 
2.8.3 Regional and national policy, the Scottish Development Agency and the 
Scottish Arts Council 
 
Tensions between Scotland’s status as both a distinct nation and a region of the 
UK were reflected during the period 1970 to 1989 in the use of agencies or 
quangos23 to administer elements of regional policy. The seventies and eighties 
saw the rise of regional economic development in Scotland with the 
establishment of the SDA. In the arts, while ACGB’s remit included Britain as a 
whole, Scotland was also subject to the additional administrative layer of the 
SAC.  
 
In the period between the 1930s and 1970s, economic development provided the 
main focus of regional policy concerning Scotland, as Scotland’s economic 
growth lagged behind that of the UK more broadly (Devine, 2012: 272, 557 and 
570). However, a driving factor of the development of regional policy was also to 
bolster the political position of either Labour or the Conservatives in Scotland 
and, consequently, nationally in the UK – either from the threat each posed to 
the other or posed to both by the SNP. The establishment of the SDA in 1975 had 
a similar dual purpose. With the aim to address the economic development of 
Scotland at a time of severe economic decline, the SDA was a Labour manifesto 
promise in the October 1974 general election. However, Keating (1988: 47) has 
argued that a driving factor was political pressure on the Labour Party from the 
advance of the SNP.  
 
The SDA absorbed a number of pre-existing bodies on its establishment, 
undergoing a series of phases of development before being merged with the 
Scottish Training Agency in 1991 to form Scottish Enterprise. While in name it 
was designated an agency for Scotland, it was effectively responsible for 
economic development outwith the area covered by the Highlands and Islands 
Development Board (HIDB), which had been established in 1965 aiming to 
reverse depopulation and economic decline (Lloyd, 1987: 105). During its sixteen 
                                               
23 Quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations. 
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year existence, the SDA led a number of sectoral and area-based projects, its 
largest area project being GEAR, the Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal project 
which ran from 1976 to 1987.  
 
While in practice the SDA was subject to occasional intervention by the Scottish 
Office (for example, the Secretary of State for Scotland directed the SDA to take 
control of the GEAR project (Boyle, 1989a: 71), which also involved GDC) as a 
quango the agency was intended to operate without direct government control 
(Keating and Midwinter, 1983: 29). By the late 1980s there had been a 
considerable shift in the SDA’s economic strategy in the years since 1975, which 
despite the SDA’s official detachment from central government revealed an 
alignment with its current urban policy (Lloyd, 1987: 107). 
 
The relationship of the SAC to both Scotland and central government provides a 
contrast to that of the SDA. The SAC was first established in 1942 as the Scottish 
Committee of CEMA, becoming in 1947 the Scottish Committee of ACGB, finally 
being renamed ‘Scottish Arts Council’ in 1967. The SAC remained a committee of 
ACGB until 1994, when ACGB was divided into the three individual Arts Councils 
for England, Scotland and Wales. By 1994, although still a sub-committee of 
ACGB, the SAC was effectively operating as an independent agency (Gray, 2000: 
65).  
 
During the 1940s, ACGB agreed firstly that the SAC should have territorial 
autonomy over the arts in Scotland, based on the argument that Scotland is a 
nation ‘with its own sense of national consciousness and cultural heritage’, and 
secondly, to a funding formula with a fixed share of ACGB’s grant-in-aid 
allocated to the SAC (Galloway and Jones, 2010: 29). Galloway and Jones (2010: 
27) have argued that ‘the specific national dimension of the arm’s length 
relationship allowed the organisation complete autonomy over arts policy in 
Scotland’, with the effect of the SAC being at ‘double arm’s length’ from 
government. Whilst the Scottish Education Department, housed within the 
Scottish Office, had an interest in the SAC’s work, the Scottish Office had no 
formal power over SAC’s activities and played a largely ‘benign role’ (2010: 32). 
However, the relationship between the SAC and ACGB was not without its 
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tensions, primarily over matters concerning funding and policy (Galloway and 
Jones, 2010: 32-33; Harvie, 2016: 190).  
 
Both the SDA and SAC were non-departmental public bodies at arms-length from 
government. Unlike the SAC, the SDA was not a committee of a broader Britain-
wide agency, but established solely for Scotland, a time before comparable 
agencies were established in England and Wales. The SAC, however, not only in 
its ‘double arm’s length’ position, but also in its focus on the arts – a 
considerably more marginal aspect of central government activity than economic 
development – in a state which had no official cultural policy, can be viewed as 
the agency with greater autonomy from government.  
 
2.9 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has discussed Glasgow’s contexts as a Labour-dominated city during 
the 1970s and 1980s; as an industrial city and a city that by 1970 faced socio-
economic decline; as a cultural city; and as a European, British and Scottish city.  
 
Glasgow was one of a number of Labour-led cities in the UK during the three 
Thatcher governments of the 1980s. However, despite the election of GDC’s first 
female leader, the city’s councillors largely remained a more traditional figure 
than their new urban left counterparts in other cities. 
 
By 1970 Glasgow faced a broad range of socio-economic problems, such as 
deindustrialisation, depopulation, deprivation and an unshakeable reputation for 
gang violence and sectarianism. It was no longer ‘Second City of the Empire’ or 
the ‘Workshop of the World’. The prosperity generated in the city at its 
Victorian peak had by no means been equitably shared. Some of the more 
entrenched problems the city faced in 1970, such as housing, stretched back to 
the Victorian era and earlier, exacerbated in the intervening decades by such 
factors as major global change and the consequences of central and local 
government policy decisions, such as the promotion of New Towns and 
comprehensive redevelopment. 
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Glasgow’s industrial history, however, provided a cultural legacy for the city. 
The bequests of industrialists such as Archibald McLellan and William Burrell 
provided the city with art collections which were of national and international 
significance. Glasgow Corporation, and its partnerships with the city’s business 
sector, occupied an important position in the development of Glasgow’s 
museums and galleries, halls and theatres, parks and libraries from the Victorian 
era, civic pride being a driving factor. However, Glasgow’s cultural 
infrastructure by 1970 was also constructed in no small part by the individual 
agency of key actors, many of whom worked unconnected to the Corporation or 
business community.  
 
Glasgow’s status as a European, British and Scottish city was also pertinent to 
the development of cultural policy in the city between 1970 and 1989. The UK 
being one of the twelve EC member states in 1985 when the ECOC programme 
was initiated, having joined only twelve years earlier, certainly in hindsight had 
major implications for the development of cultural policy in Glasgow. As a 
British city, Glasgow was situated in a country which, unlike comparable 
European countries such as France, was without a centrally-directed cultural 
policy. As a Scottish city, Glasgow was subject not to the ACGB but to the SAC, a 
quango at ‘double-arm’s length’ from government.  
 
Politically, the City of Glasgow occupied a rather dissonant position: the party 
leading Glasgow at local government level rarely aligned with that in central 
government during the 1970s and 1980s. For three quarters of this period, the 
Conservatives were in government at a time when the party was in decline, not 
only in Glasgow but in Scotland more broadly. This was also an era which saw 
the rise and fall of the SNP in Scotland, followed by the dramatic reshaping not 
only of Scotland but the UK more broadly during the Thatcher era. The outcome 
of the 1979 referendum on devolution meant that the 1980s was not to be the 
decade in which a Scottish parliament would be established.  
 
During the 1970s and 1980s, Glasgow was a city facing severe socio-economic 
problems, within a political context predicted on tensions between central and 
local government, and within a period of significant global change. 
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CHAPTER 3 CULTURE, REGENERATION AND THE POST-
INDUSTRIAL CITY  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In setting out Glasgow’s contexts as a Labour-led, industrial city; a city facing 
decline yet with an established cultural infrastructure; and a European, British 
and Scottish city, Chapter 2 established a broad historical framework for the 
thesis.  
 
This chapter will extend this conceptual framework to encompass the dominant 
theoretical and ideological developments and established narratives framing the 
emergence of cultural policy in Glasgow during the period 1970 to 1989.  
 
Firstly, this chapter will examine the advent of the ‘post-industrial city’; a 
discussion of the theoretical social forecasting of Touraine and Bell during the 
1970s will be followed by a consideration of media narratives of the post-
industrial city in Britain, with particular reference to Glasgow. It will then 
discuss the emergence of neoliberalism and its relationship to culture and the 
post-industrial city during the 1970s and 1980s. Following a discussion of the rise 
of public relations in central and local government during the period 1970 to 
1989, this chapter will then outline the development of the concept of the 
cultural industries in Britain by 1989. Finally, this chapter will discuss ‘culture-
led regeneration’ as an orthodoxy, examining the established narratives 
surrounding Glasgow, the ECOC and culture-led regeneration, and the idea of 
cities as models of culture-led regeneration, concluding with an overview of 
current debates on the topic. 
 
3.2  The post-industrial city  
 
This section will discuss Glasgow’s context as a post-industrial city. With 
particular reference to the work of Alain Touraine and Daniel Bell during the late 
1960s and early 1970s, this section will discuss concepts of the post-industrial 
society as a form of social forecasting. It will then consider media narratives of 
  58 
 
the post-industrial city regarding British provincial cities during the 1980s and 
1990s, with particular reference to Glasgow. 
  
‘The post-industrial city’ – like the overlapping concepts of ‘the post-Fordist 
city’ and ‘the post-modern city’ – is more difficult to define than the era or 
movement it nominally follows. This is because it is a term defined primarily by 
its difference to that which preceded it, rather than by that which it actually 
constitutes.  
 
Douglas V Shaw noted in 2001 that while ‘the post-industrial city is an emerging 
set of urban forms and functions that appears to be sufficiently different from 
the industrial city of the past two centuries to warrant a separate definition’, 
the use of the ‘post-industrial’ term,  
 
represents both a sense on the part of observers that we have crossed a 
significant development boundary, and that the precise nature of the 
terrain on the other side is still largely unknown. (Shaw, 2001: 284) 
 
The ‘post-industrial city’ is not coterminous with the city undergoing a process 
of ‘deindustrialisation’, as discussed in the context of Glasgow in Chapter 2. It is 
part of the ‘post-industrial society’ and therefore sociologically broader in 
scope: rather than describing a process already underway or in the past, it looks 
predominantly to the future.  
 
An early proponent of the term post-industrial society was French sociologist 
Alain Touraine, notably his 1969 work, La Société Post-industrielle.24 The 
concept was subsequently developed by American sociologist, Daniel Bell, in his 
1973 work, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social 
Forecasting.  
 
Bell (1973: 9) described his idea of the post-industrial society, the premise of his 
book, as ‘a social forecast about a change in the social framework of Western 
society’, social frameworks being ‘not “reflections” of social reality but 
conceptual schemata’. Arguing that ‘analytically, society can be divided into 
three parts: the social structure, the polity and the culture’ (1973: 12), Bell 
                                               
24 This work was translated into English in 1971. 
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stated his concept of the post-industrial society ‘deals primarily with changes in 
the social structure, the way in which the economy is being transformed and the 
occupational system reworked, and with the new relations between theory and 
empiricism, particularly science and technology’ (Bell, 1973: 13, original 
emphasis). 
 
In contrast, in Touraine’s analysis (1971), the social and cultural were not 
separated but enmeshed and framed in Marxist terms of alienation, class 
struggle, conflict, power and social crisis. Written in the wake of the 1968 May 
Movement, with a particular focus on France and its youth, and declaring that ‘a 
new kind of society is being born’ (Touraine, 1971: 27), Touraine’s work veered 
between the present and the future. Indeed, Kivisto (1980: 31) has noted that in 
Touraine’s work ‘the boundaries between present and future are not always 
clear’. 
 
While Touraine’s work was nominally titled The Post-Industrial Society, the 
terms ‘technocratic society’ – in which Touraine identified a ‘new ruling class’ of 
‘technocrats’ as the dominant power (1971: 47-49) – and ‘programmed society’ – 
according to ‘the nature of their production methods and economic 
organization’ (1971: 3) – were used more frequently by the author to describe 
the new type of society under discussion.  
 
Bell (1973: 9) identified the move from industrial to post-industrial society as 
being as significant as previous ‘major changes in social frameworks’, such as 
‘the change from a rural to an urban society, from an agrarian to an industrial 
economy’, highlighting that ‘because such frameworks are structural, invariably 
they are crescive and difficult to reverse’. 
 
Recognising that the ‘the concept of the post-industrial society is a large 
generalization’, Bell divided it into five components:  
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1. Economic sector: the change from a goods-producing to a service 
economy; 
2. Occupational distribution: the pre-eminence of the professional and 
technical class; 
3. Axial principle: the centrality of theoretical knowledge as the source of 
innovation and of policy formulation for the society;  
4. Future orientation: the control of technology and technological 
assessment; 
5. Decision-making: the creation of a new ‘intellectual technology.’  
(Bell, 1973: 14)  
 
Here, Bell engaged in theoretical forecasting (which, he argued, differed from 
the prediction of events) (Bell, 1973: 3), in which he described the future 
trajectory of Western society from the industrial society – defined as ‘the co-
ordination of machines and men for the production of goods’ – to the post-
industrial society, which would be ‘organized around knowledge, for the purpose 
of social control and the directing of innovation and change; and this in turn 
given rise to new social relationships and new structures which have to be 
managed politically’ (Bell, 1973: 20). 
 
While Touraine was the first to formally identify the post-industrial city, it can 
be argued that Bell’s concept of post-industrial society was of greater influence 
in the US and UK in the following decades.  
 
As a form of social forecasting, such attempts to define the post-industrial 
society or city have not passed without criticism. Kristoffer Chelsom Vogt (2016: 
367) commented in 2016 that whilst theories of post-industrial society have been 
met with ‘sustained scholarly criticism’ since their initial formulations ‘for 
presenting a seriously misleading understanding of social change’, they ‘continue 
to be of influence’. 
 
One particular arena of influence pertinent to the topic of this thesis is the UK 
national media in which narratives of the post-industrial city have been 
constructed and perpetuated. Glasgow’s status as a post-industrial city, its 
deindustrialisation and so-called ‘urban renaissance’, has generated a great deal 
of national media coverage in the decades since the 1980s, notably in relation to 
ECOC 1990 (Reason and Garcia, 2007). Tim Hall (2008: 152) has noted a shift in 
media narratives of British provincial post-industrial cities, from such cities 
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being ‘defined through discourses of decline, redundancy and militancy’ during 
the early 1980s, to reports that they ‘were changing in ways that appeared to 
challenge their prescribed identities’ during the late 1980s, to a ‘more critical 
take on urban regeneration’ during the mid-1990s.  
 
Hall has emphasised the binary nature of media narratives of the British 
provincial post-industrial city, in which Glasgow was no exception. Following a 
‘basic motif of conflict’, a dual city narrative has developed which reduces the 
complex geographies of the post-industrial city to ‘an assumption about the city 
as being sharply divided’. Where resident populations feature in such journalism, 
it is to reinforce these binary narratives:  
 
They are present in the articles in order to highlight problems with, or the 
failures of, urban regeneration, to act as signifiers of that failure, and for 
no other purpose. Consequently they are only represented as poor, 
dependent, excluded or victims. Such constructions provide a striking 
opposition to the ‘glamorous’ new developments. Here the populations of 
the inner city are homogenised, presented only as exemplars of exclusion. 
(Hall, 2008: 152-154)   
 
In Glasgow’s case, this description touches upon two concepts that will be 
discussed elsewhere in this chapter: firstly, the ‘dual city’ concept, which will 
be discussed in relation to neoliberalism in section 3.3; and secondly, in relation 
to the aforementioned ‘glamorous new developments’, the concept of ‘culture-
led regeneration’, which will be discussed in section 3.6.  
 
To conclude, in academic terms the ‘post-industrial’ label is problematic. 
Although Daniel Bell described the concept of the post-industrial society with 
distinct clarity, as a venture in social forecasting this was describing a future 
which was yet to take place. In the intervening years since Touraine and Bell’s 
initial works, attempts to define both the post-industrial society and post-
industrial city have been met with ‘sustained scholarly criticism’. However, 
distinct narratives of the post-industrial city have been constructed and 
perpetuated in the UK’s national media in relation to British provincial cities, 
with Glasgow, not least in relation to ECOC 1990, being a prominent example. 
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3.3 Neoliberalism, culture and the post-industrial city 
 
This section will provide a brief overview of neoliberalism and its relationship to 
culture and the post-industrial city during the 1970s and 1980s, as significant 
aspects of the broader political, historical and socio-economic context 
surrounding the emergence of cultural policy in Glasgow during these two 
decades.  
 
Following a discussion of definitions and perspectives of neoliberalism, this 
section will examine the rise of city marketing during the 1980s. Finally, this 
section will discuss the ‘dual city’ concept and debates surrounding neoliberal 
ideology and ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ with particular reference to 
Glasgow during the 1980s and into the 1990s. 
 
3.3.1 Defining neoliberalism  
 
Although some commentators have identified neoliberalism as having emerged in 
the late 1970s and 1980s – Harvey (2005: 1) pinpointing its origins to the period 
1978 to 198025 – what neoliberalism constitutes continues to be contested well 
into the twenty-first century. This is due in no small part to its considerable 
overlap with a number of other related concepts, such as Thatcherism, market 
liberalism and economic rationalism (Berry, 2014: 2). In addition, while 
commentators such as Harvey consider neoliberalism to be a political economy 
or ideology, others consider it a process (Brenner and Theodore, 2005: 102; 
Miles, 2012: 217).26 Significantly, neoliberalism has been characterised as being 
articulated through ‘contextually specific strategies’. Brenner and Theodore 
have argued:  
 
                                               
25 Harvey (2005: 1) stated: ‘future historians may well look upon the years 1978-80 as a 
revolutionary turning-point in the world’s social and economic history’ citing as epicentres of 
‘revolutionary impulses’ the four key events of Deng Xiaoping making, in 1978 the first steps 
towards liberalisation of communist-ruled China; Paul Volcker taking command of the US Federal 
Reserve in July 1979 and ‘within a few months dramatically changed monetary policy’; the 1979 
election of Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister; and the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan as 
President. 
26 Brenner and Theodore (2005: 102) have argued: ‘Neoliberalism is not a fixed end-state or 
condition; rather, it represents a process of market-driven social and spatial transformation’. 
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Neoliberalism does not exist in a single, ‘pure’ form, but is always 
articulated through historically and geographically specific strategies of 
institutional transformation and ideological rearticulation.  
(Brenner and Theodore, 2005: 102, original emphasis)  
 
Despite these disparities, commentators such as Harvey (2005: 2), Brenner and 
Theodore (2002a: 350) and Berry (2014: 2) have all cited a belief in open, 
competitive and deregulated free markets as the foremost defining 
characteristic of neoliberalism.27 This is accompanied by a significant shift in the 
institutional role of the state, whereby the role of the public sector is 
comparatively reduced or weakened – Berry (2014: 2) goes as far as describing 
this as a ‘belief in the unnecessary and malign impact of government 
interventions in the economy’ – while the roles of the private sector and 
entrepreneurial individuals are bolstered by such measures as the privatisation 
of public services and spaces. 
 
Thirty to forty years after the emergence of neoliberalism in the western world 
and notably following the 2008 economic crisis, a dominant perspective in 
current academic literature on neoliberalism, particularly that emanating from a 
Marxist perspective, is of neoliberalism as a failed ideology, dangerously all-
pervasive and needing to be replaced by alternatives (Harvey, 2005; Apeldoorn 
and Overbeek, 2012; Berry, 2014). At city level, the ‘neoliberal city’ is now, 
according to Steven Miles (2012: 216), ‘increasingly defined by elites through 
and by consumption’ and hence ‘by disparities of wealth’ and related social 
divisions. 
 
However, neoliberalism itself emerged during the early 1980s as a means of 
addressing significant economic problems: a ‘strategic political response to the 
sustained global recession of the preceding decade’ (Brenner and Theodore, 
2002a: 350). In the UK, the neoliberal tendencies of privatisation and 
deregulation, competition, public-private partnership and the commodification 
of culture and cities were absorbed to varying degrees in central and/or local 
government policies and strategies over the course of the 1980s as solutions to 
                                               
27 Brenner and Theodore, for example, have stated: ‘The linchpin of neoliberal ideology is the 
belief that open, competitive, and unregulated markets, liberated from all forms of state 
interference, represent the optimal mechanism for economic development’ (2002a: 350). 
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the socio-economic problems arising as industrial cities became post-industrial 
cities.  
 
3.3.2 Commodification and the rise of city marketing 
 
A significant aspect of the relationship between neoliberalism, culture and the 
post-industrial city is the neoliberal tendency of commodification: the idea that 
anything, even entire cities and their ‘culture’, can become a commodity to be 
marketed, sold and consumed. The rise of city marketing – marketing entire 
cities, rather than their constituent parts, as ‘products’ – during the 1980s is an 
example of neoliberalism in action. Mark Goodwin (1993: 145) has argued that 
‘the selling of cities is as old as commodification itself’; far from beginning 
during the 1980s its origins were some centuries earlier. However, several 
factors combined during the 1980s to make city marketing a characteristically 
neoliberal development.   
 
During the 1980s and into the 1990s, city marketing in the US and UK became 
both professionalised and competitive, with ‘place marketing’ becoming an 
industry in its own right (Holcomb, 1993: 133). Sadler (1993: 175) has noted 
that, at a time of intensified global restructuring, place-marketing grew 
increasingly significant within what became a competitive and burgeoning 
‘place-market’, in which cities began to compete with each other for investment 
and jobs. The rise of place-marketing during the 1980s and 1990s is thus 
inherently connected to repositioning the city and restructuring its economy at a 
time of global change.  
 
Holcomb has defined the aim of place marketing during this period thus:  
 
The primary goal of the place marketer is to construct a new image of the 
place to replace either vague or negative images previously held by current 
or potential residents, investors and visitors. (Holcomb, 1993: 133) 
 
However, this goal proved inherently problematic in marketing the post-
industrial city. As Paddison has stated,  
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cities are unlike the products which advertising and marketing seek to 
promote within the commercial market-place, precisely because they are 
not new: recasting a post-industrial image for a city such as Glasgow needs 
to come to terms with its previous existence as an industrial city.  
(Paddison, 1993: 348) 
 
This highlights the potential social divisiveness inherent in marketing the post-
industrial city during this era.  
 
3.3.3 The dual city, neoliberal ideology and ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ 
in Glasgow 
 
The ‘dual city’ concept became popular in academic circles towards the end of 
the 1980s and into the 1990s as a means of describing emerging socio-spatial 
divisions in cities in the western world, initially in North America (Keating, 1989; 
Marcuse, 1989; Pacione, 1990; Van Kempen, 1994).  
 
The dual city was characterised by a polarisation between the rich and the poor, 
with inhabitants increasingly socially segregated and spatially disconnected 
along these lines. It was applied in particular to the post-industrial city as it 
underwent a process of economic restructuring (Van Kempen, 1994: 997-998).  
 
Michael Keating (1989) was one of the first academic commentators to identify 
Glasgow as a dual city by the late 1980s. Examining the publicity surrounding the 
‘transformation’ of Glasgow during the 1980s, which portrayed its economy as 
‘restructuring, undergoing a successful transition to the post-industrial era with 
a healthy service-based economy to match an improved environment’, Keating 
concluded that such interpretations were ‘selective and misleading’: on the 
contrary, Glasgow’s economy was stagnating (1989: 515). Keating identified that 
a conflict between growth and distribution was emerging in urban policy in 
Glasgow: the ‘remarkable improvement in conditions in central Glasgow’ 
contrasted with the ‘highly damaging’ spatial impact of government policies in 
the peripheral estates, with ‘no linking mechanism, beyond a vague filtration 
theory,’ to redistribute the state-subsidised benefits of the former to the latter 
(1989: 515 and 531). Keating observed:  
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Glasgow emerges as a dual city, with subsidization of downtown business 
and amenities but widespread deprivation, especially on the periphery. 
(Keating, 1989: 513) 
 
As discussed in section 3.2 in the context of the post-industrial city, ideas of 
Glasgow as a dual city also developed in media narratives during the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, with considerable overlap between the two concepts. Mooney 
and Danson (1997) found accounts of Glasgow as a polarised dual city to be 
widespread in local and national newspapers and television by the late 1980s. 
This study found Glasgow’s peripheral estates to be widely portrayed as 
‘uniformly depressed and welfare-dependent’, with media accounts dominated 
by ‘ideas of dependency, exclusion, marginalisation, hopelessness and despair’ 
(Mooney and Danson, 1997: 81). These ideas were reinforced in the early 1990s 
by media publicity of a Glasgow gangland murder trial, and provided a stark 
contrast to the ‘new Glasgow’ represented by Merchant City, a recently-
developed renewal area in the city centre (Mooney and Danson, 1997: 77). 
 
Such accounts reveal the dual city concept to be less than nuanced. Common 
criticisms of the dual city concept to emerge during this period were that, like 
the post-industrial city concept, it was vague, ambiguous and lacked clear 
definition; that it assumed a deep social divide between ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’, 
which ignored the vast majority of the population in the middle; and that it 
focused on results but not causes (Marcuse, 1989: 698; Van Kempen, 1994: 997 
and 1011). 
 
However, rather than being the sole preserve of Glasgow or the post-industrial 
city in the UK, the dual city concept was a global phenomenon. Marcuse 
observed in 1989:  
 
The one advantage of the dual city metaphor is that it points to a real 
phenomenon. Polarization is indeed increasing in almost all western private 
market societies, in most of the third world, and perhaps in some socialist 
societies as well. (Marcuse, 1989: 698) 
 
By the early 2000s, the dual city concept became connected by commentators 
such as Brenner and Theodore (2002a, 2005) – and subsequently in the case of 
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Glasgow, Boyle, McWilliams and Rice (2008) – to ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ 
in academic debates on neoliberalism and the city. 
 
Brenner and Theodore highlighted the ‘blatant disjuncture’ between 
neoliberalism as an ideology and ‘actually existing neoliberalism’:  
 
whereas neoliberal ideology implies that self-regulating markets will 
generate an optimal allocation of investments and resources, neoliberal 
political practice has generated pervasive market failures, new forms of 
social polarization, and a dramatic intensification of uneven development 
at all spatial scales. (Brenner and Theodore, 2002a: 352) 
 
In examining neoliberalism as a process rather than ideology, they argued that a 
‘marked urbanization’ of neoliberalism had occurred in the 1980s and 1990s, 
with cities acting as laboratories for such neoliberal policy experiments as:  
 
Place-marketing, enterprise and empowerment zones, local tax 
abatements, urban development corporations, public-private partnerships, 
and new forms of local boosterism to workfare policies, property-
redevelopment schemes, business-incubator projects, new strategies of 
social control, policing, and surveillance….  
(Brenner and Theodore, 2002a: 368)  
 
In their examination of ‘the spatialities of actually existing neoliberalism in 
Glasgow’ since 1977, Boyle, McWilliams and Rice argued in 2008 that Glasgow 
was ‘an early pioneer of proto-neoliberalism in the British context’ (2008: 314). 
However, they noted that during the 1980s,  
 
Glasgow City Council had more of an orientation towards neoliberalism 
than a coherent neoliberal agenda as such. Exposed to Thatcher’s 
implementation of full-fledged roll-back neoliberal reform at the national 
level, and constrained by the rules of ultra vires, the local council had only 
limited options available to it to counter deindustrialization.  
(Boyle, McWilliams and Rice, 2008: 316) 
 
As will be discussed in later chapters, whilst Glasgow arguably became one of 
the first cities in the UK during the 1980s to experiment with what have since 
been termed ‘neoliberal doctrines’, GDC proceeding without a formal 
commitment to neoliberal ideology, its approach both restricted and enabled by 
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a broader context in which ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ was becoming 
embedded within increasingly spatially-polarised cities, nationally and globally. 
 
In conclusion, this section has discussed definitions and perspectives of 
neoliberalism as an emerging concept during the late 1970s and 1980s. It has 
also discussed the rise of city marketing – and the problems of marketing the 
post-industrial city – and the dual city concept within this context. It has shown 
that by the end of the 1980s, within a broader context of increasing polarisation 
in the western world, Glasgow was regarded by commentators such as Keating as 
a dual city, and that by the early 2000s, Glasgow during the 1980s was viewed 
retrospectively by commentators such as Boyle, McWilliams and Rice as a site of 
‘actually existing neoliberalism’. 
 
3.4 The rise of public relations  
 
This section will discuss the rise of public relations (PR) in central and local 
government during the period 1970 to 1989. Following a brief outline of critical 
debates on the roles of PR in the mass media and government, this section will 
discuss the growth and professionalisation of PR in central and local government 
during this period, with specific reference to the use of PR specialists and to the 
reaction of the Thatcher governments to the use of PR techniques by Labour-led 
municipal authorities to launch attacks on government policies. 
 
Public relations has been defined by L’Etang as:  
 
the practice of presenting the public face of an organisation […] or 
individual, the articulation of its aims and objectives, and the official 
organisational view on issues of relevance to it. (L’Etang, 2009: 2)  
 
It entails, L’Etang has argued, ‘meaning management’ and relies on a symbiotic 
relationship with the media (2009: 3).  
 
The period 1970 to 1989 saw an expansion and increased professionalisation of 
PR as an industry in the UK, accompanied by a burgeoning of media outlets, 
notably in radio and television (Franklin, 1994: 5). It was a period in which the 
use of PR became increasingly prevalent in both central and local government. It 
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was also a period in which the relationship between government and the mass 
media and its hegemonic effects were subject to Marxist academic scrutiny on 
both sides of the Atlantic.   
 
During the 1970s, as Director of the recently-established Centre for Cultural 
Studies at the University of Birmingham, Stuart Hall led research in the new 
academic discipline of media studies in the direction of political 
communications. This was prompted by a perceived ‘crisis in the media’, which 
emerged from the late 1960s, and focused on the ideological role played by 
media in society, including questions of ‘credibility, access, bias and distortion 
in the way political and social events of a problematic nature were represented 
in the media’ and regarding the relationship between broadcasting, politics and 
the state (Hall, 1980: 119). 
 
In America by the late 1980s, Herman and Chomsky (1988) identified what they 
termed a ‘propaganda model’: a systematic and structural means by which a 
dominant elite, comprising both the government and private interests, 
manipulate the mass media to communicate their messages to the general 
populace, thereby perpetuating inequality, marginalising dissent and 
‘manufacturing consent’, not least in the electorate. Herman and Chomsky 
argued that the propaganda model operated despite a media that appeared not 
to be censored and that, conversely,  
 
actively compete, periodically attack and expose corporate and 
governmental malfeasance, and aggressively portray themselves as 
spokesmen for free speech and the general community interests.  
(Herman and Chomsky, 1988: 1)   
 
The attempts of governments to manage the media was not a new development 
in the 1970s, either in the US or UK. Commentators such as Davis (2003: 32) have 
remarked upon the well-established tendency for governments to use public 
relations as a means of managing the public during times of difficult social 
transition.  
 
However, the considerable expansion of PR activity in central and local 
government in the UK during late 1970s and 1980s – undoubtedly a period of 
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difficult social transition – culminated in a paradigmatic shift towards the end of 
this period. Corner and Schlesinger (1993: 339, original emphasis) commented in 
the early 1990s on the ‘rapidly changing character of public communication’, in 
which the scope of PR management in the ‘source-media-public relationship’ 
was particularly significant – notably the move from a ‘reactive’ to ‘an 
aggressively proactive’ model ‘in which the media are identified as providing key 
opportunities for publicity within a broader campaign of public persuasion’. In 
her 2007 study of the evolution of political campaign communications, Norris 
(2007) identified a shift from modern to postmodern campaigning having taken 
place in the late 1980s, in which government moved to ‘permanent campaign’ 
mode and professional communications consultants became co-equal actors with 
politicians.   
 
The Thatcher era – and the immediate period leading to it – was significant in 
this respect in the growing influence of PR specialists, both in election 
campaigns and the day to day business of government. The roles of three of 
these experts: Gordon Reece, advertising agency Saatchi and Saatchi, and 
Bernard Ingham, will now be discussed. 
 
From 1975 to 1979, ex-television producer, Gordon Reece, acted as an advisor to 
Margaret Thatcher on her image, with the goal of her becoming firstly Leader of 
the Conservatives, then Prime Minister. Reece’s influence extended to improving 
Thatcher’s performance on television and radio by such techniques as lowering 
the tone of her voice and changing her hairstyle to soften her image; drawing up 
an ‘enemies list’ of hostile interviewers to be avoided; and arranging for 
Thatcher to appear on such popular television and radio programmes as Aspel 
and The Jimmy Young Show, rather than established political programmes such 
as Today on Radio 4, in order to broaden her appeal to target voters (Cockerell, 
Hennessy and Walker, 1984: 191-193; Franklin, 1994: 6 and 148-150). In 1978, 
leadership of the Conservatives having been secured, Thatcher appointed Reece 
as the party’s Director of Communications. Reece in turn brought in Saatchi and 
Saatchi to run the party’s 1979 election campaign (Cockerell, Hennessy and 
Walker, 1984: 193). 
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The Tories’ 1979 election campaign marked a turning point in the use of political 
marketing in electioneering in the UK. Launched in 1978, months before a 
general election was called, Saatchi and Saatchi’s ‘Labour Isn’t Working’ 
posters, which showed a dole queue snaking into the distance, were a 
memorable example of the ‘attack campaign’ (Bruce, 1992: 100). The poster 
drew forceful complaints from the Labour Party that the queue had been posed 
by actors (and Conservative Party members) and was therefore fraudulent, 
which succeeded only in generating free publicity for the campaign and its 
underlying message (Scammel and Langer, 2006: 73).  
 
Bernard Ingham was appointed by Thatcher to the initially minor role of Press 
Secretary, which grew in prominence over the course of the 1980s, with Ingham 
becoming Head of the Central Office of Information in 1988. Though a civil 
servant and therefore, in theory, politically neutral, Ingham nonetheless 
presented the messages of Thatcher and Thatcherism through daily briefings to a 
‘relatively pliant Lobby drawn from a mostly one-party press’ (Morgan, 1991: 
257-258), navigating ‘problems of presentation’ that arose during this era, such 
as unemployment or the government’s privatisation policies (Cockerell, 
Hennessy and Walker, 1984: 71-74). The extent of Ingham’s influence over 
policy-making as well as policy presentation has been debated, some arguing 
that Ingham was ‘the sewer rather than the sewage’, others, such as Morgan 
(1991: 257), arguing that Ingham may have had ‘an extraordinary capacity to 
help mould policy as well as determine its presentation’. 
 
The growth of the PR function in central government over the course of the 
1980s was matched by that in local government. Franklin commented that by 
1994, following rapid expansion in the mid-1980s, 90 per cent of metropolitan 
authorities had established PR departments, typically staffed by ex-journalists 
with extensive knowledge of the local and national political and media scene 
(Franklin, 1994: 7).  
 
Glasgow Corporation was one of a small proportion of local authorities to have 
established a PR function some decades prior to this boom. At the start of the 
period 1970 to 1989, Harry Dutch led public relations activity in Glasgow 
Corporation, moving to a Head of Public Relations role at the new SRC; Harry 
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Diamond, an ex-journalist who acted as Harry Dutch’s assistant in the 
Corporation, became Head of Public Relations in the new GDC, building an 
expanding PR empire within the new authority over the course of the late 1970s 
and 1980s (Diamond, 1996: 66-67).  
 
Local government officials had been instrumental in the professionalisation of PR 
in the decades preceding the 1980s, for example, acting as the driving force in 
the establishment of the Institute of Public Relations in 1948 (L’Etang, 2009: 
62). The National Association for Local Government Officers argued in the mid-
1940s that a better appreciation of local government services would lead to 
greater involvement of local people in their community (Franklin, 1994: 113). PR 
therefore was connected by local authorities in the decades preceding the 1980s 
to ideas of enriching local democracy.  
 
However, during the 1980s, the use of PR by local authorities – particularly 
Labour-led metropolitan councils – attracted new central government scrutiny. 
The Widdicombe Committee was established in 1985 to inquire into ‘the conduct 
of local authority business’ following what were regarded by the government as 
increasing abuses of political power in Labour-controlled councils (Leach, 1989: 
101). The Widdicombe Committee’s focus on public relations activity was 
prompted by Ken Livingstone’s use of the Greater London Council’s PR 
department to launch attacks on the Conservative government’s policies – not 
least a campaign opposing the abolition of the GLC, which was successful in 
realigning public opinion in the GLC’s favour if not preventing abolition itself – in 
the years before the council’s eventual demise. The scope of the Widdicombe 
inquiry also extended to so-called ‘propaganda on the rates’: municipal 
newspapers containing content critical of central government policies, created 
by such Labour-led authorities as Merseyside County Council and distributed to 
local residents (Franklin, 1994: 118-119). 
 
In conclusion, the 1980s saw a rapid expansion and professionalisation of PR in 
central and local government. It was an era in which the potential power of PR 
activity to influence the general public – notably the electorate – was recognised 
by both the Thatcher governments and Labour-led municipal authorities, the 
former resorting to establishing an inquiry in part to attempt to curb the PR 
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activity of the latter and thus marginalise dissenting voices. It was also an era 
that saw an increasing reliance on specialist PR advisors to ‘sell politics like soap 
powder’, both in the form of external agencies such as Saatchi and Saatchi on 
election campaigns from 1978 onwards and communications staff such as Gordon 
Reece and Bernard Ingham, who managed the media in the day to day business 
of government in a context in which the line between policy presentation and 
policy-making became increasingly blurred.  
 
3.5  The cultural industries 
 
This section will discuss the concept of ‘the cultural industries’ during the 1970s 
and 1980s and its theoretical predecessor, ‘the culture industry’. As will be 
discussed in Chapter 7, the cultural industries as a framework for the production 
and consumption of culture gained traction within some areas of the UK over the 
course of the 1980s, notably in some post-industrial cities as a means of 
countering the economic decline brought by deindustrialisation. However, the 
cultural industries concept was also a developing phenomenon in the broader 
western world during this period. The idea of the cultural industries developed 
in the UK, as in some other western countries, in a context in which established 
distinctions between the value of ‘high’ and ‘popular’ culture were slowly 
shifting. It became inherently connected to social and economic change.  
 
During the 1980s – as now, in its current incarnation of ‘the creative industries’ – 
the cultural industries was a contested term (Hesmondhalgh, 2013: 22). As 
UNESCO noted in 1982, there was ‘still some doubt as to the type of activities it 
is supposed to cover’ (UNESCO, 1982: 21). However, despite this lack of clarity, 
the cultural industries concept was adopted in some quarters during this period 
with enthusiasm and optimism, notably for its economic development potential, 
whilst being met with concern in relation to its implications for the future of 
‘culture’ in others.   
 
The term ‘the culture industry’ originated in Adorno and Horkheimer’s 1944 
publication Dialectic of the Enlightenment (Mattelart and Piemme, 1982: 51-52; 
O’Connor, 2010: 11; Hesmondhalgh, 2013: 23). It was not framed in optimistic 
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terms as a welcome means of improving a city’s economy; for Adorno and 
Horkheimer, the culture industry was no less than a form of ‘mass deception’.   
 
In Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944), the culture industry was described as an 
all-encompassing system through which the entirety of an individual’s needs 
were both fabricated and met, and in which everyone was complicit as a 
consumer, despite being able to see through it. Film and radio, cartoons and 
music (with jazz a focus of particularly strong criticism), language, advertising 
and magazines were all brought under the ‘single false denominator’ of the 
totality of the culture industry, which in presenting the world through a filter, 
‘endlessly cheats consumers out of what it endlessly promises’ (Adorno and 
Horkheimer, 1944: 108 and 111). The culture industry was a system in which 
entertainment was ‘the prolongation of work under late capitalism’. 
Entertainment and amusement moved ‘strictly along the well-worn grooves of 
association’, and through signals mechanically prescribed the spectator’s 
reactions, requiring of the spectator ‘no thoughts of his own’. It was sought out 
by the off-duty worker as a means of temporarily escaping the mechanised 
labour process, ‘so that they can cope with it again’, but at the same time, they 
can experience ‘nothing but after-images of the work process itself’ (Adorno and 
Horkheimer, 1944: 109). 
 
Adorno and Horkheimer’s work on the culture industry was produced at what 
was a juncture of two significant historical events. Firstly, it was written in exile 
from Nazi Germany, the two members of the Frankfurt School having escaped to 
California. Secondly, it was written in the wake of ‘the collapse of the classical 
Marxist evolutionary schema for historical development,’ as JM Bernstein (1991: 
3) described it, which for Adorno, meant, ‘the Marxist belief that capitalist 
forces of production when unfettered from capitalist relations of production will 
generate a free society is illusory’.  
 
Peppered with references to Nazi Germany, Hitler and Goebbels, Adorno and 
Horkheimer’s work drew parallels between the oppressive regimes of the fascism 
they had only recently escaped and of the culture industry they identified as 
existing within liberal industrial societies, particularly America. The culture 
industry, however, presented a model with which consumers were willingly 
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coerced into conformity, a ‘freedom to be the same’ (Adorno and Horkheimer, 
1944: 136).  
 
Furthermore, Adorno and Horkheimer’s thesis developed during a time of 
technological change. It followed Walter Benjamin’s Marxist critique, The Work 
of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, which was similarly written in 
exile from Nazi Germany, and in which Benjamin discussed the concept of the 
‘aura’ of a unique work of art becoming lost through technical reproduction. 
Benjamin viewed mechanical reproduction as changing ‘the reaction of the 
masses toward art’; in such developments as film, ‘the unconventional is 
uncritically enjoyed, and the truly new is criticized with aversion’ (Benjamin, 
1968: 227).  
 
In Adorno and Horkheimer’s analysis, however, art at all its levels ‘from 
Hemingway to Emil Ludwig, from Mrs Miniver to the Lone Ranger, from Toscanini 
to Guy Lombardo’ was ‘infected with untruth’ through its being absorbed into 
the culture industry, not least through advertising in which ‘everything is 
directed at overpowering a consumer conceived as distracted or resistant’. The 
‘triumph of advertising’ at the heart of the culture industry, Adorno and 
Horkheimer argued, was ‘the compulsive imitation by consumers of cultural 
commodities which, at the same time, they recognise as false’ (Adorno and 
Horkheimer, 1944: 114, 133 and 136). 
 
Adorno and Horkheimer’s concept of the culture industry has been criticised for 
overstating its powers of manipulation and its homogeneity (Bernstein, 1991: 21 
and 26; O’Connor, 2010: 24-25). Hesmondhalgh (2013: 24) has described how 
during the 1970s, French sociologists such as Huet, Miège and Morin converted 
the culture industry term into ‘cultural industries’, as a means of showing its 
complexity, rather than presenting it as a ‘unified field’.  
 
The cultural industries also attracted the attention of policy makers during this 
period. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, UNESCO undertook research into The 
Place and Role of Cultural Industries in the Cultural Development of Societies 
(UNESCO, 1982). This was prompted by a perception that the cultural industries 
had become increasingly important, and that the new technological 
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developments and new sectors of activity to have emerged since the Second 
World War were ‘decisively setting the future of culture at stake throughout the 
world’ (UNESCO, 1982: 9). This research encompassed a diversity of views within 
UNESCO member states and experts on whether the cultural industries presented 
a threat or an opportunity for such concepts as ‘cultural development’ and 
‘cultural democracy’. Concern was voiced about the ‘marginalization of cultural 
messages that did not take the form of goods, primarily of value as marketable 
commodities, or that could not be used as a more or less sophisticated means of 
exerting pressure on public opinion’, (UNESCO, 1982: 10) and that cultural 
development could not be ‘reduced to “economic growth accompanied by social 
change”’ (UNESCO, 1982: 236). 
 
As will be discussed in Chapter 7, during the 1980s some British metropolitan 
authorities developed a specific policy focus on the cultural industries, the 
premise of which was indeed ‘economic growth accompanied by social change’. 
The most prominent example is the cultural industries strategies of the Greater 
London Council (GLC) and Greater London Enterprise Board (GLEB), which 
although influential in the UK, were not implemented due to the abolition of the 
GLC. The GLC’s approach involved shifting policy away from ideas of subsidising 
the artist or creator towards a new focus on the distribution of culture to the 
audience or consumers. It was also connected to the distinctly separate issue of 
regenerating the city economy (O’Connor, 2010: 27-28; Hesmondhalgh, 2013: 
167).   
 
The idea of the cultural industries became a vehicle for an emerging policy 
concern – within authorities such as the GLC, if not central government – which 
focused on commercial production in contemporary culture and dismantling the 
dichotomy between ‘high’ and ‘low’ or ‘popular’ culture. This was reflected in 
the 1986 publication, Saturday Night or Sunday Morning: From Arts to Industry – 
New Forms of Cultural Policy, produced by consultants Comedia, and written by 
Geoff Mulgan and Ken Warpole, both of whom worked in the Cultural Industries 
Unit of the GLEB, which began:  
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Who is doing most to shape British culture in the late 1980s? Next Shops, 
Virgin, W. H. Smith’s, News International, Benetton, Channel 4, Saatchi and 
Saatchi, the Notting Hill Carnival and Virago, or the Wigmore Hall, Arts 
Council, National Theatre, Tate Gallery and Royal Opera House? Most 
people know the answer, and live it every day in the clothes they wear, the 
newspapers they read, the music they listen to and the television they 
watch. (Mulgan and Warpole, 1986: 9) 
 
The late 1980s brought debates about the extent to which the cultural industries 
were different to any other form of industry (Hesmondhalgh, 2013: 9). Padioleau 
argued, in 1987, that the cultural industries, notably media and 
communications, were losing their peculiarity and undergoing a ‘normalization’ 
process in which, according to the management practice of ‘speculative 
financierism’, they became ‘not only firms just like any other but they have also 
lost any identity other than that of being a commodity traded in a particular 
market’ (Padioleau, 1987: 295). 
 
The culture industry/cultural industries concept was also adapted during the 
late 1980s to form the permutation of the ‘heritage industry’. In his 1987 book, 
The Heritage Industry, Robert Hewison discussed the relationship between 
heritage and the economy in less than optimistic terms, bemoaning the growth 
in museums in the UK during a period of deindustrialisation. Complaining that 
‘instead of manufacturing goods, we are manufacturing heritage’, Hewison 
defined the heritage industry as not only ‘an attempt to dispel this climate of 
decline by exploiting the economic potential of our culture’, but also as the 
growth of a ‘new cultural force’ which ‘is expected more and more to replace 
the real industry upon which the country’s economy depends’ (Hewison, 1987: 
9). 
 
In conclusion, during the 1970s and 1980s, the concept of the culture industry 
became detached from the overtly pessimistic moorings provided by the critical 
dialectics of Adorno and Horkheimer to become, in its plural form, a developing 
area of public policy, viewed by authorities such as the GLC not as an all-
pervasive structural problem but an opportunity. Although a contested term, 
lacking in a shared definition of what it did and did not encompass, the cultural 
industries became viewed during the 1980s as arguably no different to other 
forms of industry; culture became viewed by some as a commodity, no different 
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to other commodities being traded; distinctions between ‘high art’ and ‘popular 
culture’ began to change with the shift from high modernism to postmodernism. 
The GLC’s enthusiastic adoption of the cultural industries as part of a solution to 
London’s socio-economic problems contrasted not only with the downright 
pessimism of Hewison’s idea of the heritage industry, but also with the cautious 
approach of UNESCO, which was concerned with the international implications 
for the future of cultural development in an approach premised upon economic 
growth accompanied by social change.  
 
3.6 Culture-led regeneration  
 
This section will discuss, firstly, the rise of ‘culture-led regeneration’ as an 
orthodoxy in the years since 1990 and Glasgow’s position within these developing 
and established narratives. It will then consider specifically, with particular 
reference to Glasgow and Liverpool, the idea of cities as replicable models of 
culture-led regeneration. Finally, it will examine current academic debates 
related to the problems of measuring and evidencing culture-led regeneration. 
 
Whilst little research has been undertaken in the emergence of cultural policy in 
Glasgow in the years preceding 1990, a significant amount has been written 
about the relationship between Glasgow and culture-led regeneration in the 
years since ECOC 1990. A mythology has developed about Glasgow’s approach to 
the ECOC as being one of culture-led regeneration: a fully-formed model which 
had a socially and economically transformative effect on Glasgow and which can 
be transferred to and replicated by other cities.  
 
However, as subsequent chapters of this thesis will demonstrate, culture-led 
regeneration was not a term or concept adopted in Glasgow during the 1980s 
and Glasgow’s regeneration cannot be described as ‘culture-led’. The term 
culture-led regeneration gained common currency in the decades following 1990 
and has been applied retrospectively to describe Glasgow’s approach to ECOC 
1990. 
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3.6.1 The culture-led regeneration orthodoxy 
 
‘Culture-led regeneration’ is, as Miles and Paddison recognised in 2005, ‘part of 
the new orthodoxy by which cities seek to enhance their competitive position’ 
(2005: 833). Garcia (2007: 1) has argued that ‘the phrase “culture-led 
regeneration” has grown from an interesting alternative to urban development 
policy into a core strategy in an increasing number of cities and regions 
worldwide’. Vickery, however, has identified that culture-led regeneration is 
‘not a single coherent term, but has multiple meanings and applications’ 
(Vickery, 2007: 2).  
 
The scope of culture-led regeneration in existing literature is broad. It has been 
connected, flexibly, to a range of components: cultural quarters, cultural 
tourism and the cultural industries, which have their roots in the 1980s; the 
urban cultural economy and creative industries, which are largely post-1997 
conceptions.  
 
What is within and beyond the scope of the ‘culture’ of culture-led regeneration 
is no nearer a widely accepted resolution now than when Raymond Williams 
recognised in his 1976 Keywords that ‘culture’ was ‘the original difficult word’ 
(Williams, 1976: 14). This is further complicated by the idea that culture can 
‘lead’ urban regeneration having formed a central tenet in ‘creative city’ 
narratives to develop since the mid-1990s.28 Within such narratives, ‘culture-led 
regeneration’ is intrinsically connected to the equally problematic term, 
‘creativity’.  
 
Much of the research into the phenomenon of culture-led regeneration dates 
from the mid-2000s onwards. This reflects not only the growth in cultural policy 
research more broadly in the twenty-first century, but also that one of the more 
enthusiastic proponents of culture-led regeneration in the UK has been a prime 
                                               
28 As well as the 1995 Comedia/Demos publication, The Creative City by Landry and Bianchini, 
which will be discussed in this section, the work of Richard Florida, such as The Rise of the 
Creative Class, first published in 2002, is a prime example of a creative city narrative. Jim 
McGuigan argued in 2009 that: ‘The work of Richard Florida has proven extremely influential in 
cultural policy circles in recent years’ (McGuigan, 2009: 291). 
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object of cultural policy research: the Department for Culture, Media and Sport 
(DCMS) during the New Labour era.   
 
Vickery (2007) has argued that the concept of culture-led regeneration gained 
credibility in national policies and policy frameworks in the UK during the New 
Labour era, and in particular, the period 1999 to 2004. During this period, as 
part of its work ‘to increase awareness within other Government departments of 
the potential contribution of cultural activity to their regeneration programmes’ 
– undoubtedly in order to draw in increased resources for the new department’s 
work29 – the DCMS commissioned a review of evidence of ‘the contribution of 
culture to regeneration in the UK’, which defined culture-led regeneration as a 
model in which ‘cultural activity is seen as the catalyst and engine of 
regeneration’ (Vickery, 2007: 2 and 5). This is also a period which ended with 
the DCMS publication, Culture at the Heart of Regeneration (2004), an example 
of the department’s promotion of culture-led regeneration, despite, as Miles and 
Paddison (2005: 835) have stated, its acknowledgement of the ‘limited 
evidential basis’ for proving its benefits.  
 
This was also a period which was preceded by a growing instrumentalisation of 
culture in policy terms in the UK, as public expenditure on the arts and culture 
became increasingly justified on the basis of its anticipated ability to solve 
entrenched economic and social problems. 
 
Bianchini and Parkinson’s 1993 publication, Cultural policy and urban 
regeneration: The Western European experience, recognised the ‘growing 
importance of cultural policy as a strategy contributing to the regeneration of 
cities’, following a series of influential conferences on the topic in Glasgow and 
Liverpool, involving policy-makers from the UK and USA (Bianchini and 
Parkinson, 1993: foreword).  
 
Later in the 1990s, consultants and think tanks, such as Comedia and Demos, 
produced influential reports advocating the economic and social benefits of 
                                               
29 Eleanora Belfiore has demonstrated how the DCMS’s first Secretary of State, Chris Smith, 
became ‘the champion of the socio-economic impacts of the arts’, despite ‘paltry’ evidence to 
support his claims, and how Smith justified his approach thus: ‘If it helped to get more funds 
flowing into the arts, the argument was worth deploying’ (Belfiore, 2009: 348-349). 
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culture. The purpose of Landry (the Director of Comedia) and Bianchini’s 1995 
publication, The Creative City, published by Demos, was to set out ‘why 
[creativity] is important for economic success – and how creativity can be 
mobilised to help solve the myriad problems of the city’ (Landry and Bianchini, 
1995: 1). Comedia’s 1996 report, The Art of Regeneration: Urban Renewal 
Through Cultural Activity, by Landry, Greene, Matarasso and Bianchini provided 
case studies of ‘city examples’ and proposals for the development of ‘culture-
driven regeneration’. Matarasso’s 1997 report, Use or Ornament? The Social 
Impact of Participation in the Arts, published by Comedia, was written on the 
cusp of the New Labour era on the following premise: 
 
The election of a Government committed to tackling problems like youth 
unemployment, fear of crime and social exclusion is the right moment to 
start talking about what the arts can do for society, rather than what 
society can do for the arts. Unfettered by ideology, the new pragmatism 
can extend its principle of inclusiveness to the arts by embracing their 
creative approaches to problem-solving. Britain deserves better than the 
exhausted prejudices of post-war debates over state support for the arts. 
(Matarasso, 1997: foreword) 
 
These reports followed an earlier form of research-as-advocacy: the 1988 PSI 
report by John Myerscough et al., The Economic Importance of the Arts in 
Britain (1988a), and its case studies of Glasgow (1988b), Ipswich and Liverpool, 
which, as will be discussed in Chapter 7, was ground-breaking in UK cultural 
policy in its articulation of the economic value of the arts in economic terms, 
notably with regard to the city economy.   
 
In the years since 1990, the culture-led regeneration orthodoxy emerged within 
this broader rhetorical context, in which the economic and social value of the 
arts and culture superseded its cultural value.  
 
3.6.2 The established narratives: Glasgow, the European City of Culture and 
culture-led regeneration  
 
Contrasting narratives have become established, both in the media and in policy 
terms, which reflect Glasgow, ECOC 1990 and the city’s approach to culture-led 
regeneration, as exemplary and as divisive.  
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The first established narrative characterises Glasgow’s culture-led regeneration 
based approach to ECOC 1990 as an unmitigated triumph: pioneering, pivotal in 
the history of the ECOC and socially and economically transformative to the city. 
Within this narrative, Glasgow has been repositioned within a league of 
international ‘Cultural Capitals’, defined by Louise C. Johnson (2009: 6) as ‘a 
city which has recently and consciously made the arts (and often related 
Cultural Industries) central to its society, economy, urban form and place 
identity’. As will be discussed below, Glasgow is viewed as a ‘benchmark’, 
exemplifying what can be achieved through culture-led regeneration. In this 
narrative overall, culture-led regeneration in Glasgow is portrayed as a 
remarkable success story and, as will be discussed below, a model other cities 
want to replicate. This narrative is perpetuated in current policy terms (Crossick 
and Kaszynska, 2016: 75).  
 
In contrast to this dominant success story narrative is one of ECOC 1990 and 
culture-led regeneration in Glasgow as divisive, and socially and economically 
disastrous for some sections of the city. This has been particularly prevalent in 
some media narratives, which, as discussed in section 3.2 above, have reduced 
complex geographies to a binary ‘dual city’ narrative, in which culture-led 
regeneration and ECOC 1990 exacerbated the divide between rich and poor in 
the city. Reason and Garcia (2007: 322-323) have examined press coverage of 
ECOC 1990, finding it to be divided between positive coverage of Glasgow’s 
transformation from ‘No Mean City’ to ‘City of Culture’ and associated 
improvements to quality of life, and two strands of negative coverage firstly 
describing Glasgow as divided into two cities of haves and have nots, and 
secondly describing the city’s transformation as false, ‘undermining the “real” 
character and identity of Glasgow’. As will be discussed in Chapter 7, the latter 
narrative was promoted by Workers City, a group of writers and self-appointed 
representatives of the ‘real Glasgow’, who viewed ECOC 1990 as no less than a 
‘betrayal’ of the working class (McLay, 1988). This formed a backlash against the 
messages of transformation and renewal promoted by the city’s authorities.  
 
The ‘culture-led regeneration as divisive’ narrative has been reinforced more 
recently (and credibly) in the AHRC Cultural Value Project, which commented on 
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the potential for culture-led regeneration to lead to gentrification and thus 
increase inequality in the city.30  
 
The established narratives about ECOC 1990 and culture-led regeneration in 
Glasgow are polarised and somewhat contradictory, in portraying them 
simultaneously as transformative and divisive, having solved severe structural 
socio-economic problems as well as exacerbating them, an imposition as well as 
a replicable model.  
 
3.6.3 Cities as models of culture-led regeneration  
 
Firmly rooted within the established narratives of culture-led regeneration is the 
idea of the ‘Glasgow model’, in which the ability of culture to lead social and 
economic transformation can be transferred and replicated in other cities 
through such vehicles as the ECOC and the UK City of Culture initiative.  
 
Glasgow has been held as a model for Liverpool, the subsequent British city to 
host the ECOC event in 2008 – which in turn has been described as the ‘Liverpool 
model’. As Garcia (2017: 2) has noted, ‘the champions of the Liverpool 2008 bid 
mentioned Glasgow 1990 extensively as a key point of reference and a model to 
replicate’. In a comparison of Glasgow and Liverpool, Garcia stated that:  
 
These two cities are widely perceived to be paradigmatic not only of 
successful culture-led regeneration but also of the power of the ECOC title 
to transform city image. (Garcia, 2017: 1) 
 
As will be discussed in Chapter 7, the idea of cities as constituting transferable 
models of regeneration – and the position of the arts within this – is rooted in the 
1980s. Here, the direction of travel was from the US to the UK, with some 
American ‘rustbelt’ cities viewed as models of economic renewal at both central 
and local government level in the UK: for example, the latter Thatcher 
governments viewed the ‘Pittsburgh model’ as having potential for replication 
                                               
30 The AHRC Cultural Value Project research report, Creating Space: A re-evaluation of the role 
of culture in regeneration, by Kate Oakley (2016) questioned why city governments have not yet 
been ‘weaned off’ the idea of culture-led regeneration or the ‘creative city’ narratives by the 
global literature on gentrification and uneven developments.   
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within deindustrialised cities in the UK; Baltimore was viewed as a model for 
Glasgow’s regeneration.  
 
The idea of cities as models of culture-led regeneration is also connected, more 
recently, to broader debates about ‘urban policy mobilities’ to have emerged 
during the twenty-first century. A burgeoning area of academic research, urban 
policy mobilities is defined by Baker and Temenos (2015: 825) as exploring ‘the 
processes, practices and resources brought together to construct, mobilize and 
territorialize policy knowledge’.  
  
However, to return to Glasgow and Liverpool as models of culture-led 
regeneration: both have been described as inherently problematic. In his 2004 
critical reflections on Glasgow’s reign as ECOC 1990, Mooney recognised that 
‘“Doing a Glasgow” has now become a recurring theme in discussions of urban 
cultural policy and place marketing in many of Europe’s older industrial cities’, 
and argued that ‘the so-called “Glasgow Model” for urban regeneration is 
essentially sustaining a myth, as opposed to celebrating a reality’ (Mooney, 
2004: 327-328). Cox and O’Brien (2012) have highlighted the specificity of the 
context surrounding Liverpool’s perceived success, and questioned the 
transferability of Liverpool’s culture-led regeneration model from one city to 
another. 
 
3.6.4 Current debates surrounding culture-led regeneration: problems with 
measurement and evidence  
 
As outlined above, culture-led regeneration as a policy concept is inherently 
problematic. This is due, not least, to difficulties in measuring and evidencing 
culture-led regeneration.  
 
Miles and Paddison noted as early as 2005 that ‘the ability of [culture-led 
regeneration] policy to deliver beyond the rhetoric is already being questioned’ 
(2005: 834). Over a decade later, in the AHRC Cultural Value Project report, 
Evidence of Things that Appear Not? which reviewed the evidence and 
evaluation methods concerning the role of arts and culture in the regeneration 
of urban places and communities in the UK, Campbell et al. (2016) commented 
  85 
 
on the lack of progress made in these areas. Campbell et al. identified a short-
termist approach to gathering evidence, with a lack of longitudinal data due in 
no small part to a lack of requisite resources (2016: 46-47). They also identified 
problems with transparency of methods and propositions, in addition to a 
‘deficit in clarity’ around what the research is attempting to achieve, 
accompanied by an over-emphasis on economic impact, which the effect that 
‘social impacts are either taken for granted, or expected to naturally “trickle 
down”’ (Campbell et al., 2016: 48, 50-51). Furthermore, Campbell et al. argued 
that even when methods are clear, ‘measurement is not always feasible’ (2016: 
55). ‘Nevertheless’, the report concluded, ‘there are continued assertions that 
culture is playing a regenerative role, regardless of evidence, or in opposition to 
evidence, in the current decade’ (Campbell et al., 2016: 45). 
 
The difficulties of gathering robust evidence for culture-led regeneration have 
been further complicated by the rise of research as advocacy, an approach to 
research and policy-making which extends beyond cultural policy in other areas 
such as social policy. This can be summarised as organisations using research to 
draw attention to issues of specific interest to them, with the aim of increasing 
resources, particularly public funding, to address the issue. McLaughlin (2015: 
240) has summarised the problems of ‘advocacy research’ as the potential for 
organisations to inflate the extent of their particular issue and the effectiveness 
of their interventions, with the consequence that ‘instead of improving 
knowledge, they can distort our understanding of the real scale of social 
problems and adversely affect social policy, for example, by public funds and 
services being allocated disproportionately’. Thus research becomes a form of 
marketing.  
 
To conclude, the rise of culture-led regeneration as a policy concept has been 
proven to be based on less than robust evidence, but has gained traction in the 
UK, and elsewhere in the world, nonetheless.  
 
Ultimately, culture-led regeneration is a concept which has been promoted in 
the UK by influential consultants and policy-makers for pragmatic purposes. The 
particularly selective approach taken by Chris Smith during his tenure at the 
DCMS to the use of evidence to reinforce developing narratives around the 
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socially and economically transformative powers of culture, in order to advocate 
for increased resources from other departments is one example of this 
pragmatism in action.  
 
The culture-led regeneration orthodoxy developed post-1990, within this broader 
rhetorical context in which economic and social value superseded cultural value 
as a justification for public funding for the arts and culture.  
 
Glasgow and ECOC 1990 occupy a prominent position within the culture-led 
regeneration orthodoxy, not least as a replicable model. However, as will be 
discussed in subsequent chapters of this thesis, this idea was applied 
retrospectively and is ultimately flawed.  
 
3.7 Conclusion  
 
Building on Chapter 2, this chapter has discussed the dominant theoretical and 
ideological developments and established narratives framing the emergence of 
cultural policy in Glasgow during the period 1970 to 1989.  
 
The period 1970 to 1989 saw the emergence of the somewhat contested 
concepts of the post-industrial city and neoliberalism. It was a period in which 
many cities in the western world became increasingly polarised, Glasgow being 
no exception. By the end of the 1980s, Glasgow began to be viewed as a dual 
city, with a widening gulf between rich and poor. By the early 2000s, Glasgow 
during the 1980s became viewed retrospectively as a site of ‘actually existing 
neoliberalism’. 
 
This was also a period in which political marketing became increasingly 
sophisticated and prevalent within central and local government in the UK, as 
public relations became increasingly professionalised.  
 
During this period, the concept of the cultural industries shifted from its 
Frankfurt School origins as an all-pervasive structural problem to being 
enthusiastically perceived as a solution to socio-economic problems in London, 
whilst being treated with caution by UNESCO on the basis of the international 
  87 
 
implications for the future of cultural development in an approach premised 
upon economic growth accompanied by social change. Distinctions between the 
value of ‘high’ and ‘popular’ culture began to be reappraised, as modernism 
merged into postmodernism and the value of culture began to be articulated in 
economic terms. This was a period in which both cities and culture were 
marketed as commodities, and in which culture, some argued, became no 
different from other commodities being traded.  
 
The period 1970 to 1989 was an era before the term ‘culture-led regeneration’ 
was coined. However, Glasgow’s approach to ECOC 1990 currently occupies a 
prominent position within the culture-led regeneration orthodoxy, not least as a 
fully-formed model which had a socially and economically transformative effect 
on Glasgow and which can be transferred to and replicated by other cities. This 
narrative has developed over the past two decades in particular, within a 
broader rhetorical context in which the instrumental power of culture – its 
economic and social value – has superseded cultural value as a justification for 
public funding of the arts and culture in the UK. 
 
As will be discussed in subsequent chapters of this thesis, Glasgow’s approach to 
ECOC 1990 does not constitute a replicable model of culture-led regeneration 
but provides a different kind of example to other cities, one which resonates 
with developing narratives around the transformative powers of the arts and 
culture being based more on advocacy than incontrovertible evidence: an 
approach based on public relations and pragmatic improvisation.   
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CHAPTER 4 METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1  Introduction  
 
This chapter will discuss the research methodology, highlighting a theoretical 
framework that involves both cultural policy research and historiography, 
followed by the particular nature of pursuing this research via a Collaborative 
Doctoral Award that involved Glasgow Life and the University of Glasgow. It will 
then focus on the two main methodological strands of archival and documentary 
research and oral history interviews that the project used.   
 
This is a qualitative research project, which aims to gain a better understanding 
of the emergence of cultural policy in Glasgow in the decades leading up to 
1990. It is based on documentary research and on interviews with the key 
surviving decision makers. The research project is shaped by six research 
questions, examining what happened and why:  
 
1. What factors prompted the ‘cultural turn’ in Glasgow’s policy making?  
2. What factors facilitated the new policy drive?  
3. Who were the key actors involved?  
4. What were the obstacles encountered? 
5. To what extent can the period from 1979-89 be periodised in terms of 
critical events and how are we to understand the significance and 
influence of these events? 
6. What strategies were employed by Glasgow District Council in developing 
its bid to become the European City of Culture? How did it mobilise the 
requisite expertise? How did it assess the challenge represented by its 
rivals and counter that challenge? 
These research questions were prompted by a gap in existing research: a 
significant amount of research has been undertaken into the various impacts of 
the ECOC on Glasgow and other cities that have held the title, and on the 
subsequent direction of the programme itself, but there is a lack of research 
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into the emergence of cultural policy in Glasgow itself in the decades leading up 
to 1990.  
 
4.2  Cultural policy research: theoretical framework and guiding principles  
 
This section will set out the theoretical framework and guiding principles for the 
research methodology deployed to address the research questions. It will explain 
an approach based on an understanding of cultural policy as potentially implicit 
and explicit, relational and territorial, and as intersecting with a broad range of 
other policy areas, such as urban policy and economic policy.  
 
As well as being focused on cultural policy research, this research project also 
presents historiographical concerns. While the 1970s and 1980s can be described 
as a period of ‘contemporary history’, it is history nonetheless, and to be 
necessarily understood as a different era from the 2010s in which the research 
project has been undertaken. A theoretical framework related specifically to the 
methodology of oral history will be discussed in section 4.5 (below), whilst some 
of the broader guiding principles related to this as an historically-focused 
cultural policy research project will be addressed in this section.  
 
Cultural policy studies is a relatively new academic field, yet there already 
exists a variety of ideas of what constitutes cultural policy research. Clive Gray 
(2010) has argued that cultural policy is not actually a ‘distinct discipline’ but 
‘incorrigibly plural’. Gray has gone so far as to question whether the 
development of a specific ‘cultural policy’ discipline is necessary: 
 
The strengths of the current plurality of disciplines and methodologies that 
are employed in the analysis of cultural policy include the development of 
forms of analysis that build on the essentially contested nature of the core 
concept – ‘culture’ – that is involved, allowing the potential to capture at 
least the multiple forms and dynamics of policy that are contained within 
it, rather than closing analysis down into more restrictive boundaries. 
(Gray, 2010: 227) 
 
Other commentators have attempted to define approaches to cultural policy and 
cultural policy research, often framed around the ‘applied’ and the ‘critical’. An 
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example of a current applied approach is Mulcahy’s definition of cultural policy, 
which quotes Schuster:  
 
Cultural policy can be most usefully considered as the totality of a 
government’s activities ‘with respect to the arts (including the for-profit 
cultural industries), the humanities, and the heritage’. (Mulcahy, 2017: xiii)  
 
However, Scullion and Garcia (2005) and Bennett (2004) have recognised the 
limitations of the applied approach taken by Schuster. Scullion and Garcia have 
described Schuster’s approach as focused on ‘cultural policy as public policy and 
as a policy goal of government’ which ‘excludes the conceptual engagement 
with issues of governance and of identity’ (2005: 118). Bennett has compared 
Schuster’s approach to cultural policy research with the ‘critical’ approach of 
Jim McGuigan in Culture and the Public Sphere, in which McGuigan warns against 
‘reducing the meaning of cultural policy […] “to an ostensibly apolitical set of 
practical operations that are merely administered and policed by government 
officials”’ (Bennett, 2004: 242). 
 
This project draws on both applied and critical approaches to cultural policy 
research. I seek to conceptualise ‘cultural policy’ not simply in terms of local 
and/or central government’s operational activities with respect to culture – 
however defined – in Glasgow during the 1970s and 1980s, but to expand that 
basis to take into account the broader ideological and political context in which 
it emerged.31 This approach is based on an understanding of the potential for 
cultural policy to be explicit and implicit, territorial and relational. 
 
Jeremy Ahearne (2009: 143) has distinguished between explicit or ‘nominal’ 
cultural policy and implicit or ‘effective’ cultural policy, defining the former as 
‘any cultural policy that a government labels as such’, and the latter as ‘any 
political strategy that looks to work on the culture of the territory over which it 
presides (or on that of its adversary)’. Ahearne has commented on this 
distinction:  
 
                                               
31 This includes, for example, the emergence of the ‘new managerialism’ within public 
administration, the early years of neoliberalism in the UK and the centrality of traditional Labour 
values to GDC. 
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‘Explicit’ cultural policies will often identify ‘culture’ quite simply with 
certain consecrated forms of artistic expression, thereby deflecting 
attention from other forms of policy action upon culture. Within the 
domain of ‘implicit’ cultural policies, one might also distinguish between 
the unintended side effects of various kinds of policy and those deliberate 
courses of action intended to shape cultures but which are not expressly 
thematised as such. (Ahearne, 2009: 144) 
 
David Throsby (2009: 179) has considered the explicit/implicit cultural policy 
distinction from an economic perspective, suggesting that ‘some economic 
policies have a hidden cultural purpose, and therefore qualify as implicit cultural 
policy’. Both these conceptions of cultural policy – as explicit and implicit – have 
influenced investigation into the location and nature of Glasgow’s emerging 
cultural policy during the period of study. They remain useful whether or not 
one perceives in the actions of GDC a formal overarching ‘cultural policy’ 
through which its action on ‘culture’ was co-ordinated or whether implicit 
strategies (whether political or economic) for culture in the city developed 
elsewhere without being explicitly labelled ‘cultural policy’. 
  
Connected to this is the conception of policy-making as territorial and relational. 
Urban geographers McCann and Ward have argued that: 
 
urban policy-making must be understood as both relational and territorial; 
as both in motion and simultaneously fixed, or embedded in place. The 
contradictory nature of policy should not, however, be seen as detrimental 
to its operation. Rather, the tension between policy as relational and 
dynamic, on the one hand, and fixed and territorial, on the other, is a 
productive one. (McCann and Ward, 2010: 176) 
 
Although McCann and Ward applied these terms to the contemporary twenty-
first century context in which they were writing, the concepts of policy-making 
as territorial and relational can also be applied to the investigative approach 
taken in this research project to cultural policy in Glasgow during the 1970s and 
1980s: that is, the extent to which a cultural policy emerged which was 
restricted to the city of Glasgow (territorial) and the extent to which it 
connected to policy areas other than ‘culture’, to policy development in other 
cities or countries and to specific key actors (relational), this latter point also 
relating to the contemporaneous emergence of ‘urban cultural policy’.  
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Bell and Oakley (2015) have discussed the idea of a specifically ‘urban cultural 
policy’, focused on the city. With reference to Grodach and Silver, they have 
argued that ‘urban cultural policy is a relatively new concept, dating back 
around thirty years, before which culture was largely a matter for the nation-
state’ (Bell and Oakley, 2015: 78). Discussing how cities are ‘the traditional 
location of our grandest cultural inheritances – from the Gothic cathedral to the 
contemporary art gallery’ as well as the locus of much of the support 
infrastructure surrounding cultural activities, Bell and Oakley concluded:  
 
The trouble for policymakers is that these deep and interlinking assets are 
only occasionally the results of deliberate cultural policy. They are much 
more often the legacy of education policy, transport policy, planning and 
licencing laws, migration and housing policy, of philanthropy and 
commercial hard sell – mixed together with a variety of cultural assets, 
public and private. (Bell and Oakley, 2015: 80) 
 
In investigating what and where Glasgow’s cultural policy was during the 1970s 
and 1980s – and examining the extent to which a deliberate cultural policy 
focused on the city also emerged during this period – in line with current 
thinking about the scope of cultural policy such as that outlined above, the 
methodological scope broadened to include other policy areas in the city, such 
as economic development policy. This influenced (and was influenced by) both 
the archival research and oral history interviews with key actors.  
 
As well as drawing on a range of academic disciplines, such as urban geography 
and (cultural) economics, the methodology draws on historiographical 
approaches. Whilst the study focuses on the period 1970 to 1989, it is positioned 
within a broader historical context, taking into consideration histories of the city 
of Glasgow, of Scotland, the UK and the European Community over previous 
decades and even centuries. Furthermore, this research was undertaken during 
the 2010s, more than 25 years since the end of the period of study. As a 
researcher I was unavoidably aware of events post-1989, notably including some 
of the consequences of decisions or actions taken – or not taken – during the 
1970s and 1980s.  
 
This presents the research with a methodological concern when approaching oral 
history interviewing, where the past is viewed from a distance through the lens 
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of the present and interviewees may – consciously or subconsciously – attempt to 
describe or justify their actions or inaction based on their knowledge of 
subsequent events. Hindsight bias will be discussed below in section 4.5.  
 
This research project has taken place not only some decades after the period of 
study, but also after Lyotard described the ‘postmodern condition’ as being 
‘characterised by incredulity toward “grands récits”’ (Carr, 2016: 133). This 
research project proceeded following the guiding principles that it is exploring 
and presenting not a singular ‘universal history’ but, rather, a conception of 
history as pluralistic,32 as based on an understanding of the future being 
unpredictable, not least to the key actors in the topic of study, on there being 
no inevitability to the course of events, and on the premise that the 
development of Glasgow’s cultural policy is likely to have involved the 
unintended consequences of a range of planned and improvised actions.  
 
4.3  The Collaborative Doctoral Award process  
 
This research project was established as an AHRC-funded Collaborative Doctoral 
Award (CDA) by Glasgow Life and the University of Glasgow. Glasgow Life is the 
arms-length external organisation established in 2007 to deliver cultural, 
sporting and learning activities on behalf of Glasgow City Council. It is 
responsible for museums such as The Burrell Collection and Kelvingrove Art 
Gallery and Museum; performing arts venues such as the City Halls and the 
Glasgow Royal Concert Hall (which opened as part of ECOC 1990 celebrations); 
arts centres and galleries such as Tramway and the Gallery of Modern Art; 
libraries in the city; and facilities for sport, as well as a range of festivals. Over 
the course of this research project, Glasgow Life has been responsible for the 
delivery of such large-scale events as the venue design and build and the 
Cultural Programme for the 2014 Commonwealth Games (something that was 
referred to in oral history interviews undertaken during the summer of 2014). 
The research topic is intrinsically connected to the history of Glasgow Life itself, 
particularly in the infrastructure and festivals the organisation maintains today 
                                               
32 This is particularly the case with the use of oral history as a research methodology, which 
often involves recording contrasting and contradictory accounts of past events, sometimes within 
the same interview as well as between different interviewees. This will be discussed further in 
section 4.5. 
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and which may be understood as part of the legacy provided by ECOC 1990. 
Recognising this, the general area for the research project – a pre-history to the 
ECOC – was established with the potential to deliver to Glasgow Life a better 
understanding of the factors affecting the historical direction taken by Glasgow 
cultural policy, and whether these factors continue to play out in the present. 
 
An expected outcome for the Glasgow Life sponsors was historical research 
conducted in partnership with today’s policy-makers that would provide them 
with exposure to new historical information, demonstrate robust research 
methodologies and provide policy-relevant knowledge for the organisation, in 
order to ensure it remains an influential leader in the field of cultural policy, 
driving agendas and approaches. To this end, the general shape of my project, 
the research aim, objectives, research questions and broad research 
methodologies were devised collaboratively by Glasgow Life and the University 
of Glasgow, prior to my recruitment as the doctoral researcher. However, my 
role has been that of an independent doctoral researcher rather than a 
consultant or advisor to Glasgow Life. I was charged with shaping the project 
afresh once appointed and I have been able to capitalise on Glasgow Life’s 
involvement to access key data, including key interviewees.33  
 
I have also been able to draw on knowledge held within Glasgow Life which has 
enabled me to refine initial research findings in an important way. An event to 
share initial research findings with over forty Glasgow Life staff generated 
additional insights from responses from members of staff, some of whom worked 
in Glasgow’s cultural sector during the 1980s. Dr Mark O’Neill, Director of Policy 
and Research and my supervisor at Glasgow Life worked in Glasgow museums 
during the late 1980s and has been uniquely placed to provide insights and 
guidance on the period of study. 
 
As the topic of study covers a period of recent history, well within living 
memory, the consequences of policy decisions made during the 1970s and 1980s 
continue to play out directly today. I have been in the extremely beneficial 
position of being able to talk not only to some of the key actors that directly 
                                               
33 For example, City Archivist, Dr Irene O’Brien, and her team at Glasgow City Archives have 
provided a great deal of support in locating crucial archive documents. 
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shaped Glasgow’s cultural policy but also some of those who influenced its 
development in a more supporting role – as well as some of those directly 
affected by decisions made during this period.  
 
The collaborative involvement of Glasgow Life in the research project, 
therefore, has enabled me to gain a better understanding of the significance and 
influence of events and developments during the 1970s and 1980s in Glasgow’s 
cultural policy today.  
 
4.4 Archival and documentary research  
 
This section will discuss the public archives accessed and the approach taken to 
the available archival material. It will discuss the significance and value of the 
archival material accessed as well as unexpected gaps in the archives. It will 
also discuss the archival material privately held by some of the key actors that I 
was able to access as a result of my programme of interviews.  
 
4.4.1 Local and regional government archival material 
 
Archival research concerning the City of Glasgow focused largely on the records 
of GDC and SRC, with some reference to the records of Glasgow Corporation, 
held in Glasgow City Archives and Special Collections at the Mitchell Library in 
Glasgow.  
 
GDC and SRC were both created in 1975 when the responsibilities of Glasgow 
Corporation were divided between the two new authorities. Whilst GDC’s 
responsibilities were geographically confined to the city boundaries, SRC’s 
geographical boundaries extended beyond the city to encompass the rural 
farmlands and islands, towns and coalfields of the Strathclyde region as a whole. 
Whilst GDC was allocated such aspects of ‘culture’ as museums and galleries, 
libraries, halls and theatres, and parks, municipal responsibility for the 
development of culture in the city was not clear cut. During its existence, SRC 
provided significant amounts of money and resources for the arts, museums and 
libraries in the city, particularly in relation to education and social work, as well 
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as aspects of economic development. The remit of GDC and SRC overlapped, 
geographically as well as in (cultural) policy terms.   
 
My searches of local authority archival records were, therefore, not restricted to 
the files of GDC’s Festivals Unit, nor to the culture-focused departments listed 
above, though these were important. My investigation into the extent to which 
Glasgow’s emerging cultural policy was explicit or implicit, relational and 
territorial drew in a wider scope of local and regional authority departments, 
not least of which were economic development, public relations and the Chief 
Executives’ offices, as well as the committee minutes of both councils.  
 
Many of the boxes searched – particularly containing the records of GDC – were 
uncatalogued and contained a huge range of documents: meeting minutes; 
memos; press cuttings; handwritten notes; formal reports; policy and strategy 
documents; drafts and redrafts of bid documents; promotional material; and a 
broad range of correspondence, both written and received by the authority. 
From studying these documents, various ‘narratives’ began to emerge. However, 
some considerations when assessing documents were the reliability of these 
narratives and what the archives revealed about the key actors who had 
originally compiled them. 
 
The documents contained in each of the uncatalogued boxes were not mediated 
by an archivist but determined by the depositor. They were there as a result of 
the depositor’s highly subjective filtering process, through which material had 
either been discarded or retained for posterity in the archives. For example, the 
documents contained in the largely uncatalogued boxes of archival material 
formerly belonging to GDC Public Relations department included the hand-
written notes of Head of Public Relations, Harry Diamond, alongside meeting 
minutes. What is retained and preserved in these particular boxes suggests the 
PR department approached archiving based on a keen awareness of how archival 
material can shape a legacy. In short, the archives are not ‘neutral’. 
 
There were some gaps in the archive with regard to the research aim and 
questions. Not all reports referred to in oral history interviews or archival 
material have been retained. In these cases, council committee meeting minutes 
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from the period of study were systematically searched for references to the 
reports and indications – or otherwise – of their significance. I concluded that 
reports that were considered important by the council committees would be 
referenced in the meeting minutes (in some cases, a précis of a particularly 
significant report was recorded in the minutes), and those that were not would 
not feature in the minutes.  
 
Furthermore, the fact that GDC and SRC were two different organisations is also 
manifest in their respective approaches to record keeping. These differences 
provide an insight into the differences in managerial styles between the two 
councils, which proved to be pertinent in the research findings: I found that SRC 
embraced the ‘new managerialism’ – which will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 7 
– to an extent that GDC did not.  
 
4.4.2 Central government archival material 
 
Central government archives were accessed both online and in person. The 
research involved accessing the pre-devolution records of the Scottish Office 
held in the National Records of Scotland in Edinburgh. The Scottish Office files 
accessed in Edinburgh were not digitised and many were classed as containing 
sensitive information. Recent changes in practice in Scotland, where such files 
were released after fifteen, rather than thirty, years, meant that I was able to 
access crucial Scottish Office files produced in 1986, at an early rather than late 
stage in the research process. Scottish Office files contained meeting minutes; 
reports; bid documents (notably Glasgow’s and Edinburgh’s 1986 submissions and 
supplementary submissions as part of the competition to win the UK’s 
nomination for the ECOC); and correspondence with local authorities, agencies 
such as the SDA and Glasgow Action, and other government departments 
including the Office of Arts and Libraries within the Department for Education 
and Science, the Treasury, the Foreign Office and the Department for the 
Environment (which was concerned with local government and some aspects of 
heritage). There also included correspondence from the various departments 
within the Scottish Office, often in the form of a ‘PS Note’ or ‘PS Minute’ 
(discussed below). As such, the Scottish Office files provide the perspectives of 
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both ministers and civil servants within the Scottish Office and the tension 
between the two. 
 
Further central government records, such as the Hansard, have been digitised 
and are available online. These records provided a broader central government 
context and perspectives beyond those of the Scottish Office.   
 
The archive documents studied are from a pre-digital era, in the years before 
ministers and civil servants – and any of the key actors in this research project – 
communicated by mobile phones, email or social media. The internal Scottish 
Office PS Notes/Minutes are particularly valuable in recording something of the 
robust informal debates between private and permanent secretaries, ministers 
and other civil servants prior to reaching a formal decision. Handwritten 
comments, initialled by the civil servant – or occasionally minister – concerned, 
were added to the typed note as it was passed between key protagonists in the 
decision-making process. Often, a series of handwritten comments were added 
to PS Notes over a period of days, or even weeks, before a formal decision was 
reached by the minister concerned. Such traces provide an insight into the pace 
as well as the process of decision-making within central government during this 
pre-digital era.  
 
4.4.3 Privately-held archival material  
 
Like the publicly-held archival material, privately-held material was not treated 
as ‘neutral’. For example, Glasgow Action’s annual reports were originally 
produced during the 1980s with an advocacy function to generate support for the 
organisation and thus are particularly selective with the information they 
present. However, this particular material was particularly valuable in gaining an 
understanding of the ways in which key actors had presented the agency to 
those they wished to influence.  
 
This additional privately-held material addressed some archival gaps, 
particularly around agencies such as Glasgow Action, and provided new 
perspectives beyond those within local, regional and central government.  
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4.5  Oral history interviews  
 
In planning and executing my oral history interviews I encountered practical and 
theoretical factors that reflected a particular turning point in the development 
of oral history as a research methodology. 
 
4.5.1 Theoretical framework  
 
As a research method, oral history has its limitations, not least in its reliance on 
memory – which can be unreliable – to reconstruct the past. The psychological 
concept of hindsight bias, an associated component of which is memory 
distortion, has been defined by Calvillo (2012: 891) as occurring ‘when outcome 
knowledge influences judgements of what individuals had known prior to the 
outcome’. Gross and Bayen (2015: 253) have described hindsight bias as ‘a hard-
to-avoid and ubiquitous bias in memory and judgement’, which may ‘narrow the 
search for potential explanations for an event’. They have also stated that 
hindsight bias is stronger in older than young adults.  
 
During the early 1970s, the unreliability of memory was a central factor in 
criticism of oral history as a methodology for reconstructing the past. Alistair 
Thomson has summarised this criticism as:  
 
the assertion that memory was distorted by physical deterioration and 
nostalgia in old age, by the personal bias of both interviewer and 
interviewee, and by the influence of collective and retrospective versions 
of the past. (Thomson, 2011: 79) 
 
Later in the 1970s, oral history changed direction. Bartie and McIvor (2013: 108), 
who have charted the history of oral history in Scotland, have recognised this 
shift, in Scotland as elsewhere in the UK and Europe, from ‘reconstructive mode’ 
to ‘interpretive mode’. That is: attempting to reconstruct the events of the past 
through direct eye witness testimony to turning the perceived weakness of oral 
history – the subjectivity of memory – into its strength.   
 
Oral historians Paul Thompson and Alessandro Portelli were instrumental in this 
shift. In his 1978 text, The Voice of the Past: Oral History, Thompson defended 
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the validity of oral sources as alongside written sources. He argued that 
subjectivity of memory should not be viewed as a problem restricted to oral 
sources, but that ‘all historical sources are suffused by subjectivity right from 
the start’ (Thompson, 1978: 172). Tackling the issue of the comparable 
reliability of oral and written sources of evidence, Thompson (1978: 118) 
asserted that as subjective, spoken testimony, oral sources have a special value 
as historical evidence. Thompson contended that the due to the distinctive 
qualities of oral rather than written communication – the verbal social clues or 
the nuances of uncertainty – a recording of an oral source ‘is a far more reliable 
and accurate account of an encounter than a purely written record’ (1978: 126). 
Furthermore, Thompson afforded a position to the conveying of individual and 
collective memory and imagination through oral sources equal to other aspects 
of history:  
 
History, in short, is not just about events, or structures, or patterns of 
behaviour, but also about how these are experienced and remembered in 
the imagination. And one part of history, what people imagined happened, 
and also what they believe might have happened – their imagination of an 
alternative past, and so an alternative present – may be as crucial as what 
did happen. (Thompson, 1978: 162) 
 
In his 1979 article, What Makes Oral History Different? Portelli also set out the 
case for the validity of oral history. In this article, Portelli directly tackled the 
inherent non-objectivity and subjectivity of oral history, the credibility of oral 
sources compared to ‘the holiness of writing’, and the relationship between 
memory and history.   
 
Portelli, crucially, stated that: ‘Oral sources are not objective… they are 
artificial, variable and partial’ (Portelli, 1979: 38). Portelli argued that this lack 
of objectivity applied to all sources, whether oral or written; however, 
artificiality, variability and partiality were ‘specific intrinsic characteristics’ of 
oral sources.  
 
On subjectivity, he argued that oral history ‘tells us less about events than about 
their meaning […] Subjectivity is as much the business of history as are the more 
visible “facts”’ (Portelli, 1979: 36). Portelli argued, however, that its subjective 
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nature did not ‘imply that oral history has no factual validity’. Indeed, he 
contended that:  
 
What informants believe is indeed a historical fact (that is, the fact that 
they believe it), as much as what really happened. (Portelli, 1979: 36) 
 
On credibility, Portelli argued that ‘there are no “false” oral sources’, as: 
 
Oral sources are credible but with a different credibility. The importance 
of oral testimony may lie not in its adherence to fact, but rather in its 
departure from it, as imagination, symbolism, and desire emerge.  
(Portelli, 1979: 37) 
 
On the relationship between memory and history, he went on to claim that:  
 
Memory is not a passive depository of facts, but an active process of 
creation of meanings. Thus, the specific utility of oral sources for the 
historian lies, not so much in their ability to preserve the past, as in the 
very changes wrought by memory. These changes reveal the narrators’ 
effort to make sense of the past and to give a form to their lives, and set 
the interview and the narrative in their historical context.  
(Portelli, 1979: 37-38)  
 
What has come to be known as hindsight bias is now framed not as a weakness 
but as a strength of oral history. Acknowledging that changes to the 
interviewee’s life, such as, for example, their socio-economic standing, their 
political opinions or personal circumstances, may affect the valuation or 
colouring of the story recounted, may mean that ‘the most precious information 
may lie in what the informants hide, and in the fact that they do hide it, rather 
than in what they tell’ (Portelli, 1979: 38).  
 
Thompson (1978: 172) viewed ‘the reflective insights of retrospection’ brought 
by the ‘living humanity’ of oral sources as one of the strengths on which the 
historical value of the remembered past rests. He argued that, ‘it is precisely 
this historical perspective which allows us to assess long-term meaning in 
history’. Thompson also argued that:  
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the living presence of those subjective voices from the past also constrains 
us in our interpretations, allows us, indeed obliges us, to test them against 
the opinion of those who will always, in essential ways, know more than 
ourselves. We simply do not have the liberty to invent which is possible for 
archaeologists of earlier epochs. (Thompson, 1978: 172) 
 
The approach to interviewing and interpretation of the resultant data generated 
in my research resonated strongly with many of Thompson and Portelli’s findings 
and their influential approach to oral history. But there were differences and 
divergences.  
 
Portelli argued against the use of transcripts in oral history, stating:  
 
Oral sources are oral sources. Scholars are willing to admit that the actual 
document is the recorded tape; but almost all go on to work on the 
transcripts, and it is only transcripts that are published. […] The transcript 
turns aural objects into visual ones, which inevitably implies changes and 
interpretation. (Portelli, 1979: 33) 
 
He has discussed the traits which may be lost in translation from an oral 
recording to a written transcript: the velocity of speech as its changes during the 
interview, the narrator’s emotions and the way the story affected them. In so 
doing, he argued that, 
 
By abolishing these traits, we flatten the emotional content of speech 
down to the supposed equanimity and objectivity of the written document. 
(Portelli, 1979: 35) 
 
In this research project, the production of oral history transcripts was 
unavoidable as I wanted to quote directly from interviewees in my thesis. As 
such, my oral history interview material has been ‘reduced’ to a visual form 
alongside the written archival material collected, with the primary source 
remaining the audio recording rather than the written transcript of the 
recording.  
 
Working from a socialist perspective, Thompson pioneered the use of oral history 
as a valuable methodology for including those that might otherwise be ‘hidden 
from history’ or voiceless in the construction of history (Thompson, 1978; 
Thomson, 2011: 79). This has been a dominant strand of oral history. For this 
  103 
 
study, the research questions demanded not an engagement with ECOC 1990 
audiences but with interviewees who were generally not hidden from history. 
This methodological focus on the key decision-makers, rather than those 
affected by the decisions they made, reflects the focus of the research aim and 
questions on the emergence of Glasgow’s cultural policy rather than its impact. 
Indeed, the majority of interview participants held prominent positions in 
society in Glasgow and the UK, albeit some holding ‘behind the scenes’ roles as 
civil servants, for example. All are what Antony Seldon (Seldon and Pappworth, 
1983) has termed the ‘elite’ in that they are eminent in their field. However, 
whilst some participants have been interviewed frequently in the past, others 
have not. For all, the interview-based methodology provided participants with 
the opportunity to tell their story, their version of events, their testimony, 
wherein its value lies.  
 
4.5.2 Selection of and access to interviewees 
 
Some of those interviewed were well known as significant figures in the 
political, cultural and/or economic life of Glasgow during the 1970s and 1980s – 
and working through Glasgow Life often facilitated access to them. Others – such 
as those who worked as civil servants during the 1980s – were identified through 
their appearance in archive documents and contacted via other routes. Some 
interviewees suggested the names of other people that should be interviewed 
for the research project.  
 
The voices of a number of people involved in the development of Glasgow’s 
cultural policy are absent from this study. The number of people involved in the 
development of Glasgow’s cultural policy during the 1970s and 1980s far 
outweighs the number of people interviewed for this project: I had to make 
choices based on what I considered their significance to my research questions.   
 
There is, perhaps, a general lack of diversity in that of the thirteen 
interviewees, ten were men and three were women. This reflects the fact that it 
was less common for women to be promoted to senior leadership roles than men 
during the 1970s and 1980s in areas related to the topic of study. This was 
particularly prevalent, for example, in the Glasgow Labour Group during this era 
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when Glasgow was led by the ‘City Fathers’, Jean McFadden being one notable 
exception.  
 
Access to interviewees was generally very good. Pat Lally and Harry Diamond – 
both formidable characters in 1970s and 1980s Glasgow – were unable to be 
interviewed due to illness. Several other key protagonists declined to be 
interviewed. One figure that proved to be elusive declined to be interviewed on 
the basis that he might be asked the wrong questions. Where key actors have 
played an integral role in the development of Glasgow’s cultural policy in the 
years leading to 1990, but have not had the opportunity – or have declined the 
opportunity – to present their own version of events and reflections on the 
subject, I have written about them and the roles they played nonetheless, based 
on available data.  
 
One notable key actor who declined an invitation to be interviewed was Malcolm 
Rifkind, MP for Edinburgh Pentlands and Secretary of State for Scotland in 1986, 
when decisions were made on which city should be awarded the ECOC title. I 
wrote to him to request an interview in February 2015, shortly before he 
appeared in the news for having various second jobs whilst also being a Member 
of Parliament. His personal assistant replied to my letter in March 2015, just 
after he resigned as an MP, declining to be interviewed on the grounds that: ‘Sir 
Malcolm was not involved in the decisions that were made at that time and, 
therefore, does not feel he can assist’.34 
 
Whilst it might be understandable that, at the particular moment of my request, 
Rifkind might not wish to be interviewed by a researcher, the reason given for 
declining the interview was odd: archival evidence shows that he was very 
closely involved in the decisions that were made at that time, going so far as to 
advocate for Edinburgh to be added to the government’s shortlist of UK cities 
bidding for the ECOC nomination and leading Scottish Office support for 
Edinburgh’s bid over that of Glasgow’s, despite Glasgow’s stronger bid.35 This 
archival evidence is reinforced by the testimony provided by Richard Luce 
                                               
34 Letter to Clare Edwards from Christine Shaylor, PA to Sir Malcolm Rifkind MP, 5 March 2015. 
35 As will be discussed in Chapter 6, Edinburgh’s bid to host the ECOC was extremely poor in 
comparison to Glasgow’s. Edinburgh’s submission was restricted to a rather incoherent list of 
venues and arts organisations that did not meet the selection criteria.  
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(interview, 24 March 2015), the Minister for the Arts responsible for selecting the 
UK’s ECOC.36 
 
This demonstrates the value of oral history in illuminating archival evidence. 
Rifkind’s declining the opportunity to contribute his personal perspective in the 
form of an oral history interview arguably shows the desire of some key actors 
not to revisit, publicly, events which could be described as ‘delicate’ and which 
might be open to reinterpretation given the events that actually followed.  
 
4.5.3 Interview preparation  
 
Interviews followed the Oral History Society and British Library guidelines. This 
meant that prior to the interviews, interviewees were given written information 
on the broad scope of the project. This included details of the project 
partnership, background and aim or the project, oral history archive, plans for 
dissemination of research, expected outcomes and oral history interviews 
themselves. Interviewees were informed that the oral history interviews would 
be topical, on the subject of the interviewee’s role and work during the 1970s 
and 1980s, with particular reference to the development of Glasgow’s cultural 
policy. They were also informed that the interviews would provide an 
opportunity for the key protagonists involved in shaping Glasgow’s cultural 
policy at a significant point in the city’s history to tell their story, and in so 
doing contribute to new, original research, which would be used as a public 
resource, for scholars, policy-makers and residents of Glasgow and beyond.  
 
Interviewees were also sent in advance of their interviews a copy of the 
appropriate ‘Consent to use of data’ form, facilitating their consent for the 
                                               
36 In his testimony, Richard Luce (interview, 24 March 2015) described the roles other members 
of the government played in influencing his decision in the selection process, stating: ‘The 
person in the end I had to consult careful was, I think, Malcolm Rifkind, Secretary of State for 
Scotland, because we were homing in on Scottish matters.’ Discussing the decision to add 
Edinburgh to the shortlist, Luce stated: ‘I think I may be right in saying that Malcolm Rifkind 
actually pressed me or whoever then was Secretary of State.’ CE (interviewer): ‘Yes that was 
Malcolm Rifkind.’ RL: ‘It was Malcolm Rifkind. He may have… yes because I remember talking to 
him on the telephone about it actually. That was almost near to the final decision and I said, 
“Look Malcolm I’m minded to go for Glasgow, I want you to tell me how Edinburgh’s going to 
react, not because I want to choose them at all because I don’t, but I want you to be alerted so 
that you know how to handle it, and advise me too.” And it was delicate.’ 
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researcher to collect data in the form of a digital audio recording of an oral 
history interview for use in this academic research project.  
 
As part of this consent process, interviewees were informed in writing before the 
interview that the digital audio recordings and transcripts of the interviews 
would be used in accordance with the wishes of the contributor. They were also 
informed that interviewees will be named and not anonymised, as the naming of 
interviewees was essential in pursuit of the research in question.  
 
Interviewees signed the consent form prior to the start of the interview, after an 
opportunity to discuss any queries about the project and the use of data.  
 
A flexible framework of semi-structured interview questions was prepared in 
advance of the interviews and differed between interviewees, with some 
commonalities, as shall be discussed below. Whilst interviewees were 
intentionally not given the fine detail of questions prepared for their specific 
interview in advance, some brought to the interview notes of topics they wished 
to discuss as prompts. None read from a prepared script, although occasionally 
responses included ‘rehearsed’ material, as discussed below.  
 
4.5.4 The interviews  
 
Formal oral history interviews were recorded with thirteen interviewees 
between March 2014 and June 2015.  
 
Each interview was held at a venue agreed with the interviewees, where they 
might feel most comfortable speaking frankly, such as at their homes or at 
meeting rooms in the University of Glasgow or elsewhere. The duration of 
interviews depended predominantly upon interviewees’ availability or when the 
conversation reached a natural conclusion. My audio recordings vary between 25 
minutes and 1 hour 48 minutes.  
 
For each interview I produced a brief biography of the interviewee, including 
their roles or job titles and key dates. I then checked this biographical timeline 
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with each interviewee, to ensure that all the information was correct and to 
complete any gaps.37  
 
The interviews were generally thematic rather than full life interviews. They 
were generally semi-structured, with questions tailored to each individual. 
Topics and themes of interview questions were broadly guided by my research 
questions, adapted for each interviewee and their respective roles. There were 
some commonalities in lines of enquiry for some of the interviewees, particularly 
where their roles had overlapped. In the case of those who had worked in 
Glasgow during the 1970s and 1980s, topics included, for example, the 
challenges facing the city, Glasgow’s image and Glasgow’s strategic approach to 
the ECOC and the roles the interviewee and their associates played within it. 
Those who had worked at the Office of Arts and Libraries were questioned on 
the government’s approach to the ECOC initiative and to selecting the UK’s 
nominated city for the title.  
 
The interviews often took a broadly chronological approach, for example, 
starting with pertinent background information, generally including a brief 
overview of the interviewee’s career prior to the main topic focus. With some 
interviewees, their testimonies began at the point at which they left school with 
their motivations for going into their chosen field, some decades before the 
1980s. For others the interviews began at the height of their careers in relation 
to the topic. For example, the interview with Richard Luce (24 March 2015) 
began with the background to his becoming Minister for the Arts and the media 
reaction to his appointment, before going on to discuss the European Economic 
Community, then the European City of Culture initiative and specific details on 
the UK’s approach.  
 
Ultimately the direction each interview took was determined by listening and 
responding to the interviewee. In some cases, I took the approach advocated by 
George Ewart Evans to ‘let the interview run […] never attempt to dominate it. 
The least one can do is to guide it’ (Thompson, 1978: 227), providing prompts 
and probing questions where necessary to glean further information. Other 
interviewees, however, responded to a more direct and structured question-and-
                                               
37 An illustrative example of a biographical timeline produced is provided in Appendix B.  
  108 
 
answer approach addressing a series of topics, particularly where their time was 
short and a faster pace was required.  
 
In addition to the biographical information discussed above, I also prepared 
specific prompts, such as timelines, for each interview, should access to specific 
dates of historical events be required. For example, for the interview with 
Richard Luce (24 March 2015), I produced a list of European Cities of Culture 
between 1985 and 1998, and a list of cities to submit bids and to be shortlisted 
during 1986 by the Office of Arts and Libraries for the UK nomination for 
European City of Culture 1990. These prompts proved extremely useful during 
the interview, for example when discussing the ECOC selection process. These 
were added as appendices to the final written summary and transcript. In other 
cases, I brought publications, such as The 1990 Story, Glasgow’s ECOC 1990 
catalogue, which contained pictures, details of events and lists of committee 
members, which interviewees were able to view and reflect on during their 
interview, if required.  
 
Over the course of the interviews, I asked reflective questions, as well as 
anchoring questions in order to connect dates to specific aspects of the 
testimony. Each interview started with the interviewer and interviewee 
confirming their name and date of birth, with confirmation of the date of the 
interview. The biographical and historical timelines discussed above were 
referred to from this anchoring perspective. Towards the end of the interview I 
asked each interviewee whether there was anything else they wished to discuss 
that had not been covered.  
 
4.5.5 After the interviews  
 
I produced written summaries and verbatim transcripts after each interview 
which followed the standard template used by the British Library. However, the 
interviews follow the principle that the audio recording is the primary source, 
with the written summaries and transcripts a guide to the audio recording.  
 
Following the interview, each interviewee was sent a copy of the full audio 
recording and written summary and transcript, resulting in some minor editing to 
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remove small amounts of material. As the data is to be used in accordance with 
the wishes of the contributor, where the interviewee has requested information 
remain confidential it remains so.  
 
4.5.6 Reflections on interviews 
 
I encountered many examples of what Portelli (1979: 38) described as the 
‘artificial, variable and partial’ nature of oral sources.  
 
The oral history archive is partial in that it privileges the voices of those who are 
alive and well over those who are not. Several participants in the events being 
described declined to be interviewed. Some interviewees – and some potential 
interviewees – referred in their testimonies to other people, crediting them with 
certain achievements or roles in Glasgow’s emerging cultural policy, whilst in 
some interviews, other figures appear to have been ‘written out’ of the story. I 
have attempted to redress this balance in the thesis by including those figures 
who were integral to the emergence of Glasgow’s cultural policy, whether or not 
they participated in an interview. 
 
Interviewees participating were all in their sixties, seventies and eighties and 
were being asked to recall events from thirty or forty years ago. In some cases, 
this covered events which they had not recalled for some time and/or which 
they found difficult to recall fully, and/or which had been differently recalled 
with other interviewers. This variability means that the oral history interviews 
cannot be described as replicable. However, this does not reduce their validity 
as a research methodology.  
 
The oral history interviews present a partial – and to some extent artificial – 
version of events in that some interviewees have been particularly selective with 
the facts, unintentionally or otherwise.  
 
More concerning than the variability of testimonies – that is, that in other 
circumstances an interviewee’s version of events might be recalled in a different 
way – was, conversely, the lack of variability in one interview in particular, 
where the account was identical to some newspaper articles. The challenge for 
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me was to conduct a research-driven interview with a public figure who was 
particularly adept at public relations. I found that the historical events recalled 
were woven together in a series of ‘key messages’, with the interviewee 
appearing to be permanently ‘on message’. The interviewee’s parting comment, 
once the digital recorder had been switched off, was, ‘Don’t tell them about the 
weather!’ I felt that the inference was that I should be complicit with him in 
constructing a particular history and narrative of Glasgow, in which unfavourable 
facts have been omitted.   
 
Here, I have drawn the conclusion that changing Glasgow’s image is, for some, a 
lifetime’s work and this is period of history which continues to have 
repercussions in the present. Given the context of this particular interview – that 
it is part of a history that concerns not only the rise of public relations but also 
the use of the arts and culture as a public relations tool – attempting to control 
the message through public relations techniques is the story. As Portelli 
commented:   
 
In these cases, the most precious information may lie in what the 
informants hide, and in the fact that they do hide it, rather than in what 
they tell. (Portelli, 1979: 38) 
 
The value of oral history as a research methodology here is, as Portelli (1979: 
36) has it, that it tells us ‘less about events than their meaning’.  
 
4.6 Conclusion  
 
Both of the main methodological strands that I have used in this qualitative 
study have their strengths and limitations. Oral history has been attacked as a 
research methodology due to the unreliability of memory. However, ‘all 
historical sources are suffused with subjectivity’ (Thompson, 1978: 172) and it is 
the job of the historian to navigate that path carefully and robustly.  
 
The written archival material available provides records of a variety of decisions 
made and to varying degrees, the decision-making processes – not least 
intimating some of the influential factors in those decisions. Just like the oral 
interview evidence, the written archival material accessed is not ‘neutral’ but 
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equally reliant on the subjective decisions of depositors of what to discard and 
what to retain for posterity. I have found that my oral history interviews have 
provided valuable qualitative data in some of the areas in which the established 
written archives are ‘silent’ – or in which some voices dominate. They have also 
provided new data which has variously corroborated and contradicted archival 
material, as well as secondary source material examined in the literature 
review. Combining archival and interview material offered me an insight into the 
converging and contrasting perspectives of some of the key protagonists, the 
multi-faceted combination of unity and dissent, improvised and constructed 
narratives, which were defining characteristics of Glasgow’s emerging cultural 
policy during the 1970s and 1980s. 
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CHAPTER 5 1970 TO 1985: SHIFTING LANDSCAPES  
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter will discuss the key actors, prompting and facilitating factors and 
obstacles encountered in the ‘cultural turn’ in Glasgow’s policy making during 
the period 1970-85. It will also examine the critical events, their significance 
and influence, in the period leading up to the turning point of Glasgow’s 1986 
ECOC bid, at which point a range of emerging strategies began to converge. 
 
Between 1970 and 1985, Glasgow faced three significant structural socio-
economic problems: deindustrialisation; depopulation; and urban deprivation 
and decay (Keating, 1988: 26-28). This period saw the emergence of an implicit 
or effective cultural policy38 in Glasgow within a shifting landscape which 
encompassed these socio-economic problems alongside political changes and a 
burgeoning cultural infrastructure.  
 
The chapter will begin by outlining, firstly, the political changes in local 
government and then Glasgow’s shifting arts and cultural landscape. It will argue 
that the severe socio-economic problems and political challenges facing the city 
did not present an obstacle to the growth of Glasgow’s cultural infrastructure, 
which expanded throughout this period without an explicit cultural policy to 
direct its development. 
 
It will then discuss how the two significant and inter-related structural changes 
of local government reorganisation and the introduction of corporate 
management in the new GDC, when combined with a new emphasis on economic 
development, acted as significant prompting and facilitating factors in the 
cultural turn in Glasgow’s policy making.  
 
The city’s strategic focus on economic development will then be examined as 
the most prominent of these factors, as the city’s cultural assets moved from 
the margins of policy and planning, as key public bodies began to recognise their 
                                               
38 What constitutes an explicit or nominal cultural policy, as opposed to an implicit or effective 
cultural policy was discussed in section 4.2 of Chapter 4.  
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potential as a consumption activity within the developing service sector 
economy.  
 
The recognition of the increasing importance of Glasgow’s image to its changing 
economy, as it became a post-industrial city, as well as the approach taken by 
Glasgow’s leadership to change the city’s image during the early 1980s will then 
be discussed. Finally, the chapter will examine the rise of public-private 
partnerships as a key facilitating factor in the city’s emerging cultural policy.  
 
It is notable that attempts to develop a formal, explicit cultural policy for the 
city followed rather than preceded Glasgow being awarded the ECOC title 
through a national competition in 1986 and became intrinsically connected to 
the city’s planning for the event. Whilst the city’s 1986 ECOC bid was based on a 
coherent strategy, it was not a strategy which stemmed from a coherent, 
explicit or nominal cultural policy. Rather, the development of Glasgow’s ECOC 
strategy – and the city’s subsequent cultural policy – was prompted and 
facilitated by a range of factors and key actors.  
 
5.2  Political change in local government in Glasgow, 1970 to 1985 
 
The 1970s was, characteristically, a period of upheaval in local government in 
Glasgow, with the administrative restructure of local government reorganisation 
followed by a period of instability at political level within the council.  
 
Local government reorganisation in Scotland took place during the mid-1970s as 
a result of the recommendation of the 1969 Wheatley report, with changes 
coming into effect in May 1975. The responsibilities of Glasgow Corporation were 
divided between two new tiers of local and regional government: Glasgow 
District Council and Strathclyde Regional Council. Geographically, the former 
Corporation’s boundaries in the east were extended to include Rutherglen in the 
new GDC, whilst GDC was situated at the centre of the new regional authority, 
which stretched from Argyll and Bute in the north to Ayrshire in the south. 
Despite these apparent geographical advantages, this process of local 
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government reorganisation in Glasgow has been described as disempowering39 
for the city by Steven Hamilton, who joined the Corporation in 1948 and became 
Town Clerk and Chief Executive of GDC in 1979.  
 
Steven Hamilton (interview, 19 August 2014) characterised Glasgow Corporation 
as the ‘all-purpose authority’, its remit including electricity, gas, water, health, 
social work, probation, children’s homes, education, traffic, sewerage, the 
police and fire services. Hamilton has reflected on the consequences of local 
government reorganisation in Glasgow:  
 
First of all, all the major services, all the high spending services except 
housing went to the Regional Council, and so Glasgow lost that. And 
Glasgow didn’t have nearly as much influence in the Regional Council as 
you might have expected. Strathclyde didn’t, to my mind, regard Glasgow 
as being the core of the Regional Council, they tended to regard Glasgow as 
a rival organisation. And politically they were run by representatives 
elected in Lanarkshire and Ayrshire who joined together and they were able 
to out-vote the Glasgow representatives.  
(Steven Hamilton, interview, 3 July 2014) 
 
The division of responsibilities between the two tiers of local government 
resulted in a number of grey areas where both authorities developed their own 
activities and plans for the city which – as will be discussed in section 5.5 in the 
case of economic development – did not always align.40  
 
This restructuring process did not result in the establishment of a department 
for culture in either authority. Departments such as museums, libraries and halls 
and theatres, which to a large extent constituted ‘culture’, were allocated to 
                                               
39 For Steven Hamilton, the Thatcher era also saw an escalation in the central government 
disempowerment of local authorities. Commenting on the changes to the city and the council by 
the time he retired in 1991, Steven Hamilton (interview, 3 July 2014) stated: ‘The most 
significant thing to change in the city over these years was that the city had been 
disempowered. That’s the most important thing. I was working in an organisation which had 
relatively little powers and not very much money. And we made the best of it. […] My feeling 
was a slight feeling of regret that we had so few powers, some satisfaction that I think we used 
these powers as well as we could possibly have done in the circumstances of the time. The 
circumstances of the time were very… they were bad. I mean the Thatcher years were bad for 
us, bad for Glasgow in every respect.’  
40 Keating (1988: 43) has highlighted the interdependence of SRC and GDC’s responsibilities, 
listing the responsibilities of the new regional council as follows: ‘strategic planning, structure 
plan, industrial development, highways, transport, water and sewage, education, social work, 
police, fire, registration of births, deaths and marriages, registration of electors and consumer 
protection’; and the district council as follows: ‘local plans and development control, building 
control, housing, leisure and recreation, libraries, environmental health and licencing’. 
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the District Council. However, the development of the arts and culture in 
Glasgow was one such overlapping area of responsibility between GDC and SRC, 
not least because this was an era when arts and culture was a non-statutory and 
therefore entirely discretionary aspect of local government activity in 
Scotland.41 Over the course of its 21 year existence, SRC provided significant 
amounts of funding and support for the arts and culture in Glasgow. However, 
during the 1970s this support was not connected to that of GDC in formal policy 
terms.42  
 
These structural administrative changes were implemented as GDC entered a 
period of political instability. The 1977 local elections brought an abrupt end to 
the Labour Group’s domination of the District Council, as the longest-serving of 
its ‘City Fathers’ lost their seats. As outlined in Chapter 2, two years of a hung 
council ensued, with a minority Conservative administration reliant on the SNP, 
followed in 1979 by the return of Labour as a minority administration. Jean 
McFadden, Leader of the Glasgow Labour Group from 1977 and of the council 
between 1979 and 1986, has described the events surrounding the ‘massacre of 
1977’:  
 
In 1977 there was a council election and that election was held at a time 
when the Labour Party’s fortunes were very low. Jim Callaghan was Prime 
Minister. There had been the oil crisis, there were cuts, and there were 
also arguments between the then Leader and the Housing Convener, which 
hit the front pages of the local papers and as a result the Labour Party lost 
25 members in the election of 1977. And I, having been there for six years, 
became one of the most senior members. And that led to changes, because 
the Labour Group decided to go into opposition and a hung council was 
                                               
41 Gray (2000: 174) has commented on the Local Government Scotland Act 1994 which brought a 
statutory duty for local authorities in Scotland to make provision for the arts. This was the first 
Act ‘to force local authorities in Britain to undertake such activities, implying a commitment to 
spend money on the arts by law’. This statutory duty did not exist in the 1970s or 1980s.    
42 It should be noted that GDC and SRC’s financial contributions to the arts in Glasgow were 
connected in one aspect, through the new funding formula for the national arts companies 
(Scottish National Orchestra, Scottish Opera, Scottish Theatre Ballet and Scottish Chamber 
Orchestra) agreed between COSLA, the Convention for Scottish Local Authorities, and the 
Scottish Arts Council in 1979 (Jones and Galloway, 2011: 231-232), as three of these companies 
were Glasgow-based. However, this funding formula only applied to this specific aspect of arts 
funding and did not constitute an explicit, overarching cultural policy for Glasgow. The COSLA 
formula also appears to have caused some confusion within GDC in the subsequent years on its 
role in funding the three Glasgow-based organisations in relation to SRC (as the GDC Finance 
Committee’s difficulty in reaching a decision on a 1980 Scottish Ballet grant application 
demonstrates (GDC, 1980c)) and the COSLA agreement was still under negotiation with local and 
regional authorities in March 1983 (GDC, 1983b). 
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formed between the Conservatives and the SNP members, and I became 
Leader of the Opposition. (Jean McFadden, interview, 24 March 2014) 
 
These events led to a difficult period in local government, in which little 
progress was made in tackling the city’s severe socio-economic problems. Jean 
McFadden has commented that: 
 
The three years between 1977 and 1980 were very difficult for the Council 
because no party had overall control. It just lurched from one thing to 
another and it was impossible for any long term planning.  
(Jean McFadden, interview, 24 March 2014) 
 
During this period, GDC did not have a formal, explicit cultural policy and did 
not make it a priority to develop one.43 As Leader of the Opposition, Jean 
McFadden decided the Labour Group should ‘take a close look at our policies, 
draft some new policies and just come back at the next election’ (Jean 
McFadden, interview, 24 March 2014). This process of policy development did 
not extend, either within the Labour Group or within the council, to policies for 
the arts and culture.  
 
Jean McFadden has reflected on the emphasis of the city’s policy concerns 
during the late 1970s and into the 1980s:  
 
I must say I think cultural policy took a back seat in that period. What we 
were most concerned about at that time was housing, because there were 
still slum houses, houses without adequate facilities that had to be either 
refurbished or demolished and replaced. After the general election of 1979, 
unemployment became a huge issue. It was to become an even bigger issue 
during the 1980s, when Glasgow had lost most of its major industries. 
Shipbuilding was not what it had been, people were leaving the city as 
well, that was a huge problem, trying to stem the flow of population. So 
there wasn’t really much thinking about arts at the time.  
                                               
43 This is reflected in a review of GDC council and committee meeting minutes from this period 
(see boxes GDC 1-2 1976/77-1980/81 in Glasgow City Archives, The Mitchell Library, Glasgow). 
The arts and culture were not a top priority for the council during the late 1970s. While decisions 
on some arts and cultural grants were discussed at GDC’s Finance Committee, the remit for 
culture was held by a sub-committee of a relatively minor committee: the Civic Amenities 
Committee’s Sub-committee on Cultural Matters. This sub-committee concerned libraries, 
museums, halls and theatres, discussing mainly operational and maintenance matters as they 
arose as well as agreeing museum loans. This sub-committee did not make any plans to develop a 
formal, explicit cultural policy for the city during this period. It did, however, plan for some 
cultural projects that were eventually realised during the 1980s, such as the expansion of library 
provision across the city, the acquisition of the Provand’s Lordship Museum and the development 
of the Concert Hall (which opened in 1990). 
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(Jean McFadden, interview, 24 March 2014) 
 
The political and administrative turbulence of the 1970s was short-lived. 1979 
was a critical year in heralding the beginning of a new period of political 
stability in Glasgow, albeit one which encompassed a polarisation of left and 
right wings in local and central government respectively, bringing accompanying 
challenges. As GDC entered a new period of Labour leadership – albeit as a 
minority administration – Margaret Thatcher entered 10 Downing Street, bringing 
new political challenges to the city. In 1980, the Glasgow Labour Group gained a 
majority and a return to its dominance of the council, which continued 
throughout the eleven years of the Thatcher governments and into the 1990s.  
 
This new period of political stability brought with it changes to decision-making 
processes and a prioritisation of economic development which, as will be 
discussed in sections 5.4 and 5.5, would subsequently act as facilitating factors 
in the development of cultural policy in Glasgow.  
 
5.3  The shifting arts and culture landscape in Glasgow, 1970 to 1985 
 
Contrary to the image of a city in decline, several large-scale capital projects 
were underway, completed or planned in Glasgow during the 1970s and early 
1980s. A £10m extension to the Mitchell Library was completed in 1981. The 
Burrell Collection, built to house the bequest of Sir William Burrell opened to 
critical acclaim in 1983. Also in 1983, Tron Church became Tron Theatre, one of 
a number of buildings to be subsequently converted into new arts venues the 
city. A new venue was planned to house the Royal Scottish Academy of Music and 
Drama (now the Royal Conservatoire of Scotland), opening in 1988, and initial 
plans were underway for a new Royal Concert Hall, which opened in 1990.  
 
Developments in Glasgow’s built environment during the early 1980s followed 
recognition in the early 1970s of the significance of Glasgow’s Victorian 
architecture, marking a policy shift away from comprehensive redevelopment 
and demolition towards conservation of architectural assets. Lord Esher’s 1971 
report for Glasgow Corporation, Conservation in Glasgow, stated ‘Glasgow is 
now the finest surviving example of a great Victorian city’ despite a history of 
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neglect and the fact that ‘it has been a point of pride in the city to destroy and 
build better’ (Esher, 1971: 1). In 1981, The Mackintosh House opened in the new 
Hunterian Art Gallery, the reassembled interiors of Charles Rennie Mackintosh’s 
previously demolished house reflecting a growing appreciation and rediscovery 
of the Glaswegian architect. 
 
During this period, national arts organisations, such as the Royal Scottish 
National Orchestra, Scottish Opera and Scottish Ballet, had become based in 
Glasgow alongside other major companies such as Citizens Theatre. There were 
a growing number of smaller arts organisations and festivals, such as 7:84 
Theatre Company and Mayfest. 
 
However, these capital projects – and the expansion of the city’s arts 
organisations and events – were not connected by any kind of formal, 
overarching cultural policy during this period. Rather, they were part of ‘a series 
of individual projects and events’ that ‘matured at the same time, producing an 
important critical mass of cultural activity’ (Boyle, 1989a: 78).  
 
Between 1963 and 1983, the number of museums in the control of the local 
authority trebled from three to nine. However, this considerable increase was 
due more to opportunism than coherent and interconnected strategic planning. 
For example, Pollok House was gifted to the city in 1967 by the Maxwell 
Macdonald family. Rutherglen Museum became part of Glasgow’s department of 
museums and art galleries following the extension of the city’s boundaries to 
include the Burgh of Rutherglen as part of the 1975 local government 
reorganisation. The Burrell Collection eventually opened in 1983 after several 
decades of stalled planning following the 1944 bequest and Sir William Burrell’s 
death in 1958.   
 
Whilst the Burrell bequest was the most substantial, comprising over 8,000 
objects including works by Rodin and Cézanne alongside Chinese and Islamic art, 
it was by no means unique as a gift to the city from a prominent industrialist 
collector. As discussed in Chapter 2, over the course of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, Glasgow benefitted significantly from bequests of 
coachbuilder Archibald McLellan (who died in 1854) and shipping magnate 
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William McInnes (who died in 1944), amongst others, their collections forming 
the basis of that of Glasgow Museums and Art Galleries. Indeed, that Glasgow 
was in a position to benefit from such bequests was in no small part connected 
to its standing as Second City of the Empire, a status which diminished with the 
post-war decline of the British Empire and the advent of Glasgow’s post-
industrial era. Here, a dominant prompting and facilitating factor in the 
construction of Glasgow’s cultural infrastructure is an historical one: the civic 
pride of prominent businessmen, their bequests reinforcing the stature of the 
city – as well as themselves being key actors in its rise to distinction – for 
posterity.   
 
Despite a lack of formal, explicit policy for museums and galleries,44 however, 
GDC benefitted during this era from the individual strategies developed in 
previous decades by such key actors as Tom Honeyman, Director of Glasgow 
Museums and Art Galleries between 1939 and 1954, who, as discussed in Chapter 
2, has been credited with persuading Sir William Burrell to bequeath his 
collection to the city (Webster, 1997: 166-174).  
 
Thus, in the years preceding Glasgow’s 1986 ECOC bid, a critical mass of cultural 
activity developed in the city. However, the development of this cultural 
infrastructure was not driven by a formal or coherent overarching cultural policy 
for the city. Nor was it driven – despite a considerable investment of its public 
funds – entirely by the local or regional authorities. A number of key actors 
within the field of the arts and culture in Glasgow were instrumental in its 
expansion during this period. As discussed in Chapter 2, Tom McGrath founded 
the Third Eye Centre in 1974. This was followed by the establishment of WASPS 
(Workshop and Artists Studio Provision Scotland), and Transmission, the city’s 
                                               
44 Alasdair Auld began working for Glasgow Corporation’s Museums department as an Assistant 
Curator in 1956, remaining with the department through local government reorganisation and 
succeeding Trevor Walden in the post of Director of Museums and Art Galleries in 1979, retiring 
in 1988. Alasdair Auld (interview, 25 February 2015) has reflected that there was no formal plan 
during his time at the museums service but that he felt the department worked well without 
one. He commented that the large increase in museums over the 20 year period from 1963 was 
‘just opportunity’. 
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first artist-run gallery, established in 1983 by a group of Glasgow School of Art 
graduates.45  
 
Erika King worked as Administrative Director at the Third Eye Centre between 
1979 and 1990. Describing Kelvingrove Museum and Art Gallery and The Glasgow 
School of Art as ‘quite tired brands’, and organisations like Scottish Ballet, 
Scottish Opera, the RSNO and the Citizens Theatre as working individually at 
‘world level’ in their own fields, King has commented that McGrath and the 
founders of the Third Eye Centre as aiming to achieve something different:  
 
They had this drive and vision about a massive explosion of energy and 
activity and that by bringing various artforms together in a synergy you’re 
going to change the world. (Erika King, interview, 3 June 2015) 
 
King (interview, 3 June 2015) has described how under McGrath, and 
subsequently Chris Carrell, the organisation’s scale of ambition was greater than 
the resources at their disposal. She has characterised the organisation’s political 
ethos of collaboration and partnership as a ‘philosophical point of view […] 
we’re all going to be better if we work on a bigger level and we can achieve 
more’, as much as a practical necessity. 
 
By no means did the city’s lack of an explicit cultural policy present an obstacle 
to this approach. To the contrary, the freedom afforded by this lack of formal 
direction can be seen as something of a facilitating factor in the development of 
Glasgow’s cultural ecology.  
 
5.4 Culture, decision-making and the new managerialism  
 
Thus far, this chapter has shown that Glasgow Corporation and subsequently GDC 
played an important role in the development of the city’s cultural 
infrastructure, though by no means was the local authority the sole driving force 
behind its expansion. The decisions made in relation to the arts and culture by 
the council were not, during the 1970s, guided by a formal corporate strategic 
                                               
45 Transmission was run by a committee rather than led by an individual. Committee members in 
1983 were Alastair Magee, Lesley Raeside, John Rogan, Michelle Baucke and Alastair Strachan 
(Transmission: Committee for the Visual Arts, 2001).  
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approach but were reliant, conversely, on strategies pursued by individual key 
actors. However, in the early 1980s, corporate management began to be 
established within GDC. This acted as a significant prompting and facilitating 
factor in the cultural turn in Glasgow’s policy-making over the course of the 
1980s. As the arts and culture rose to a more prominent position in council 
policy from what was a rather marginal base, GDC’s support for culture became 
subject to tensions between old and new managerial approaches.  
 
This section will discuss the establishment of corporate management as a new 
framework for decision-making and its implications for the development of 
cultural policy. Economic development will then be explored in section 5.5 as 
the most significant prompting factor – facilitated by the ‘new managerialism’ – 
in the new policy drive.  
 
The 1969 Wheatley report, which prompted the mid-1970s local government 
reorganisation, was followed in 1975 by the Paterson report, The New Scottish 
Local Authorities (and the Bains report, its equivalent in England). The Paterson 
committee was established to consider management arrangements for the new 
authorities, recommending the introduction of corporate management (Keating, 
1988: 66).   
 
Corporate management is otherwise known as the new managerialism, the 
introduction of which into central government was discussed in Chapter 2. A 
definition of corporate management as it applied to local authorities in Scotland 
has been provided by McConnell, who has chronicled its introduction:  
 
Corporate management is an integrated approach to the management of 
local authority affairs. It aims to transcend all the various departmental, 
political and public interests in order to bring order, priorities, strategy, 
planning and suitable resource allocations to the decision-making and 
governance of local communities. (McConnell, 2004: 74) 
 
This new corporate approach involved a major shift in working practices for 
council workers, particularly departmental managers, who would be expected to 
work cross-departmentally through strategic planning towards achieving common 
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strategic priorities,46 which may not have originated in their particular 
department’s nominal area of expertise (as will be discussed below in the 
example of GDC’s department of museums and art galleries).   
 
This differed from the ‘traditional approach’ preceding corporate management 
in local authorities, which McConnell (2004: 75) has characterised as ‘based very 
much on bottom-up “incrementalism”’ and lacking ‘any fundamental 
examination of services or costs […] Typical developments were for services and 
costs to expand “incrementally” on an annual basis’. In contrast, McConnell has 
characterised corporate management as ‘based much more on a top-down 
“rational” approach which its proponents see as apolitical’.  
 
By 1978, 90 per cent of Scottish councils had adopted a corporate approach in 
principle and 80 per cent had changed their departmental structures in line with 
Paterson principles (McConnell, 2004: 78). However, the degree to which it was 
implemented varied between councils over the course of the 1970s and 1980s. 
According to McConnell (2004: 79) and to Rhodes and Midwinter (1980: 97), 
corporate management was adopted as a ‘coping strategy’ and a ‘quick solution 
to problems’. It appeared to offer a unifying force following the upheaval of 
local government reorganisation, and a means of coping with a difficult 
economic climate.  
 
In Glasgow’s case, whilst corporate management was introduced into the new 
GDC from the organisation’s advent in 1975, it did not begin to become 
established until 1980. This was due to a period of instability during the late 
1970s at both political and officer levels of GDC’s leadership.  
 
On the officer side, the Corporation’s administrative head, the Town Clerk, was 
replaced in the new District authority by a Town Clerk and Chief Executive, an 
attempt to reconcile the traditional approach of the past with the corporate 
structure of the future, creating a contradictory clash of old and new. GDC’s 
first Town Clerk and Chief Executive, Charlie Murdoch, spent much of the early 
years of the District Council’s existence absent from work due to illness. This 
                                               
46 The foremost corporate priority in GDC’s case during the early 1980s was economic 
development, as shall be discussed below.  
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leadership void was eventually filled by Steven Hamilton, who became Acting 
Town Clerk and Chief Executive in 1978, subsequently being appointed Town 
Clerk and Chief Executive in the following year.  
 
The insecurity in administrative leadership during this period was mirrored by 
the instability in political leadership – discussed in section 5.2 – which presented 
a major obstacle to the establishment of corporate management in the 1970s.  
 
1980 marked the start of a new period of political stability with the Labour 
Group being returned to a majority administration. This – combined with Steven 
Hamilton’s background as a member of the Paterson committee – was a turning 
point for the establishment of corporate management in GDC.  
 
One of the key consequences for working practices was the centralising approach 
to decision-making brought by corporate management, whereby major decisions 
on the strategic direction to be taken by GDC were often not taken by the 
elected members but rather, a small core group of members and officers.47 
 
Jean McFadden, Leader of GDC between 1979 and 1986, has described what was 
the emergence of this approach:  
 
Very soon after the election in 1980, the Chief Executive organised what 
we call an away day, where we went, I think, to the Mitchell Library, and 
thrashed out what we saw as the policies for the city for the next I think it 
would have been four years, because by that time we had a four-year term. 
And it was quite invigorating; it was a new start. It was out with the old 
and in with the new. (Jean McFadden, interview, 24 March 2014) 
 
                                               
47 This approach was not without its tensions. Michael Keating (1988) has written about the 
tensions between the left/traditional and right/centralising wings of the Glasgow Labour Group 
and their leaders: Pat Lally and Jean McFadden. In the example of the GDC revenue budget, 
Keating (1988: 71) has outlined this approach, its tension with the ‘traditional’ approach and the 
eventual political consequences: ‘The revenue budget has been put together by the leader, 
deputy leader, treasurer and deputy treasurer (the gang of four) sitting with the chief executive 
and director of finance. As in the region, the system is regarded as not sufficiently corporate by 
those at the centre and as too centralising by those on the periphery.’ In Keating’s analysis, this 
centralising approach was to prove the downfall of Jean McFadden’s first tenure as GDC Leader, 
as she came to be challenged for the leadership in 1986 by Pat Lally, who promised to restore 
power to backbench councillors and service committees. 
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The core group attending the away day described by Jean McFadden provided 
the basis of the new policy and resources committee,48 which Steven Hamilton 
has described thus:   
 
The Finance Director and myself and sometimes the Director of Planning 
would be closely involved with the leaders of the Council in policy planning 
matters. And it was on occasions such as these where we really exercised 
genuine corporate management. (Steven Hamilton, interview, 3 July 2014) 
 
Hamilton considers the policy and resources committee to have been ‘a very 
successful thing’ as a means of countering the process of disempowerment the 
authority faced: 
 
That was where we got down to analysing what the council could still do in 
spite of having so few statutory powers, and that boiled down to doing our 
best to grow tourism in the city, which we saw as being a potential job 
creator, and then doing our best to support what industries existed and 
what businesses existed. (Steven Hamilton, interview, 3 July 2014) 
 
The policies for the city referenced above by Jean McFadden and Steven 
Hamilton not only became some of the main priorities in GDC’s first corporate 
plan, but also became intrinsically connected to the new strategic emphasis on 
economic development and ultimately, the subsequent emergence of an implicit 
cultural policy in Glasgow.49 
 
However, in the early 1980s, corporate management strategies and approaches 
did not always successfully extend to GDC’s administration of the arts and 
                                               
48 The policy and resources committee was established by GDC in May 1980 (See Minutes of Policy 
and Resources Committee Meeting, 15th May 1980, Box GDC 1-2 1980/81, print no. 2, in Glasgow 
City Archives, The Mitchell Library, Glasgow). GDC council minutes from this period show that 
attempts to develop corporate planning at council level were driven by Steven Hamilton through 
the new policy and resources committee during 1980 and 1981 in particular. Indeed, this began 
at the committee’s first meeting, where Hamilton presented proposals to implement a system of 
area management and area committees (GDC, 1980a) and to formulate a corporate plan (GDC, 
1980b). 
49
 GDC’s first corporate plan was produced by the end of 1981. Its development is referred to in 
the minutes of the policy and resources committee between May 1980 and December 1981 (see 
in particular the minutes of the policy and resources committee from 15th May 1980 (GDC, 1980b) 
to 3rd December 1981 (GDC, 1981b) held in Glasgow City Archives) and the corporate plan was 
agreed at a full council meeting on 17th December 1981 (GDC, 1981c). The corporate plan was 
devised through a series of employment and economic regeneration conferences in 1980 and 
1981, with further additions contributed to the plan from other departments – reflecting the 
ascendency of economic development within the council’s strategic priorities. 
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culture. One such area, introduced with mixed results, were programme area 
committees, as Steven Hamilton has outlined:  
 
I set up a programme area committee structure that tried to gather 
together chief officers who were involved in similar kinds of activities and I 
don’t think they were very successful. They certainly weren’t very popular 
amongst the heads of department who much preferred managing their own 
departments to attending long and uninteresting meetings as many of them 
seemed to be, where they discussed things that were supposed to be of 
mutual interest but often weren’t. So that wasn’t a success.  
(Steven Hamilton, interview, 3 July 2014) 
 
The new managerial approach of ‘top-down’ joint strategic planning was not 
universally embraced across all departments of the council, and not all 
departments changed their approaches accordingly. One such aspect of GDC’s 
work not to be overtly affected by the introduction of such corporate 
management structures as programme area committees during the early to mid-
1980s was the department of museums and art galleries. Alasdair Auld joined the 
museums service in 1956, becoming Director in 1979 before retiring in 1988. 
Auld has reflected that ‘nothing very much’ changed during his time at the 
museums service, and that his directorship did not mark a tremendous shift from 
that of previous directors:  
  
From ’56, apart from the increase in staff, the system, and the change of 
name from Curators, as they were, to Keepers, in line with all other big 
institutions […] the system worked exactly the same and we were lucky 
enough eventually to get more staff and some departments [of the 
museums service] got more than others […] But it worked very well.  
(Alasdair Auld, interview, 25 February 2015) 
 
During the period leading to the mid-1980s, GDC did not have an explicit cultural 
policy shaped by the new managerialism because the council did not make it a 
priority to develop one. Whilst it continued to support the city’s libraries and 
museums through core revenue funding and independent arts organisations 
through grant funding, the structures for decision-making remained closer to the 
incremental approach of the traditional council structure that corporate 
management was intended to replace than the top-down rational approach 
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associated with corporate management itself.50 As Jean McFadden has 
commented:  
 
In the very early ’80s there wasn’t what you could call an arts or culture 
policy which was coherent. Things were done on an ad hoc basis.  
(Jean McFadden, interview, 24 March 2014) 
 
Within the council, support for the arts and culture was facilitated by the 
patronage of individual key actors. For example, the catalyst for GDC support for 
the establishment of Mayfest, which from 1983 became an annual festival of 
popular music and theatre involving international performers, was Jean 
McFadden’s support of a proposal from the trade unions. McFadden has stated:  
 
I remember the day when Jane McKay, who was very much involved with 
Glasgow Trades Council and the trade union movement, came to visit me 
and suggested that there should be a festival which coincided with Labour 
Day, the first of May, and I thought it sounded like an excellent idea. And 
again it was one of these festivals that could draw together a number of 
things: theatre, dance, poetry, etc., etc., and so I was very keen, and I 
went to discuss it with certainly the Director of Finance [Bill English], and 
persuaded him that it was worth supporting, and it took off very quickly. 
(Jean McFadden, interview, 24 March 2014) 
 
Mayfest initially developed as an ad hoc project, though GDC support was not 
provided without strategic intent. Amongst other things, Mayfest reasserted the 
significance of the Labour movement to the city, an example of how additional, 
often idiosyncratic, prompting factors for GDC support were at play.  
 
In addition, a key actor in is revealed to be Bill English, Director of Finance, who 
often played a more significant role than the directors of museums, libraries and 
halls and theatres – or indeed, the elected members on the arts and culture 
                                               
50
 Decisions on the arts and culture continued to be made in the same way through the 
Committee Civic Amenities Committee’s Sub-committee on Cultural Matters and the Finance 
Committee throughout the early 1980s as in the late 1970s and at no point was the development 
of an explicit formal cultural policy discussed. The Sub-committee on Cultural Matters was 
‘upgraded’ to become an Arts and Culture Committee in its own right in September 1982 (GDC, 
1982b). This can be interpreted as the as an indication of the upward trajectory of arts and 
culture in the council agenda in the years leading to 1990. However, in practice this upgrade 
appears to have been in title only, the new committee functioning in the same way during its 
early years as the previous sub-committee. The major preoccupation of the policy and resources 
committee, which drove policy decisions, during the early 1980s was not the arts and culture but 
economic development.  
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committee – in directing decision-making on GDC’s financial support for the arts 
and culture during this period.  
 
Despite the inherent tensions between old and new structures, which continued 
throughout the 1980s, the introduction of corporate management in GDC brought 
several consequences for working practices. The most significant of these, as a 
prompting and facilitating factor in what became the cultural turn in Glasgow’s 
policy-making, was the establishment of formal structures around economic 
development, as shall be discussed in the next section.  
 
5.5 Culture and economic development 
 
The new strategic emphasis on economic development within public sector 
bodies - GDC, SRC and the SDA – was the most prominent prompting and 
facilitating factor in the development of Glasgow’s cultural policy. Whilst the 
city’s 1986 ECOC bid was based on a coherent strategy, it was not a strategy 
which stemmed from a coherent, explicit cultural policy, but from the city’s 
rapidly-developing economic development policies, plans and strategies.  
 
This section will, therefore, discuss the major public sector bodies – the SDA, 
GDC and SRC – involved in the economic development of Glasgow and their 
initially misaligned strategic approaches. It will then focus in detail on GDC’s 
approach to economic development during the early to mid-1980s, which was 
facilitated by the establishment of corporate management. It will discuss, in 
particular, the shifting position of culture from a peripheral position in GDC’s 
formal Economic Development Plans, as it emerged as a tool for economic 
development. It will conclude that culture emerged in GDC’s Economic 
Development Plans as a consumption and image-boosting activity within the 
service sector economy, rather than being conceived as an industry in its own 
right. This section will argue that GDC’s early Economic Development Plans 
brought a new coherence to economic development work in the city more 
broadly that – alongside the development of public-private partnerships for 
economic development purposes (to be discussed in section 5.7) – provided a 
foundation for the strategic direction of Glasgow’s 1986 ECOC bid and 
subsequent cultural policy.  
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Economic development in Scotland presumes the existence of a Scottish 
economy. Some academics have disputed whether the Scottish economy existed 
during the 1980s. Writing in 1983, Keating and Midwinter stated:  
 
It is a matter of debate whether there is nowadays such a thing as a 
Scottish economy. In the nineteenth century, the heyday of Scottish private 
enterprise, there clearly was a distinct economic system and industrial 
network, albeit one which was closely linked to England.  
(Keating and Midwinter, 1983: 169) 
 
Keating and Midwinter (1983: 169) argued that, following the decline of 
prosperity in Scotland since the First World War, Scotland no longer had a 
distinct economy of its own: ‘the main instruments of economic policy […] are a 
UK responsibility’ and ‘the responsibilities of the Treasury, the Inland Revenue 
and the Bank of England are identical in England and Scotland’.  
 
However, for the Labour Party to promise the establishment of a Scottish 
Development Agency as ‘the main instrument for the regeneration of the 
Scottish economy’ (Keating, 1988: 47-48) in its October 1974 election manifesto, 
and then to establish it once in government, suggests a political recognition of 
the need to address the shortcomings of a specifically Scottish economy.  
 
The SDA’s remit was not entirely coherent when the organisation was first 
founded in 1975/76. Its establishment involved the merging of several bodies in 
Scotland with disparate purposes – such as derelict land clearance, industrial 
estates and the development of rural areas – into a new non-departmental public 
body at ‘arms-length’ from central government (Hood, 1991: 3; Gulliver, 1984).51 
 
Stuart Gulliver (interview, 28 August 2014), Regional Director at the SDA 
between 1978 and 1990, has commented that although the SDA was ‘setting the 
pace and inventing the agenda’ in the days before the establishment of its 
                                               
51 Gulliver (1984: 322) has written about the ‘unique powers’ conferred upon the SDA, which 
brought together what he termed the ‘hardware’ and ‘software’ components of economic 
development within a single organisation for the first time. Gulliver described the hardware 
components as: ‘essentially physical works including land assembly, infrastructure provision, 
factory and commercial building, environmental works and land renewal’. He describes the 
software elements as ‘the facility to make loans, give guarantees, take equity participation and 
provide a wide range of business development services’.    
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equivalent agencies in England, its agenda ‘wasn’t formed in great detail’ during 
the 1970s. Gulliver has reflected that a turning point was the appointment of 
Chief Executive, George Matheson in 1980:  
 
He was there for ten years and it was really good to have a leader like him, 
who gave us a lot of space to identify the future for the Scottish economy, 
to recognise that even though we had powers which were unprecedented at 
the sub-national level, nevertheless these were quite small levers which we 
could pull to affect the future performance of the Scottish economy. 
(Stuart Gulliver, interview, 28 August 2014) 
 
If the scale of the agency’s powers was unprecedented, so was the scale of the 
challenge the agency faced in Glasgow and Scotland more broadly.52 However, 
over the course of the late 1970s and early 1980s, the SDA’s work often did not 
cohere with GDC’s work to regenerate Glasgow’s economy. Unlike the 
contemporary GLC and GLEB in London, GDC and the SDA did not spend four 
years working together on a joint overarching industrial strategy for the city. 
One reason for this was that – unlike the GLC and GLEB – the geographical 
boundaries of the SDA’s and GDC’s economic development activity did not 
correspond. This was further complicated by the economic development 
approach of SRC, whose boundaries extended far beyond Glasgow.  
 
As the SDA covered Scotland as a whole (apart from the area covered by the 
HIDB) its remit included, for example, developing industrial activity in New 
Towns in the West of Scotland, a priority reinforced by SRC. This involved the 
relocation of businesses and employees from Glasgow, undermining GDC’s 
efforts to retain industry and population within the city boundaries.53  
 
Within GDC, the establishment of corporate management and formal structures 
to support the council’s identified corporate priority of economic development 
resulted in the establishment of the Economic Development Unit, headed by 
                                               
52 Gulliver (interview, 28 August 2014) has described ‘responding to the massive change that’s 
taken place in Scotland’s economy’ as ‘a very exciting but also very difficult period’: ‘When 
announcements are made almost daily that another company has gone down the tubes employing 
20,000 people, or there’s another one employing 15,000 people, and there’s a very difficult 
situation involving 40,000 people involved in a whole sector that’s disappearing. These were 
almost daily occurrences, and therefore what you do in the teeth of that… [It was] extremely 
difficult and inventing and developing a response to that was tough.’ 
53 The social and economic impacts of this approach are well documented in such studies of the 
‘Glasgow Effect’ as the 2016 report, History, Politics and Vulnerability: explaining excess 
mortality in Scotland and Glasgow by Walsh et al.  
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Town Clerk Depute, Theo Crombie.54 Steve Inch worked as a Planning Officer at 
GDC’s new Economic Development Unit between 1981 and 1986 before becoming 
Head of the new Regeneration Unit in 1986. Commenting on the link between 
corporate management and economic development, Steve Inch stated:  
 
The intention was that no single department would be given the job of 
regenerating the economy. (Steve Inch, interview, 6 August 2014) 
 
Each department was expected to participate, through programme area teams, 
in this shared council priority. In practice, planners such as Steve Inch, enabled 
by the new corporate approach and priority of economic development, were in 
fact one of a select group of individual officers and elected members within GDC 
– such as the Chief Executive, Leader, Director of Finance and Head of Public 
Relations – to have a strategic overview of the entirety of GDC’s remit and 
activity, including the arts and culture.  
 
As there was no department or director of culture within GDC during the 1980s, 
those leading the separate departments of halls and theatres, libraries and 
museums were not amongst those to have a strategic overview of GDC’s cultural 
activity as a whole. Whilst these departments continued to be led in the 
traditional way with some resistance to new managerial approaches, planning 
for the city’s cultural infrastructure gradually became subsumed into the 
Economic Development Plans produced by the Economic Development Unit over 
the course of the 1980s.  
 
The focus of GDC’s first Economic Development Plan (GDC, 1981a), dated 
September 1981, was a full review of the city’s economic, accompanied by 
chapters on potential solutions to the economic challenges identified, principally 
                                               
54 The Economic Development Bureau, as it was initially known, was established by the policy 
and resources committee in December 1980, as a result of Steven Hamilton’s recommendations 
arising from a Corporate Plan Conference on Employment and Economic Regeneration held in 
November 1980 (GDC, 1980d). In establishing the Economic Development Bureau, the committee 
agreed to Steven Hamilton’s proposal that ‘the Chief Executive be made directly responsible for 
the control and co-ordination of all the Council’s activities in the field of economic regeneration’ 
– reflecting the importance of economic regeneration and placing the new Economic 
Development Bureau in a powerful position in the council’s structure.  
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the significant rise in unemployment.55 Describing the Economic Development 
Unit’s approach to the first plan, Steve Inch has stated:  
 
We looked at what we should be doing as a council in terms of land 
development, in terms of joint ventures with the private sector, in terms of 
working with Scottish Development Agency as it was at the time, in terms 
of joint working with Strathclyde Regional Council, because we quickly 
cottoned on to the fact that economic development had to look at much 
wider issues than the council itself had responsibility for, particularly 
education and training, workforce development and some of the social 
work issues about dealing with disadvantaged groups, poverty, quite a 
complicated system all of these things tied together.  
(Steve Inch, interview, 6 August 2014) 
 
At no point in the main body of the plan was culture seen as a solution to these 
complex economic challenges. However, ‘improving Glasgow’s attractiveness to 
tourists and other visitors’ was seen as a contributing factor in economic 
development and an appendix listed potential initiatives to support this. In this 
appendix, amongst the suggestions to ‘improve signposting’ and ‘better litter 
collection’ were suggestions for ‘a visitors centre/exhibition hall giving an audio 
visual presentation of the City’s history, culture and architecture’ and 
‘promotion of the industrial heritage of the city by appropriate publicity and a 
“living museum”’ (GDC, 1981a: 75-76). From this peripheral position, culture 
began to emerge as a tool for economic development.  
 
In GDC’s second Economic Development Plan (GDC, 1983a), produced in March 
1983, tourism shifted from the appendices to a chapter in its own right, 
alongside chapters on ‘retail employment’, ‘industrial promotion’ and ‘training 
and job creation’. GDC identified three problems with the city’s tourism 
industry:  
 
1. How can the District Council improve the poor image of the City?  
2. How can Glasgow attract more visitors?  
3. How can the City improve provision for the visitor? (GDC, 1983a: 32)  
 
                                               
55 GDC’s first Economic Development Plan (GDC, 1981a: 3) recognised that: ‘Between 1971 and 
1980 employment in Glasgow declined by an estimated 54,500 (-10.9%). This compares with a 
1.8% employment growth in Great Britain as a whole during the same period. Since 1977, job 
losses in the City have accelerated with some 33,000 redundancies officially recorded between 
June 1977 and May 1980.’  
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As solutions, this second Economic Development Plan identified the development 
of festivals and events as well as museums as ‘visitor magnets’ (GDC, 1983a: 38) 
and recognised the importance of promoting the city’s existing cultural 
facilities, stating:  
 
there is also a need for an officer to market and promote the Council’s own 
leisure facilities (eg halls, museums and art galleries) as tourist assets and 
promote further projects. (GDC, 1983a: 36) 
 
1983 became a turning point for the development of Glasgow’s tourism industry 
and the position of the city’s cultural assets within it. As will be discussed in 
section 5.6, the launch of the ‘Glasgow’s Miles Better’ public relations 
campaign, which aimed to transform the city’s image, was combined with the 
launch of Greater Glasgow Tourist Board (GGTB) and a ‘homecoming’ campaign, 
‘Welcome Home to Glasgow’, aiming to draw people from around the world with 
a connection to Glasgow into the city. Significantly, that year also saw the first 
Mayfest arts festival and the opening of The Burrell Collection by HM The Queen, 
accompanied by assertive promotional activity. 
 
GDC’s early Economic Development Plans brought a new coherence to economic 
development work in the city more broadly, acknowledging the duplication of 
efforts and lack of strategic connection between GDC’s and the SDA’s economic 
development activity and beginning to develop solutions. In the years preceding 
Glasgow’s 1986 ECOC bid, GDC and the SDA worked together on joint projects, 
such as the building of the Scottish Exhibition and Conference Centre (opened 
1985) and the 1988 Garden Festival (awarded to the city in 1983).   
 
GDC’s subsequent Economic Development Plans produced during the mid-1980s 
(GDC, 1984a, 1984b) planned for the development of cultural facilities – such as 
festivals, events, heritage trails and tourist attractions in general – and activity 
to promote them as an integrated part of activity to strengthen tourist facilities 
in the city (GDC, 1984b: 28). However, at no stage in these plans did the 
development of culture go beyond this. The cultural industries were not 
identified as a sector of the city economy to be developed in its own right; 
conversely, culture became an increasingly integrated part of the city’s 
developing tourist industry.   
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The SDA and GDC’s approaches to the economic development of Glasgow show 
that neither was alone in initially lacking obvious solutions to the city’s severe 
socio-economic problems, though both nonetheless invested resources in a range 
of endeavours in an attempt to halt the decline. The position of the arts and 
culture was marginal in the initial work of both the SDA and GDC Economic 
Development Unit. However, over the course of the 1980s, GDC began to 
recognise the potential of the city’s cultural assets as a consumption activity 
within the developing service sector economy, particularly as a means of 
changing the city’s image and attracting more visitors and their accompanying 
spending power.  
 
It was this – alongside the development of public-private partnerships for 
economic development purposes – that provided a foundation for the strategic 
direction of Glasgow’s 1986 ECOC bid. As such, the new emphasis on economic 
development, combined with the new managerialism, reveals a slow burn 
towards a coherent, yet implicit and effective rather than explicit and nominal, 
cultural policy for the city.  
 
5.6 Re-representing the city: Glasgow’s image and the rise of public  
relations   
 
With the realisation in the early to mid-1980s that Glasgow was becoming a post-
industrial city came the recognition of the increasing importance of the city’s 
image to its changing economy.  
 
This section will discuss the reasons why Glasgow’s image gained a new 
significance in efforts to regenerate the city economy. Within the broader 
context of the rise of public relations, it will outline the approach taken by 
Glasgow’s leadership to changing the city’s image in the early 1980s, with 
specific reference to events in 1983.  
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As will be discussed in section 5.7, the 1985 McKinsey report, The Potential of 
Glasgow City Centre (Cullen, 1985)56, presented a clear economic development 
strategy for the city centre which incorporated image building initiatives, into 
which the city’s selected cultural assets, such as its architecture and events, 
were subsumed. The report’s proposals built upon developments in the city in 
the preceding years, including recognition of the importance of the city’s image 
to the service sector economy.  
 
Michael Kelly, Glasgow’s Lord Provost between 1980 and 1984 who, significantly, 
had trained as an economist and subsequently established his own public 
relations company, has reflected on Glasgow’s image in 1980 and why it had to 
change:  
 
It’s difficult to believe how bad it was. Glasgow had a reputation for being 
a very dirty and dismal, dank place plagued by razor gangs and 
hooliganism, multiple deprivation. These problems are very similar to other 
cities in the United Kingdom but Glasgow unfortunately just got the 
reputation for that and that persisted because people continued to focus 
on those problems rather than on the positive side of Glasgow. It was a 
very problematic image for Glasgow because it did inhibit economic 
growth, it inhibited the visitor industry, it inhibited attracting key workers 
to come to Glasgow, and generally it was holding Glasgow back, especially 
as in the 1980s the old industries really had disappeared, the old heavy 
industries, and Glasgow was looking for other industries to try and create 
employment and investment and those industries were mainly service-
based. (Michael Kelly, interview, 23 June 2014) 
 
The reason Kelly argued that Glasgow’s poor image was holding the city back 
was that it had been irrelevant to the success of heavy industry but was integral 
to the viability and success of the service industries. Although in the early 1980s 
the service sector was, as GDC’s initial economic development plan identified, 
also in decline, it was beginning to be identified by the city as the main 
potential area for economic growth, in the wake of heavy industry’s decline. 
Kelly has commented:  
 
Particularly for service-based industries image was very, very important. It 
didn’t matter so much if it was a coal mine or a steelworks or an 
                                               
56 Whilst this key report is often referred to as ‘the McKinsey report’ in this thesis, I have 
followed the example of The Mitchell Library, Glasgow and The University of Glasgow Library in 
listing it in the bibliography under the name of its author, Gordon Cullen.    
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engineering works, image wasn’t necessarily important to make those 
things happen but when you’re trying to sell much softer services, 
particularly in the visitor industry image was vital, and therefore, before 
we could start doing anything on those fronts we really had to try and 
change the image. (Michael Kelly, interview, 23 June 2014) 
 
As Glasgow needed to change its image to rebuild its economy, key actors such 
as Kelly contended that public relations could provide the solution.  
 
The growing professionalisation of the PR industry, including recognition within 
political parties of the potential potency of PR and marketing activity, was 
discussed in Chapter 3. The rise of city marketing – marketing the city as a 
whole, rather than its constituent parts, as a product – during the 1980s and 
1990s was also discussed in Chapter 3. As discussed in Chapter 3, as with many 
significant developments in Glasgow during the 1980s, public relations activity 
was not new to the local authority but rooted in previous decades, Harry Dutch 
having worked as Glasgow Corporation’s PR Officer. Dutch’s assistant, Harry 
Diamond, became Head of Public Relations from GDC’s establishment in 1975 
until his retirement in 1991, and built a growing department during his time 
there,57 driving forward such image-boosting publicity campaigns as that 
attached to the opening of The Burrell Collection in 1983.  
 
However, whilst Glasgow Corporation and GDC may have been ahead of the 
national curve in establishing public relations departments, Michael Kelly has 
claimed that the council itself was an obstacle in efforts to transform Glasgow’s 
image. 
 
There were a lot of obstacles [in developing the ‘Glasgow’s Miles Better’ 
campaign] particularly within the council because councillors focused very 
                                               
57 GDC archive documents show that by the end of the 1980s, Harry Diamond had built something 
of a public relations empire within GDC. Diamond drove the establishment and growth of what 
became a particularly well-resourced press and PR department within the Festivals Unit, focused 
on ECOC 1990, in addition to his own broader PR department. Archive documents show that by 
July 1989 this department had 14 members of staff (with Harry Diamond retaining control as 
‘task force leader’) (see uncatalogued documents in GDC committee papers box 126 held at 
Glasgow City Archives, The Mitchell Library, Glasgow). This was considerably well-staffed for a 
sub-department of GDC’s broader PR department – and particularly significant given that, 
according to Diamond’s autobiography (1996: 68), there were just 3 members of staff (the Head 
of PR, the Head of PR’s assistant and a secretary) in the entire GDC public relations department 
when GDC was established in 1975. This also shows the significant role the arts and culture 
played in the growth of public relations capacity and activity in GDC over the course of the 
1980s.  
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narrow budgets on trying to make physical improvements. They were 
mending roofs and looking after houses and wanting to spend money on the 
normal council services, and they didn’t see that an advertising campaign, 
as they called it, was going to help in any way at all.58  
(Michael Kelly, interview, 23 June 2014) 
 
Indeed, Kelly has asserted that changing Glasgow’s image was not a priority in 
terms of council expenditure. 
 
The public relations department was there to promote council services. It 
wasn’t there to promote Glasgow.  
(Michael Kelly, interview, 23 June 2014)59 
 
This reflects an obstacle with city marketing in Glasgow at this nascent stage: 
that in the years before ‘destination marketing’, there was no designated 
organisation or individual responsible for marketing the city as a whole.60  
 
                                               
58 It should be noted, however, that while Kelly claims the council initially failed to support the 
Glasgow’s Miles Better campaign, archival records show that GDC was supportive of the 1983 
‘Welcome Home to Glasgow’ promotional campaign headed by Kelly, which ran concurrently to 
Glasgow’s Miles Better. This was a campaign to promote Glasgow to people living overseas with 
connections to the city, as discussed elsewhere in this chapter. In March 1982, GDC Policy and 
Resources Committee Sub-committee on Employment earmarked £80,000 towards the campaign 
after hearing from the then Lord Provost Kelly on ‘the aims of the promotion and the 
opportunities for partnership arrangements with the private sector’ (GDC, 1982a).  
59 The relationship between Michael Kelly and GDC public relations department appears not to 
have run entirely smoothly during the 1980s, judging from Kelly’s interview and Harry Diamond’s 
autobiography (Diamond, 1996). In the broader section of Kelly’s interview from which the 
quotation above is taken, Kelly took a rather dim view of GDC’s PR department, stating: ‘The 
public relations department got in the way [of the Glasgow’s Miles Better campaign] really, I 
didn’t use the public relations department at all. The public relations department in my opinion 
was very poorly run. And erm… It… The public relations department was there to promote 
council services. It wasn’t there to promote Glasgow. That is the crucial distinction, really. To 
say we had a public relations department, we were not promoting the city really we were 
promoting what the council was doing in the city. My campaign was promoting Glasgow as a 
whole. And… I wasn’t impressed by the personnel in the public relations department so I just left 
them to get on with their own thing and… the [Glasgow’s Miles Better] campaign did not run at 
any time through them when I was there.’ In his autobiography, meanwhile, Diamond stated that 
Kelly ‘carefully avoids contradicting any interviewer who mistakenly implies that he invented the 
miles better campaign and was solely responsible for telling the world about everything good 
that ever happened in the city’ (Diamond, 1996: 148). Kelly and Diamond were clearly both key 
protagonists in the rise of PR in GDC and GDC’s attempts to change the city’s image (bearing in 
mind both were GDC actors, Kelly as Lord Provost and Diamond as Head of Public Relations). As 
will be discussed in subsequent chapters, the later development of ECOC 1990 was connected to 
GDC’s attempts to change the image of the city, with GDC’s understanding of PR extending well 
beyond promoting council services (during a period in which Diamond was Head of PR). However, 
the early 1980s were a period when, despite assertive PR campaigns such as that accompanying 
the opening of The Burrell Collection, which did much to promote Glasgow, neither GDC nor any 
other agency was officially responsible for marketing the city as a whole, as this chapter goes on 
to discuss. 
60 Indeed, some interviewees reported the Scottish Tourist Board’s lack of interest or willingness 
to promote Glasgow as a tourist destination during the 1980s.  
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A further challenge was the disconnect between the city’s socio-economic 
problems and the image of the city Kelly and his associates wished to project. In 
1993, Paddison discussed the ‘image-reality gap’ emerging from ECOC 1990, 
where:  
 
the projection of the new Glasgow bore little relevance to the realities of 
social deprivation and poverty concentrated in the city’s peripheral 
estates. (Paddison, 1993: 348) 
 
That attempts to change Glasgow’s image a decade earlier were based on 
distracting attention away from the city’s severe socio-economic problems is not 
denied by key actors such as Michael Kelly. Indeed, this was central to the 
construction of the ‘Glasgow’s Miles Better’ campaign during the early 1980s, as 
Kelly has reflected:  
 
What Glasgow had to do was to focus on these positive aspects and just 
ignore the social problems. Blatantly ignoring them really because as a Lord 
Provost and as a council we couldn’t solve those problems. It needed 
massive government help, it needed outside investment. It needed a whole 
lot of things that the council couldn’t do, particularly when Thatcher was 
in power. Remember this was the era where the public sector was really 
being hit very hard so we had no funds to tackle these kind of problems. So 
I decided, well we can’t cure them, just ignore them, let’s concentrate on 
promoting the positive aspects of Glasgow as New York had done and see if 
we could change the image in that way.  
(Michael Kelly, interview, 23 June 2014) 
 
The ‘Glasgow’s Miles Better’ campaign, featuring Mr Happy and involving 
advertising trailblazer John Struthers, was inspired by ‘I Love New York’ at a 
time when, as Kelly has reflected in his interview, ‘social problems were really, 
really deep in New York and yet that didn’t seem to bother visitors because they 
concentrated on the positive aspects’ of the city. 
 
The ‘Glasgow’s Miles Better’ campaign was launched in 1983, the same year as 
the first Mayfest was held, The Burrell Collection opened in the midst of a surge 
of publicity and the ‘Welcome Home to Glasgow’ campaign was launched, as 
well as the launch of the new GGTB. GGTB figures61 state that this period saw a 
massive increase in both visitors to Glasgow and their associated spending 
                                               
61 These figures were provided by GGTB in Glasgow’s European City of Culture submission to The 
Office of Arts and Libraries in April 1986 (GDC, 1986b).  
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power, rising from 700,000 visitors spending £68m in 1982 to 2,000,000 visitors 
spending £165m in 1984.  
 
This series of events resembles, at first glance, a strategically co-ordinated 
approach across a variety of business and cultural sectors. Indeed, connections 
were made by such key actors as Eddie Friel – who worked in marketing at 
Glasgow’s Theatre Royal before becoming Chief Executive of the new GGTB in 
August 1983 – between the city’s cultural infrastructure and its developing 
tourism industry by, for example, attempting to establish a year-round 
programme of events, as theatres had previously closed over the main tourist 
seasons. However, this culmination of events in 1983 was due as much to 
opportunism and coincidence as strategic planning.   
 
While culture was beginning to shift from its peripheral position in the 
appendices to the latter sections of GDC’s economic development plans, 
McKinsey and Co. had yet to make their observations and recommendations on 
the interconnected role image, culture and events had to play in regenerating 
the city economy.  
 
The opening of The Burrell Collection was the culmination of decades of stalled 
planning. That it became part of a critical mass that emerged in the early 1980s 
was, as outlined earlier, more due to coincidence than formal, coherent and 
overarching strategic planning.  
 
Michael Kelly has stated that in the development of the ‘Glasgow’s Miles Better’ 
campaign ‘there was no strategy at the beginning […] very much for me it was 
seeing an opportunity and seizing that’ (interview, 23 June 2014). This reflects 
the pragmatic opportunism that became a defining characteristic of the city 
during the 1980s.  
 
5.7 Public-private partnership 
 
In 1986, a partnership between public and private sectors would form the 
lynchpin of Glasgow’s bid to host the ECOC event in 1990. This partnership has 
been credited by those directly involved in the decision-making process to select 
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the UK’s ECOC nomination as one of the reasons Glasgow’s bid outshone the 
competition (Richard Luce, interview, 24 March 2015; Patrick Fallon, interview, 
11 March 2015; Joy Parry, interview, 11 December 2014). This public-private 
partnership approach is also central to the strategic trajectory of Glasgow’s 
emerging cultural policy more broadly over the course of the 1980s and into the 
1990s. 
 
This key facilitating factor in the development of Glasgow’s cultural policy 
developed as a result of partnerships between public and private sectors rising 
to a new prominence in economic development planning and policy in the city 
over the course of the 1980s.   
 
Public-private partnerships have been theoretically framed by various 
commentators as both Thatcherite and an intrinsic characteristic of the 
neoliberal state (Harvey, 2005; Brenner and Theodore, 2005; Berry, 2014). 
During the Thatcher governments of the 1980s, public-private partnerships were 
one of a number of urban policy tools in which the weighting of responsibility for 
the regeneration of the ‘inner cities’ was increasingly shifted away from the 
public to the private sector. It was also one of a number of means of privileging 
private sector interests over those of the public sector.  
 
In his Marxist political economy account of neoliberalism, Harvey has dissected 
public-private partnerships in the context of Margaret Thatcher’s approach to 
economic development:  
 
Businesses and corporations not only collaborate intimately with state 
actors but even acquire a strong role in writing legislation, determining 
public policies, and setting regulatory frameworks (which are mainly 
advantageous to themselves). (Harvey, 2005: 76-77) 
 
In the twenty-first century, public-private partnerships have come to be 
associated with such projects as the building of new hospitals and schools 
through private finance initiatives, in which infrastructure formerly managed by 
the public sector is developed and managed by private sector companies as a 
means of efficiently improving public services, often resulting, conversely, in 
poor value for money to the taxpayer. In the 1980s, whilst public-private 
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partnerships were not yet established on such formal and extensive terms in the 
UK, the phrase began to gain political and academic currency. For example, 
writing in 1989 Robin Boyle (1989a: 73-74) used the term to describe a shift, 
emerging in 1985, in the SDA’s financial and administrative involvement in urban 
policy in Glasgow and Scotland more broadly, in which the role of the private 
sector was elevated. 
 
In the mid-1980s public-private partnerships were one of a number of emerging 
tendencies, now characterised as both neoliberal and Thatcherite, which 
affected local authorities such as GDC. The central government promotion of 
privatisation, another such tendency, met with vocal opposition from GDC as 
well as many other Labour-led metropolitan authorities, where it was seen as a 
force intended to undermine and weaken local government.62 However, despite 
the underlying premise of privileging private sector interests, the central 
government promotion of public-private partnerships did not meet with the 
same level of resistance in Glasgow.  
 
Steven Hamilton has noted that partnerships between public and private sectors 
in Glasgow became stronger during the 1980s, as private sector leaders appeared 
to have more influence than GDC with central government:  
 
There was nothing like the close relationship [between the council and 
business community] that was developed during the Thatcher years, but it 
was necessary. We couldn’t get things through that should have been put 
through, without the imprimatur of approval as it were, of the private 
sector people. (Steven Hamilton, interview, 3 July 2014) 
 
In the approach that developed in Glasgow over the course of the 1980s, 
pragmatism superseded any ideological opposition. Hamilton has stated:  
 
It became obvious during the Thatcher years that she [Margaret Thatcher] 
was totally opposed to anything that smacked of local authority or indeed 
public enterprise, because she thought that you couldn’t possibly have 
enterprise in the public sector, enterprise was something for the private 
sector. So, a whole lot of the things that we achieved at that time were 
                                               
62 For example, GDC established an anti-privatisation sub-committee of the council. See, for 
example, Minutes of the Council and Committees, 1988-89 print no. 3 (May, June, July 1988) 
held in GDC council minutes box: GDC 1/2, 1988/89, in Glasgow City Archives, The Mitchell 
Library, Glasgow. 
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achieved by partnership arrangements and there were plenty of people in 
the city, businessmen in the city, who could see through what was 
happening and although they were Tory supporters, they were quite 
pleased to put their name to things, to be members of the board of this, 
that or the other. I think the concert hall was one of these but there were 
other companies, other things where they were heavily involved and given 
prominent positions so that this could be presented to the government, as a 
private/public combination. It was all financed by the council as a rule. 
(Steven Hamilton, interview, 3 July 2014)63 
 
One significant reason for this lack of resistance within GDC to the central 
government ‘imposition’ of public-private partnerships was that it was no 
imposition at all: such partnerships were already historically-rooted in 
Glasgow.64  
 
It was within this context that the two critical developments of the 1985 report 
by management consultants McKinsey and Co., The Potential of Glasgow City 
Centre (Cullen, 1985), and the establishment of the public-private partnership, 
Glasgow Action, as a result of that report, provided a point of convergence 
between GDC’s economic development activity and that of the SDA.  
 
David Macdonald, Head of Service Industries Division at the SDA between 1983 
and 1985 and subsequently Director of Glasgow Action from 1985, has described 
how this marked a shift in the SDA’s approach to economic development:  
 
McKinsey and Company were commissioned to look at Glasgow. That was a 
bit of a departure for the SDA because up to that point the SDA had, to the 
extent that it focused its area initiatives, they tended to be in what they’d 
call problem areas, areas of real need for economic regeneration having 
sunk to quite a serious low point. So whether that be Clydebank or 
Coatbridge or wherever there were special initiatives in those areas. It was 
a departure that Edward [Cunningham, Director at the SDA] then 
commissioned McKinseys to look at Glasgow city centre, which wasn’t 
necessarily a problem area, but it was perceived that it could become a 
problem area or alternatively the potential of Glasgow city centre could be 
                                               
63 Hamilton’s reflections on Glasgow’s approach during this period align with Carmichael’s 
comments that the council’s approach during this era was ‘designed to enable construction of a 
consensus between the public and private sectors to advance Glasgow’s case on a unified front’ 
given that confrontation with central government held ‘little prospect of success’. In comparison 
with Liverpool during this period, Carmichael has described Glasgow’s greater capacity ‘to join 
battle in combined formation’ and work towards a shared, coherent strategy ‘rather than 
charging headlong into oblivion’ (1995: 135).  
64 For example, as discussed in Chapter 2, partnerships between Glasgow Corporation and 
businessmen were the foundation of the city’s approach to the exhibitions of 1888 and 1901 and 
the building of the Kelvingrove Museum and Art Gallery.   
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realised and it could help launch the rest of Glasgow and indeed the West 
of Scotland to create an area of economic strength.  
(David Macdonald, interview, 8 September 2014) 
 
McKinsey and Co. were commissioned by the SDA to examine Glasgow city centre 
as if it were a business, then produce a ‘business plan’ for it. Their report 
(Cullen, 1985: 3) recognised the irreversible decline in heavy industry and that 
‘service industries provide the only realistic opportunity for employment growth 
in Glasgow’. Stating that Glasgow faced ‘a spiral of decline’ (Cullen, 1985: 5), 
the report noted:  
 
Glasgow can avoid this possible spiral of decline by building a new and 
stronger economic role, based on a revitalised city centre, strong in 
services and fuelled by the talent and energy of its people.  
(Cullen, 1985: 10) 
 
The report set out the aim ‘to achieve fundamental, self-sustaining change in 
service industry performance’ through four objectives: ‘make Glasgow more 
attractive as a business base’; ‘make Glasgow more attractive to people’; 
‘create an entrepreneurial environment’; and ‘promote Glasgow’ (Cullen, 1986: 
3-4). 
 
The report’s key recommendation was the establishment of a small leadership 
group to act as a focus for these efforts. This group, named Glasgow Action, led 
by industrialist Sir Norman Macfarlane, predominantly comprised businessmen 
such as Forbes Macpherson, then Deputy Chairman of TSB Scotland and Sir Eric 
Yarrow, then Chairman of Clydesdale Bank, alongside leaders of both GDC and 
SRC, supported by a small administrative team. Notably, it was Macfarlane who 
drew together the board, persuading both council leaders as well as his business 
leader peers to become involved. 
 
Whereas the arts and culture occupied a marginal position in GDC’s early 
economic development plans, in the McKinsey report they are clearly articulated 
as critical assets in a process of economic development. Recognising that:  
 
Glasgow’s present image deters visitors and discourages people from 
considering Glasgow as a place to live and work, (Cullen, 1985: 10)   
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the report connected the arts and culture to its proposed solution of increased 
public relations activity. It proposed extending ‘Glasgow’s Miles Better’ to 
‘target audiences outside Glasgow’65 as ‘a sustained campaign to build a clear, 
positive image of Glasgow as a place to visit, as an attractive location for 
businesses, and as the centre of an area offering an outstandingly attractive 
quality of life’ (Cullen, 1985: 33). 
 
Stating that ‘advertising alone – no matter how evocative or how well targeted – 
will not change negative perceptions of the city’ (Cullen, 1985: 34), the report 
identified a vital and unique role for the arts and culture in this campaign of 
image transformation and its messages about the quality of life in the city:  
 
Publicity needs to be given to the city’s new image. The wide publicity 
given to the Burrell Collection, which has obviously been highly effective, 
should set the standard for the future. The impact and cost effectiveness 
of specially staged events would be substantial and Glasgow Action should 
promote a programme to complement and sustain the impact of the 1988 
National Garden Festival, this might include a technology World Fair, a 
motor racing Grand Prix, world premieres of major cultural events and a 
film or television series set in Glasgow, reflecting the positive qualities of 
the city. (Cullen, 1985: 34) 
 
Thus, the McKinsey report articulated the potential of ‘major cultural events’ as 
a vehicle in the city’s economic renewal; predominantly a high impact, cost 
effective vehicle for changing the city’s image to support the shift away from 
manufacturing to the service industries.  
 
This emphasis on the transformative power of cultural events is reinforced in the 
proposed physical transformation to the city centre. The report proposed the 
development of a new square – ‘Caledonia Square’ – at the top of Buchanan 
Street to ‘form the cultural focus of the city’ (Cullen, 1985: 51). In an example 
of the uneven approach to the spatial development of the city and the focus of 
investment on the city centre – rather than more deprived areas – as the main 
                                               
65 Glasgow’s Miles Better was originally aimed at audiences outside Glasgow in general but the 
McKinsey strategy recommended a more strategic approach targeting specific groups, such as 
business leaders and middle managers. Michael Kelly has commented on the original audience for 
Glasgow’s Miles Better: ‘I wasn’t particularly interested in what Glaswegians thought of the city 
because they weren’t going to influence jobs and investment here. So it was targeted outside 
Glasgow. And it was really just an unexpected by-product that it caught on so well in Glasgow 
and it really revived confidence.’ (Michael Kelly, interview, 23 June 2014)    
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catalyst for economic development, the McKinsey report proposed relocating the 
Caledonia Road Church, designed by Alexander ‘Greek’ Thomson, from the 
Gorbals to this new site as ‘a flamboyant gesture to Glasgow’s Victorian 
heritage’ (Cullen, 1985: 51). Whilst this particular proposal remains unrealised, 
McKinsey’s reframing of the city’s cultural events and architecture as assets in a 
process of economic development laid the foundations for the subsequent 
development of cultural policy in Glasgow.  
 
A further role for the arts and culture emerged: promoting confidence in 
Glasgow within the city's leadership as well as within target audiences beyond. 
This confidence is projected in the foreword to the McKinsey report, written by 
SDA Chief Executive, George Matheson: 
 
Glasgow’s willingness and ability to succeed are clearly indicated by the 
number and breadth of initiatives already taken or planned, signalling a 
renewed self-confidence and pride – for example, the Scottish Exhibition 
Centre, the opening of the Burrell Collection, its new hotels, the 
‘Glasgow’s Miles Better’ campaign, the successful hosting of the CBI 
Conference, the proposed redevelopment at the top of Buchanan Street 
and at St Enoch’s and the 1988 Garden Festival. (Cullen, 1985: 3) 
 
David Macdonald has reflected on the advantage his new insider knowledge of 
Glasgow’s cultural assets gave him as director of Glasgow Action during the 
organisation’s five-year lifespan, as he worked to attract new business to the 
city:  
 
It was an eye opener to people like me, you know, to get told, hang on a 
minute, the SNO, as it was then, is in Glasgow, it's not in Edinburgh. 
Scottish Opera's in Glasgow it's not in Edinburgh, so there were lots of 
things like that, that made me even prouder of Glasgow, but also 
strengthened my pitch when I was talking to other people about it.  
(David Macdonald, interview, 8 September 2014) 
 
For Sir Norman Macfarlane, the Chairman of Glasgow Action, Glasgow’s cultural 
assets provided a means of advocating the strengths of the city to his peers. 
Writing in Britoil Magazine 1987/88, in an article which is both celebratory in 
tone and clearly aimed at senior business sector managers, Norman Macfarlane 
discussed the relationship between industrialist art collectors, the 
developmental role of independent arts organisations such as Glasgow Art Club 
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and the Royal Glasgow Institute over the past century and Glasgow’s current 
municipal art collections, which make Glasgow ‘the most exciting and 
stimulating artistic environment in Britain today’ (Macfarlane, 1990: 50).66  
 
A dedicated art collector, Norman Macfarlane was knighted in 1982 for services 
not only to Industry but also to the Arts. Macfarlane brought credibility to his 
message about Glasgow’s established connection between the arts and industry – 
which aligned clearly with the objectives of the McKinsey strategy to promote 
Glasgow and its quality of life, and making the city more attractive as a business 
base by improving its image. As such, the arts and culture gave the city 
credibility for business.  
 
Leaders such as Macfarlane valued the arts and culture as a genuine asset to the 
city, a reflection of the city’s capabilities rather than a hollow marketing ploy. 
The city’s historical cultural achievements were viewed as intrinsically 
connected to its past industrial achievements and as such were a source of civic 
pride and belief that the city could be restored to greatness.67   
 
Over the course of the 1980s and into the 1990s, against the backdrop of the 
Thatcher government’s promotion of the role of the private sector in urban 
regeneration, Norman Macfarlane was a key actor in a public-private partnership 
that connected Labour councillors with Tory peers and which viewed culture as a 
credible vehicle for the city’s economic development.  
 
                                               
66 Norman Macfarlane was invited to be interviewed for this research project though declined 
and a formal interview did not take place. This thesis therefore relies on available public 
accounts to include Macfarlane’s voice.   
67 In his maiden speech in the House of Lords in 1992, in a debate on the Scottish Economy, and 
introducing himself as ‘a businessman and a lover of things artistic, unreservedly so in both 
respects’, Norman Macfarlane’s speech focused on Glasgow: the scale of the economic 
challenges facing the city and how ‘partnership has been the crucial factor in the regeneration 
of Glasgow’ (Macfarlane, 1992). He called for greater public and private sector investment in 
Glasgow, which he presented as a city of untapped cultural and economic assets of national and 
European significance: ‘Glasgow now stands on the threshold of once again becoming one of 
Europe’s great cities: great in the sense not only of prosperity but of completeness as a city, a 
city of opportunity, a city of environment, a city of culture and a city of real community. […] 
Investment is required from both Government and business, but that investment will reap 
substantial rewards because Glasgow is not only a city of great need but also a city of great 
opportunity. It has the potential to become a major asset and contributor to the economic and 
cultural base of our country’. 
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In conclusion, although Glasgow’s approach to public-private partnerships 
undoubtedly developed as a pragmatic response to the approach of the Thatcher 
government, such partnerships were already historically rooted in the city. 
However, the two key critical events in 1985 of the McKinsey report’s strategic 
reframing of the city’s cultural events and infrastructure as economic 
development assets and the establishment of Glasgow Action to implement the 
strategy were significant and influential factors in the subsequent direction of 
Glasgow’s emerging cultural policy. This is epitomised in the city’s approach, in 
1986, to its bid to win the ECOC nomination – another critical event which 
resolutely established this strategic trajectory.  
 
At this turning point, Glasgow’s cultural achievements provided the city’s 
leaders with confidence that the city could be restored to its former economic 
standing. However, the key actors in this process of turning cultural assets into 
economic ones over the course of the 1980s were not the city’s artists or arts 
institutions – those that produced the city’s culture – but its civic and business 
leaders, planners, development agency leaders and, ultimately, management 
consultants. Public-private partnerships were a key facilitating factor in the 
cultural policy to emerge subsequently in Glasgow.  
 
5.8 Conclusion    
 
Despite facing a variety of severe socio-economic problems throughout the 1970s 
and into the 1980s, Glasgow had a thriving cultural infrastructure which 
continued to expand without a formal cultural policy being developed for the 
city.  
 
The period 1970 to 1979 saw a dramatic restructuring of the local authority 
landscape in Glasgow, with the 1975 local government reorganisation followed 
by a period of political turmoil in GDC in which corporate management failed to 
thrive. 1980 marked a new period of political stability which, when combined 
with the centralising approach of Jean McFadden’s leadership and the corporate 
approach of the recently appointed Chief Executive, Steven Hamilton, enabled 
corporate management to become embedded within GDC. However, tensions 
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between corporate management and the traditional structures it was intended 
to replace remained throughout the period.  
 
Despite the inherent tensions between old and new structures, the introduction 
of corporate management brought several consequences for working practices. 
The most significant of these, as a prompting and facilitating factor in what 
became the cultural turn in Glasgow’s policy making, was the establishment of 
formal structures focused on economic development.  
 
From a peripheral position in GDC’s economic development plans, culture began 
to emerge as a tool for economic development, as a consumption activity within 
the developing service sector, though not as an industry in its own right. While 
economic development was prioritised by the three public sector bodies GDC, 
SRC and the SDA, the strategies developed by each did not always align.  
 
The recommendations of the 1985 McKinsey report, The Potential of Glasgow 
City Centre, and key actors in its instigation, such as Sir Norman Macfarlane, 
acted as a critical focal point, drawing together the key public sector leaders 
with those of the city’s business community, with a clear strategy for the 
economic development of the city centre.  
 
Following a period in which the city’s cultural events and infrastructure – such as 
the 1983 opening of The Burrell Collection – were absorbed into its public 
relations strategies, the McKinsey strategy reinforced the importance of the 
city’s arts and cultural assets as a means of changing the city’s image, thereby 
supporting the shift in the base of the city economy from manufacturing to the 
service industries and consumer services. However, despite these strategic 
developments, the city remained, to a large extent, reliant on its established 
approach of pragmatic opportunism.  
 
In early 1986, several months after the production of the McKinsey report and 
the establishment of Glasgow Action, and having already secured the 1988 
National Garden Festival title, Glasgow was presented with the opportunity to 
bid to become the UK’s nominee for the ECOC in 1990.  
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At this point, Glasgow did not have an explicit or nominal cultural policy to form 
the basis of its bid. It did, however, have a newly established, powerful public-
private partnership and a rapidly developing – and converging – collection of 
economic development policies, strategies and plans, in which a range of the 
city’s burgeoning cultural institutions and events had been reframed as vehicles.  
 
As will now be discussed in Chapter 6, it was this that formed the strategic basis 
of Glasgow’s ECOC bid and the subsequent strategic trajectory of Glasgow’s 
emerging cultural policy. It was this that provided the foundation of the 
emerging approach of not culture-led regeneration, but regeneration-led 
culture.  
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CHAPTER 6 1985 TO 1986: GLASGOW BECOMES A 
EUROPEAN CITY OF CULTURE  
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter will argue that the construction and reception of Glasgow’s bid for 
the UK nomination for ECOC 1990 was shaped by a combination of prestige, 
prejudice and public relations. It will examine the strategies employed by GDC 
and its coalition partners in developing Glasgow’s ECOC bid. It will examine how 
the city mobilised the requisite expertise, and how it assessed the challenge 
represented by its rivals and countered that challenge. It will also examine the 
decision-making process and consider the roles played by key actors in central 
government which resulted in Glasgow winning the nomination.  
 
1986 was the year in which the critical events of Glasgow bidding to host the 
ECOC 1990 event and subsequently being awarded the title set the strategic 
trajectory for the city’s emerging cultural policy. This was a strategic trajectory 
intrinsically connected to economic development, specifically the city’s service 
sector, an approach which privileged the consumption over the production of 
culture.   
 
Both the UK and Glasgow took distinctive approaches to the ECOC which 
subsequently had broader ramifications for the future of not only cultural policy 
in Glasgow, but also the initiative itself. However, in 1986, when the 
opportunity arose for a UK city to host the event, Glasgow’s selection as ECOC 
1990 was far from inevitable. Nor was the announcement in October 1986 of 
Glasgow as the UK’s nominated city universally popular. Edinburgh’s Lord 
Provost John MacKay is reported to have claimed that the selection of Glasgow 
rather than Edinburgh was ‘political and vindictive’ (McGhee, 1986). 
 
This chapter will begin by establishing the broader national and European 
context and parameters which shaped Glasgow’s approach to the ECOC. It will 
conclude by reflecting on how the ECOC began to emerge as a facilitating factor 
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– as well as an obstacle – in the subsequent development of cultural policy in 
Glasgow; issues which will be discussed in further detail in subsequent chapters.  
 
6.2 The EC and the UK: the opportunities presented by the ECOC and the 
parameters set 
 
The UK’s approach to the ECOC marked a departure from those of its 
predecessor host states at a relatively early stage before the conventions and 
expectations of the event were firmly established.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the ECOC was conceived by Greek Culture Minister, 
Melina Mercouri, ‘to celebrate European culture as a means of drawing the 
[European] community closer’ (Garcia, 2007: 3). The first event was held in 
Athens in 1985, followed between 1986 and 1989 by events in Florence, 
Amsterdam, Berlin and Paris. In 1986 the UK was allocated as the EC member 
state to host the 1990 event. 
 
The UK was the first state to select its ECOC through a competition between 
cities (Garcia, 2007: 4); to nominate a post-industrial city with a very different 
reputation to its predecessors; to select a city which had connected the ECOC 
programme to broader economic development aims; and to decide initially not 
to provide any additional central government funding for its ECOC event.  
 
For Glasgow, the competition to be nominated as the UK’s ECOC 1990 presented 
both opportunities and challenges. Glasgow’s bid developed in response to these 
opportunities and challenges, as well as the competition parameters that were 
developed by the UK government in response to its own identified set of 
opportunities and challenges presented by the ECOC event.  
 
This section will establish the reasons for the UK’s distinctive approach; the 
challenges and opportunities the ECOC presented to the government and the 
parameters set in response; and the broader EC context and framework in which 
it developed.  
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The establishment in 1985 of the ECOC programme by the EC was not an entirely 
welcome event for the UK government. The UK’s position was that the EC was 
established as purely an economic community with no remit for arts and culture. 
Patrick Fallon (interview, 11 March 2015), who as a civil servant led on the ECOC 
programme, inter alia, at the Office of Arts and Libraries (OAL), has explained 
the government’s view that ‘there was no justification for cultural activity in the 
Treaty of Rome’ on which the EC was founded.  
 
Unlike many of the eleven other EC member states, the UK did not, during the 
1980s, have a department for culture. Arts and culture held a fairly marginal 
position within the government. It was not in receipt of a large budget from the 
Treasury. The sole Minster for the Arts was not a cabinet position and the OAL 
was a small office in the considerably more substantial Department for 
Education and Science.  
 
Patrick Fallon has described the UK’s concerns and how it aimed to influence the 
development of the ECOC framework before it became an established – and 
expensive – commitment beyond the government’s control:  
  
The British, I think, had thought this was a potentially expensive form of 
European window-dressing which would divert money away from the basic 
spending on culture in Britain. But once European Ministers of Culture had 
agreed it, we decided that we would support it wholeheartedly, but with a 
certain amount of regard for the public economy and resources and that we 
would propose a British city candidate fairly soon, because we thought in 
our own civil service discussions that it was something that was likely to 
grow, escalate and become a bit of a ‘keeping up with the Joneses’ or the 
Schmidts or the Duponts. So we thought, we’ll get in early before the 
framework has been established and do it our way, which was exactly what 
happened.  (Patrick Fallon, interview, 11 March 2015) 
 
Whilst nominated cities had to be ratified by all twelve member states in order 
to be awarded the title, the EC’s approach to the ECOC was – at this early stage 
– inherently flexible, subject to a resolution rather than a directive, resulting in 
comparatively little central direction. In proposing, in 1986, its nominated city 
according to its own distinctive approach to selection, the UK was facilitated 
rather than blocked by this system.  
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The resolution ‘concerning the annual event “European City of Culture”’ agreed 
by the ‘Ministers responsible for Cultural Affairs’ within the Council of the 
European Communities in Brussels shortly before the first ECOC event in Athens, 
set out the ‘aims and content’, ‘selection criteria’ and ‘organisation and 
finance’ for future ECOCs with distinct brevity. Its approach to defining ‘culture’ 
was open, flexible and not a little vague:  
 
The Ministers responsible for Cultural Affairs consider that the European 
City of Culture event should be the expression of a culture which, in its 
historical emergence and contemporary development, is characterised by 
having both common elements and a richness born of diversity.  
(European Communities, The Council, 1985: 1) 
 
The sparsity of information provided here about what EC member states in 1985 
understood culture to be was undoubtedly intentional. As Raymond Williams 
(1976) highlighted in his seminal inquiry into vocabulary, ‘culture’ is a slippery 
term. This era saw increasing complexity in the developing structures connecting 
culture and Europe, including the Council of Europe and the European 
Commission as well as the European Economic Community’s changing remit, and 
a diversity of approaches to the administration of culture within the twelve EC 
member states.  The resolution provided only the information sufficient to 
enable the programme to begin, with each member state bringing its own 
interpretation of what constitutes their City of Culture’s culture.  
 
Joy Parry, Senior Executive Officer at the OAL in 1985 when the resolution was 
written, has described the defining parameters set within the document: 
 
The key thing was that in each case it would be the member state that 
made the running and paid for it. It gave them a lot of freedom to decide 
what was important to them to showcase within a European context. So the 
interest from a European point of view was to make the link between 
Europe and culture. And the interest from the national point of view was to 
showcase local and national culture, and regional to an extent. So that 
within those sort of parameters gave a lot of room to interpret it the way 
that it suited each member state.  
(Joy Parry, interview, 11 December 2014) 
 
Analysis of the UK’s interpretation reveals the connection of the ECOC’s 
parameters to a variety of government agendas, some within the scope of the 
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OAL’s remit, some beyond, as well as an interest in diverging from the 
precedent set by other EC member states to host the event.  
 
Had the UK followed the precedent set by other EC member states, a logical 
choice of ECOC might have been London, as the UK’s largest city, renowned as 
an international tourist destination and home to a prestigious and unparalleled 
collection of cultural assets. However, London was not invited to apply by the 
OAL.  
 
In February 1986, the left-wing Greater London Council was in the process of 
being abolished by the Thatcher government. London was precluded from 
bidding for the nomination as the regional local government tier which 
connected the numerous district councils was in the process of being dismantled. 
However, the then Arts Minister and civil servants interviewed for this research 
project stressed that the government was keen that London should not be the 
UK’s ECOC. In the words of Richard Luce: 
 
I did weekly tours of the arts round the country. So really this concept that 
all arts is in London was something that actually I reacted rather strongly 
against, partly because I thought all the moaning and complaining from 
some arts people like Peter Hall was coming from London and every week 
when I went round the country I could see that people weren’t moaning, 
they were actually doing an extraordinary job. They were getting on with 
things without having a great deal of money and one needed to do 
something to help fuel it, to encourage it and I therefore, I have to admit I 
probably had a slight psychological feeling against London almost, because 
London was spoilt. And not only were they spoilt but they were moaning 
about their lives the whole time and people outside weren’t moaning and 
all these wonderful cities needed a new light.  
(Richard Luce, interview, 24 March 2015) 
 
This approach reflects the broader contemporary issue of inequitable levels of 
public funding for the arts and culture between London and the nations and 
regions of the UK, highlighted by such reports as the Arts Council’s 1984 The 
Glory of the Garden: the development of the arts in England, as well as earlier 
reports by UNESCO (Green and Wilding, 1970; Abercrombie, 1982). 
 
Richard Luce has explained the decision to take a different approach to previous 
EC member states and select its nominated city through a competition:  
  154 
 
 
Paris, Berlin, Amsterdam, Florence, Athens are so… they’re unsurprising in 
a way. But I know we felt that we’ve got to give everyone who wants an 
opportunity to put in a bid. I definitely recall it was my excellent 
Permanent Secretary Richard Wilding, outstandingly good, he helped me a 
great deal and I think that was in the earlier days, that’s right. And we 
agreed we must have a really even competition and it would be exciting 
because it would galvanise certain cities to try and get their act together. 
(Richard Luce, interview, 24 March 2015) 
 
In February 1986, the OAL invited a selection of UK cities, identified through the 
Local Authority Associations – including two Scottish cities, Edinburgh and 
Glasgow – to make a formal submission to be considered for the UK nomination 
to hold the ECOC title in 1990. In choosing to select its ECOC through a 
competition between cities, the OAL’s invitation letter (Fallon, 1986) provided 
some brief guidance for applicants, the content of which was in keeping with its 
‘arms-length’ approach to the arts and culture. The government’s expectations 
of the event were described as follows:  
 
The intention is that the designated city would be responsible for a 
programme of art exhibitions […] and other cultural events such as dance, 
theatre and music. The scope of these activities is not in any way pre-
determined: they can range from popular culture to specialised events; and 
would involve artists, directors, performers and others. (Fallon, 1986) 
 
Here, although the OAL made no attempt to define culture beyond ‘the arts’, it 
very clearly steered competitors towards proposing an arts festival. Whilst some 
attempt was made to encompass ‘high’ arts and ‘popular culture’, the guidance 
was otherwise open to interpretation by competing cities. One thing, however, 
was made very clear:  
 
The Government’s view is that responsibility for the organisation and for 
raising finance should lie with the nominated City of Culture; and it does 
not envisage providing any additional funding for this purpose.  
(Fallon, 1986) 
 
Having underlined this point, the OAL provided four criteria as ‘guidance on the 
information we require’ and on which applications were to be judged:  
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1. Existing cultural status;  
2. Proposed programme;  
3. Finance: details of how you propose to finance the project with 
estimates of proposed expenditure and revenue; 
4. Accommodation, facilities and accessibility. 
(Office of Arts and Libraries, 1986a) 
 
Reflecting on the criteria, Joy Parry, one of the civil servants leading on the 
ECOC selection process at the OAL, commented:  
 
It was left very open, so that each city could see if there was something in 
it for them. It was also the time when the Garden Festivals had been done. 
So the idea of actually making a big regional show, that link had been made 
through these Garden Festivals. […] So that precedent was there but it was 
unspoken rather than in the rules.  
(Joy Parry, interview, 11 December 2014) 
 
The Garden Festivals concept, like that of the ECOC, originated in a European 
country other than the UK. Unlike the ECOC, however, the Garden Festivals was 
not a programme pioneered by EC Culture Ministers. The raison d’être of the 
Garden Festival concept was not culture but urban regeneration, its stated aim 
being to reclaim contaminated former industrial brownfield land for 
redevelopment. Conversely, the purpose of the ECOC was not urban 
regeneration but culture. 
  
Richard Luce has described the broader political context in which the OAL 
developed its approach to the ECOC: 
 
The concept of rejuvenating cities was beginning to get embedded. And 
there were some very critical reports of the government Mrs Thatcher 
didn’t like. The Church of England did a report which she didn’t like at all, 
but she put Heseltine into the job of Liverpool and giving them new leases 
of life. So now, it was that sort of background, it was an opportunity.68 
(Richard Luce, interview, 24 March 2015)  
                                               
68 The Church of England’s critical report referred to here was Faith in the City: A Call for Action 
by Church and Nation, produced by the Archbishop of Canterbury’s Commission on Urban Priority 
Areas and published in 1985. This report was highly critical of the government’s approach to 
urban policy and its effects of increasing deprivation within cities (Smith, 1990). As Secretary of 
State for the Environment during the first Thatcher government, and despite representing the 
constituency of Henley, Michael Heseltine was instrumental in the economic renewal of Liverpool 
following the 1981 Toxteth riots, including the establishment of the Merseyside Development 
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By 1986, Liverpool had hosted the first UK Garden Festival,69 with the 
involvement of the Merseyside Development Corporation, and Glasgow was 
confirmed as the host city for the 1988 National Garden Festival.   
 
Within this broader context, given the OAL’s setting of formal criteria for the 
ECOC competition, which were open to interpretation, competitors were 
expected to make the link to such unspoken agendas in their bids. A result 
anticipated by the OAL may have been that competitors would go beyond the 
precedent set by Athens and, informed by the experience of the Garden 
Festivals, identify new opportunities for the city which supported other current 
government agendas in a UK context.  
 
The ECOC presented opportunities which were distinct to each EC member state 
to host the event. For Greece, the ECOC was a vehicle for Melina Mercouri’s own 
political ambitions: her aim of securing the return of the Elgin/Parthenon 
Marbles from the UK to Greece, as well as her aim of becoming President of 
Greece.70 The UK’s distinctive approach to the ECOC reflected a broader set of 
opportunities which contrasted with those seized upon by previous EC member 
states to host the event. Taking a characteristic arms-length approach, leaving 
the formal criteria open, whilst steering competitors towards an unspoken set of 
criteria on which the competition would be judged, the UK government 
constructed parameters for the ECOC which implicitly promoted its own 
agendas.  
 
In the government’s deciding not to provide any additional central government 
funding and that the ECOC would be self-financed by the host city, the 
successful city would be required to secure philanthropic funding and private 
sector support to stage its event. In deciding to select its City of Culture through 
                                                                                                                                              
Corporation (despite ‘managed decline’ being considered by others within the government as a 
policy option for the city), earning him the epithet ‘Minister for Merseyside’.   
69 The Liverpool International Garden Festival was held in 1984, followed by the Stoke-on-Trent 
National Garden Festival in 1986. 
70 In his interview on 24 March 2015, Richard Luce discussed the EC Culture Ministers, stating: 
‘And then there was the famous Melina Mercouri. Now I’m bringing her in last but she’s really the 
significant one. You have to remember she wanted the Elgin Marbles back in Greece. She was 
wanting to be President. She was Minister for Culture but she wanted to be President. That was 
part of her campaign, to stand up for Greece.’  
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a competition between cities, the government believed it would ‘galvanise 
certain cities to try and get their act together’ (Richard Luce, interview, 24 
March 2015), connecting the event to broader agendas. Rather than risking the 
ECOC being perceived as a financial burden imposed upon a city of the 
government’s choosing, it was presented as a prestigious opportunity that the 
city had won.  
 
6.3 The opportunity and the challenge the ECOC presented to Glasgow 
 
Why did Glasgow want to host the ECOC, given that there would be no central 
government funding for it and it would consume a large amount of the city’s 
resources at a time when the city faced severe socio-economic problems?  
 
The ECOC presented Glasgow with the opportunity to align itself with the 
prestigious cities that had previously held the title: Athens, Florence, 
Amsterdam, Berlin and Paris, none of which was seen as a declining post-
industrial city, all of which were undisputed European centres of culture. It was 
the prestige of the ECOC which would allow Glasgow to reposition its image and 
thereby support the development of the city’s service sector economy.  
 
However, Glasgow faced a dilemma. Winning the ECOC title and joining a new 
group of prestigious peers could transform Glasgow’s image – but it was not in a 
position to win the title on reputation alone because its existing image did not 
align with that of the prestigious group of existing ECOC title holders.  
 
In 1986, GDC led a coalition of organisations in its bid for the UK ECOC 
nomination. David Macdonald, Director at Glasgow Action and a member of 
Glasgow’s bid coalition, has discussed how the approach taken by Glasgow 
Action to encourage businesses to relocate to the city from elsewhere in the UK 
influenced Glasgow’s pitch for ECOC 1990: 
 
It was a bit like pitching Glasgow for some of the business location stuff 
which I was leading on. You had to get people to agree to at least put 
Glasgow on the long list, you know and a lot of these things it was 
‘Glasgow? Are you sure?’ And the response had to be, ‘You know that’s OK 
just make it a long shot and assess it on merit.’ And that’s sort of what the 
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Glasgow pitch was for City of Culture. It was, you know this isn’t London, it 
isn’t Paris, but you’ll be surprised what’s here already, and you’ll be even 
more surprised what we lay on, if we have a special year.  
(David Macdonald, interview, 8 September 2014) 
 
GDC and some of its bid coalition partners realised early on that a coherent 
strategy was needed to underpin the bid, because the city was not in a position 
to be awarded the title on reputation alone and it would be competing with 
cities that were. Indeed, some in the coalition anticipated Glasgow’s bid being 
met with prejudice on the basis of its entrenched reputation preceding it.  
 
Glasgow’s bid had to be outstandingly good to compete with cities that did not 
share its challenge of a poor image. The next section will outline how Glasgow 
responded to this opportunity and challenge and central government parameters 
in order to outshine the competition. 
 
6.4 Glasgow’s response  
 
Glasgow’s ECOC submission (GDC, 1986b) was presented to the OAL in April 1986 
by GDC on behalf of the city’s coalition of cultural (predominantly, arts) 
organisations and representatives of the tourism and broader business 
communities, not least the GGTB and Glasgow Action. Despite the bid being 
presented as the work of a unified partnership of the city’s public and private 
sector constituents, one organisation notably absent was Strathclyde Regional 
Council (SRC). This absence was made all the more conspicuous by the stated 
purpose of the ECOC initiative being ‘to celebrate each year the individual 
cultural of a city and its region’ (Office of Arts and Libraries, 1986b). 
Furthermore, in its 21 years of existence (between 1975 and 1996), SRC provided 
a significant amount of revenue and capital funding and resources for the arts 
and culture in Glasgow, supporting such projects as the Royal Concert Hall and 
arts in education. Glasgow’s bid documents do not refer to SRC as an 
organisation involved in the event’s delivery. However, based on the integral 
role SRC played in the city’s existing cultural infrastructure, once Glasgow had 
been awarded the title it would have been difficult for SRC not to support the 
ECOC 1990 event, financially or otherwise.  
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The bid was co-ordinated by planners in GDC’s Chief Executive’s Office, notably 
David Ferguson, working with Head of Public Relations, Harry Diamond. The 
heads of the separate museums and libraries departments were asked to provide 
information though were not the key actors driving the bid strategy. A group of 
the city’s arts organisations, brought in at short notice before the submission 
deadline, also supported the bid though did not drive the bid strategy.71  
 
In 1986, Glasgow did not have a formal or coherent cultural policy to provide the 
strategic underpinning of its ECOC bid. However, GDC did have a rapidly 
developing and increasingly coherent economic development policy and 
strategy, which was its main priority and focus. In addition, other public 
agencies working in Glasgow, notably the SDA and Glasgow Action, also had their 
own economic development strategies for the city. These economic development 
strategies converged in Glasgow’s ECOC bid.  
 
The strategic direction underpinning Glasgow’s ECOC bid was largely provided by 
the 1985 McKinsey report, The Potential of Glasgow City Centre (Cullen, 1985). 
Figure 1 sums up the key ideas:   
 
 
 
Figure 1: McKinsey and Co. strategy diagram for the economic development 
of Glasgow city centre, 1985. 
                                               
71 GDC archive documents show that whilst the city’s arts organisations were not involved in the 
development of the bid strategy, Chris Carrell, Director of the Third Eye Centre played a more 
influential role as a member of a ‘core group’ that GDC consulted. The core group included 
Eddie Friel (GGTB), David Macdonald (Glasgow Action), Michael Dale (Glasgow Garden Festival) 
and Iwan Williams (SDA Tourist Division) as well as Chris Carrell. The core group developed after 
the bid was submitted in April 1986 and was used by GDC to gather external support for 
Glasgow’s bid (Ferguson, 1986).  
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David Macdonald, Director of Glasgow Action from its establishment in late 1985 
to its demise in 1990, has commented on the opportunity presented by the 
competition for the ECOC nomination and its potential alignment with Glasgow 
Action’s purpose:   
 
I had McKinsey’s strategy, it was a simple diagram sitting on my wall, it was 
in front of me every single day I was doing it, and the first thing, if 
anything arose I could just have a quick look at that and think, ‘Does it fit?’ 
And this thing fitted a treat. Because it addressed the image of Glasgow, it 
played to what was in a sense a surprising strength of Glasgow already that 
people didn’t know about and it would attract visitors.72  
(David Macdonald, interview, 8 September 2014) 
 
This approach to economic development was emerging within a broader context 
in which, as discussed earlier, Glasgow’s cultural infrastructure – events in 
particular – was positioned in an increasingly prominent role in the city’s 
burgeoning tourist industry. With plans underway for the impending 1988 Garden 
Festival, the key actors in the development of Glasgow’s ECOC bid strategy 
recognised the potential unspoken link – also perceived by the OAL – between 
the two events. As will be discussed in Chapter 7, learning from the experience 
in Liverpool, securing ECOC 1990 would be a means of maintaining the 
momentum of the 1988 Glasgow Garden Festival’s regeneration efforts. This 
revealed a combination of strategic planning and opportunism, which to varying 
degrees characterised much of the work that took place during the 1980s to 
change Glasgow’s image and improve the city’s economic fortunes.  
 
The broad economic development purpose underpinning Glasgow’s bid – 
specifically, to use the ECOC to support the city’s main priority to strengthen its 
service sector economy – was reinforced by the deployment of a collection of 
strategies, the foremost of which was to approach the bid as an exercise in 
public relations.  
 
                                               
72 Notably, David Macdonald has described the McKinsey diagram in Figure 1 as a series of 
‘virtuous cycles’ in which continual improvements are made to the city’s service industries and 
consumer services through various interventions such as making Glasgow more attractive for 
business and living, promoting the city and image building activity.   
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In its bid, Glasgow developed a series of ‘key messages’ to convey that the city 
would meet the stated criteria exceptionally well through the adoption of other 
central government agendas. These messages were deployed through a variety 
of tactics. One of the most significant tactics was for these messages to be 
voiced by credible representatives of each of the city’s relevant sectors; 
representatives selected to act as advocates on the city’s behalf to those in 
central government that would be judging the bids, providing a more effective 
influence on decision-making than the Labour-led local authority alone. 
 
Two of the selected advocates were the journalist and arts critic, Cordelia 
Oliver, and Sir Norman Macfarlane, both of whom were Glasgow residents. 
Cordelia Oliver provided what is presented as an ‘independent assessment’ of 
Glasgow’s cultural standing, included in Glasgow’s bid documents. Sir Norman 
Macfarlane provided letters of support for Glasgow’s bid documents, but also 
played an important role in securing the support of the city’s business 
community as well as ensuring that the bid aligned with the private sector’s 
priorities.73   
 
One of the main key messages reiterated in the bid – and asserted by both Oliver 
and Macfarlane – was that Glasgow is already an established European city of 
culture. There was no mention in Glasgow’s submission of the persistent 
problems remaining from deindustrialisation, depopulation, urban deprivation 
and decay nor the accompanying challenges regarding the city’s reputation. 
Glasgow’s submission presented its transformation from No Mean City to 
European City of Culture as complete, whilst stating that a benefit of the ECOC 
would be to ‘maintain momentum already generated by the image building 
initiatives which have played a key role in the City’s revitalised character’ (GDC, 
1986b: 2). In Oliver’s assessment, deindustrialisation was transformed into a 
positive factor in the bid, as Glasgow’s ‘past industrial history’. Glasgow was 
presented as a ‘leader in the field’ of social and industrial history. Despite 
Glasgow undergoing a painful process resulting from the decline of heavy 
industry, through the historical detachment of its setting in a museums context, 
                                               
73 In her interview on 24 March 2014, Jean McFadden, Leader of GDC when the bid was submitted 
in April 1986, mentioned that Norman Macfarlane was an influential figure in the bid and had the 
submission rewritten.  
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the city’s recent social and industrial past was preserved as ‘heritage’, a 
valuable cultural asset.   
 
At various points, the submission attempted to bolster the image of Glasgow’s 
physical appearance, highlighting its natural beauty and architectural assets. 
Oliver stated that Glasgow ‘remains the finest and most complete example of 
Victorian urban planning in the UK’ (GDC, 1986b: 34). The Burrell Collection 
‘now to be seen in its entirety in a deservedly famous custom-built gallery, is 
sited in the grounds of Pollok House, a William Adam mansion, still with its 
parkland completely unspoiled (there is even a herd of highland cattle on the 
home farm) and all within the city boundary’ (GDC, 1986b: 33). In his letter of 
support, Sir Norman Macfarlane even stated:  
 
Last week I was in Vienna for a holiday with the family, and we were 
agreed that the journey from Vienna airport to the city centre was much 
less attractive than the journey nowadays from Glasgow airport to the city 
centre. Who would have thought this even 10 years ago? (GDC, 1986b: 15) 
 
This reiterated the message in the main submission:  
 
Less than 10 years ago, the prevailing image of Glasgow was that of a 
declining industrial city. Today Glasgow has cast off the grime of its past 
industrial history. Its traditional beauty has been restored to reveal the 
most magnificent Victorian city in Europe. (GDC, 1986b: 1) 
 
Central government decision-makers were presented with an image of an idyllic 
Glasgow, with its fine architecture, significant art collections and an 
international airport more attractive than Vienna; in short the most magnificent 
Victorian city in Europe. Here, the bid addressed criteria regarding the city’s 
cultural standing and facilities, in addition to an issue not mentioned in the 
criteria, which could be perceived as a weakness: the city’s image. The message 
here was that Glasgow had changed; it was not the place it was ten years ago; it 
was as much a European city of culture as Vienna and by extension, those cities 
previously awarded the ECOC title: Athens, Florence, Amsterdam, Berlin and 
Paris. 
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Another key message emphasised throughout Glasgow’s bid was the city’s 
established relationship between the public and private sectors. This is 
significant as a link between the strategic economic development activity 
underway in Glasgow – as exemplified by the McKinsey strategy – and the urban 
renewal strategies that were being promoted by the Tory government 
contemporaneously.  
 
Glasgow’s public and private sector partnerships were highlighted as a vehicle 
for the delivery of the proposed ECOC event, addressing the OAL’s criteria 
related to facilities and finance. On the criterion of ‘accommodation, facilities 
and accessibility’, Glasgow went beyond detailing its tourism infrastructure, 
facilities and transport links to outline its track-record of staging large-scale 
events through public-private sector collaboration: 
 
The City’s public and private institutions have demonstrated their ability to 
combine in major co-operative ventures. The Scottish Exhibition and 
Conference Centre was developed and financed by a consortium comprising 
the Scottish Development Agency, Glasgow District and Strathclyde 
Regional Councils and the private sector. The Glasgow Marathon is the third 
largest in the world. The Garden Festival, which will attract over 4 million 
visitors to the City in 1988, will be operated by an independent company 
set up for the purposes, advised by a board comprising representatives of 
the Scottish Development Agency, Strathclyde Regional and Glasgow 
District Councils and the Scottish Tourist Board. (GDC, 1986b: 2) 
 
The submission asserts that there existed a strong link between Glasgow’s 
cultural assets and the city’s burgeoning tourist industry, following a period of 
intensive development involving public and private sector partners. In so doing, 
Glasgow challenged the assumed position of its ECOC competitor Edinburgh as 
Scotland’s prime tourist destination and ‘cultural capital’, stating: 
 
Massive investment by the public and private sectors has produced a 
tourism infrastructure second to none. No fewer than eight of the Scottish 
top 20 tourist attractions are located here, including the Burrell Collection 
which, in its first full year of operation, established itself as Scotland’s 
number one tourist attraction. (GDC, 1986b: 1) 
 
And:  
 
  164 
 
Glasgow’s dramatic success as a tourist centre has been based largely on 
the promotion of its cultural attractions. In 1982, 700,000 people visited 
Glasgow. By 1984 there were an estimated two million visitors, making 
Glasgow Scotland’s primary tourist centre. (GDC, 1986b: 9) 
 
In relation to the criterion of ‘finance’, the city’s commitment to developing its 
cultural and tourism sectors, as a combined strategy, was expressed in relevant 
terms. The submission inferred an anticipated causal link between its levels of 
financial investment and the return to the city in increased visitor numbers:  
 
There has been considerable public and private investment in cultural and 
tourist facilities in the past few years and much more is planned. A new 
extension to the Mitchell Library was completed in 1981 at a cost of £10m. 
The Burrell Gallery, which cost £21m, was opened in 1983. The £36m 
Scottish Exhibition and Conference Centre opened last year.  
(GDC, 1986b: 3) 
 
Crucially – and in line with the OAL’s stated criteria – it was asserted that 
Glasgow’s ECOC event would be ‘largely self-financing’ (GDC, 1986b: 10), as an 
ambitious extension of this existing strategy. It was proposed that funding would 
be contributed by public authorities and private sources including visitor income 
and business sponsorship, generated through ‘the prestige attached to European 
City of Culture’ (GDC, 1986b: 10). Here, the submission tapped into the current 
OAL agenda of ‘rebalancing’ public and private funding for the arts through 
increasing philanthropy. Key supporting figures and advocates here were Eddie 
Friel, Chief Executive of the GGTB, and Sir Norman Macfarlane, Chairman of 
Glasgow Action. Both reiterated their commitment in letters of support, 
Macfarlane stating:  
 
The Glasgow business community has an outstanding record of active 
support for the arts in general. (GDC, 1986b: 15) 
 
The clear message here, given credibility through the voices of the city’s 
business leaders, was that private sector support of the kind promoted by the 
Thatcher government, for major urban renewal projects as well as the arts, was 
already well-established in Glasgow and would be guaranteed for 1990.  
 
Glasgow was presented, then, not only as a city of sufficient cultural standing, 
but also, through its well-established partnerships, infrastructure and business-
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leaders’ support, as an option with a reduced risk to central government, 
reflecting the OAL’s stated intention that ‘it would be desirable to build on an 
existing and proven programme of activities and facilities’ (Fallon, 1986). 
 
Glasgow’s submission was an excellent work of public relations. Key messages 
ran consistently throughout the different voices in the main text of the 
submission, the supporting letters and the ‘independent assessment’, to form a 
unified bid, reflecting the city’s ‘united front’. These messages were not only 
voiced by prominent figures and credible representatives of each of the city’s 
relevant sectors, but supported by the selective inclusion of facts – all of which 
reflected the city in a positive light. Key messages were selected not only to 
demonstrate that the city more than met the OAL’s stated criteria and 
requirements for hosting the UK ECOC 1990 event, but that the city had a 
broader, ambitious strategy of economic development and urban renewal – 
aligned with the agendas of the Conservative government – in which the ECOC 
1990 event would play a key enabling role. The bid followed the OAL’s steer in 
not burdening itself with too fixed a definition of ‘culture’, but proposing what 
was largely an arts festival, which would be sufficiently flexible to allow the 
Labour-led city – and the Conservative government – to achieve their broader 
strategic aims through the instrument of ‘culture’. 
 
The emphasis in Glasgow’s bid was on the arts and culture as a consumption 
activity within the service sector, rather than the development of culture as an 
industry in its own right. The strategy underlining the bid had at its core the 
strategy for the regeneration of Glasgow city centre, imported from America by 
management consultants McKinsey and Co. and aligned with the contemporary 
Conservative government’s agendas of public-private partnership and the 
rebalancing of public and private funding for the arts.  
 
It was not a coherent cultural policy which drew together the collection of 
cultural organisations in support of Glasgow’s ECOC bid. Although many of the 
city’s major arts organisations were involved in the preparation of the 
submission, they were not brought in by the lead bodies – GDC, Glasgow Action 
and the GGTB – until a very late stage, as the deadline approached in April 1986. 
The arts organisations – the cultural constituent of the bid – were not the drivers 
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of the strategy, but rather the cultural ‘content providers’ that would be 
required for the strategy to succeed.  
 
As with the need to attract business more broadly, Glasgow had to meet both 
stated criteria and unspoken, hidden criteria in order to be given serious 
consideration. The city’s ECOC submission reflected how, in Thatcher’s Britain, 
Glasgow was becoming competitive.   
 
6.5 The decision-making process  
 
Following a brief outline of the key events in the timeframe in which the 
decision was made by Richard Luce and the OAL to nominate Glasgow as the 
UK’s ECOC 1990, this section will examine the key influential factors in the 
decision-making process and the additional challenges faced by Glasgow’s bid – 
namely, the instances of prejudice the bid encountered in some quarters, 
notably in relation to a competing bid from Edinburgh. It will demonstrate why 
Glasgow’s bid coalition leadership were justified in their approach of basing the 
city’s bid on a coherent strategy of economic development, in order to counter 
the challenge represented by its rivals and win the nomination.  
 
In April 1986, the OAL received bids for the UK’s ECOC nomination from nine 
cities: Bath, Bristol, Cambridge, Cardiff, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Leeds, Liverpool 
and Swansea. The OAL’s civil servants and Arts Minister made initial assessments 
of the bids, before drawing up a shortlist regarding which the Minister consulted, 
in June 1986, a number of his colleagues. These were: the Secretaries of State 
for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Geoffrey Howe), Employment (David 
Young), Scotland (Malcolm Rifkind), Wales (Nicholas Edwards) and the 
Environment (Nicholas Ridley); the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, John 
MacGregor, and the Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher. As a result of this 
consultation, Richard Luce’s initial shortlist of four cities – Bath, Bristol, Leeds 
and Glasgow – was expanded to include Edinburgh. Furthermore, the decision 
was made not to publish the shortlist publicly, contrary to original plans. 
 
The Arts Minister and OAL officials then made visits to shortlisted cities, who 
were subsequently asked to provide supplementary submissions addressing any 
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specific issues which had arisen. These were submitted to the OAL in September 
1986. Following further consideration, Richard Luce announced on 20 October 
1986 that Glasgow had won the UK’s nomination. This proposal was then ratified 
by EC Ministers responsible for culture on 13 November 1986.  
 
As mentioned earlier, Glasgow’s winning the nomination and subsequently, the 
title was by no means inevitable. However, at an early stage in the shortlisting 
process, the decision-making parameters appear to have shifted in Glasgow’s 
favour. Writing to consult his ministerial colleagues in June 1986 on his proposed 
shortlist, Richard Luce proffered his own opinions as guidance on the 
requirements of the UK’s nominated city:  
 
My belief is that the chosen city (and by extension the UK) need not feel 
obliged to compete directly with the major cities already selected, which 
have very large public spending programmes for this sort of activity. Of 
course, it does need to have plausible credentials in this area but the most 
important thing is that it should present its own distinctive contribution. 
This means that the city does have to be committed and enthusiastic. It is 
also important that the authorities of the city chosen should understand 
that the full responsibility for organising and financing its programme of 
events would rest with them. The benefits to the city would lie in the 
tourism, employment and publicity which would be generated, and the high 
profile that the city would enjoy during the period of the festivities.  
(Luce, 1986a) 
 
The belief set out here can be interpreted as constituting a honing of the open 
criteria sent to cities with the original invitation to bid. Indeed, it can be read as 
additional, informal selection criteria retrospectively-imposed on bids after the 
submission deadline – unbeknownst to the competing cities – informed by the 
cases proposed. Furthermore, it aligned very clearly with the basis of the case 
made by Glasgow in its submission, in which the benefits of tourism, 
employment and publicity generated by the ECOC were very clearly articulated, 
alongside clear proposals for organising and financing the programme, and a 
tone which can be described as committed and enthusiastic.  
 
However, despite this apparently beneficial development, Glasgow faced a 
number of unique challenges in securing support for its bid across the 
government, emanating not least from the Scottish Office.  
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The response of Malcolm Rifkind, Secretary of State for Scotland, to Richard 
Luce’s letter consulting ministers on the initial shortlist resulted in the 
expansion of the group from four to five with the addition of Edinburgh. The 
events within the Scottish Office surrounding Malcolm Rifkind’s response reveal a 
tension between the bias of certain Scottish Office ministers, who were also 
Edinburgh MPs, towards Edinburgh at the expense of Glasgow’s bid, and the 
tempering influence of civil servants, whose goal was to secure a Scottish 
nomination.   
 
The reason for Edinburgh’s initial exclusion from the shortlist was the poor 
quality of its submission (Edinburgh District Council, 1986a). Indeed, it appears 
that Edinburgh District Council (EDC) was well aware of the weakness of its bid, 
as it attempted to block its circulation within central government. On receiving 
Luce’s consultation letter, Scottish Office civil servants attempted with some 
difficulty to acquire a copy of Edinburgh’s submission from EDC, the council’s 
response being, ‘this was a highly confidential paper which was not for general 
circulation as they did not want anyone to know the basis of their case’.74 
 
In contrast, GDC and its allies had already been circulating copies of Glasgow’s 
submission widely amongst organisations and individuals that might have some 
influence on the nomination decision. This reflected the building of a broader, 
co-ordinated campaign of support for Glasgow’s nomination which also involved 
Glasgow MPs and MEPs, another mechanism adopted by GDC in order to 
influence the outcome of the competition.  
 
One reason for this assertive approach to communicating the messages in its bid 
was that in Glasgow the fortunes of the Conservative party were on a downward 
trajectory, whereas several of Edinburgh’s MPs were in government at the time. 
In comparison to those of Glasgow, Edinburgh’s constituencies were over-
represented at a senior level in the Scottish Office, not least by the Secretary of 
State Malcolm Rifkind, who represented Edinburgh Pentlands. The closest to a 
representative Glasgow had within the Scottish Office coterie of senior MPs was 
                                               
74 Handwritten internal Scottish Office note, written by LK, titled: Note for File: European City 
of Culture, dated 11 June 1986 (document number 7 in file: ED61/103, held in the National 
Records of Scotland, H.M. General Register House, Edinburgh). 
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Allan Stewart, Minister for Industry and Education, who represented Eastwood, 
one of the very few Conservative constituencies in the Greater Glasgow 
conurbation (though not in Glasgow itself). Indeed, EDC’s approach of relying 
not on the contents of its submission but instead on its image as a European city 
of culture, and senior Scottish Office MPs viewing the city in a favourable light 
worked, temporarily, to its advantage.  
 
The period between the Scottish Office’s receipt of Richard Luce’s consultation 
letter and its response saw positions shift on which Scottish city to back, as 
following pressure from other Edinburgh MPs such as Michael Ancram, Malcolm 
Rifkind disregarded civil servants’ advice to support Glasgow as the stronger bid.  
 
The Scottish Office’s initial position – recommended by David A. Campbell, 
Permanent Secretary in the Scottish Education Department which co-ordinated 
the Office’s ECOC work – was that the best hope of a Scottish nomination would 
be for the Secretary of State to lend strong support to Glasgow, recognising that 
Edinburgh had failed to make its case.  
 
This recommendation was challenged by Michael Ancram, MP for Edinburgh 
South, whose Private Secretary, Ian Howie, wrote:  
 
Mr Ancram […] feels that we should put in a strong supporting bid for 
Edinburgh, which he feels has rightly always been regarded as Scotland’s 
cultural centre and capital. The Minister thinks that to give it to Glasgow, 
who already have SEC and the Garden Festival, is overdoing it.  
(Howie, 1986) 
 
Further internal communications show David A. Campbell disregarding Michael 
Ancram’s intervention and applying further pressure to the Secretary of State to 
provide a Scottish Office response in support of Glasgow, stating, for example:  
 
We have just heard that Lord Young is to be advised to support Glasgow’s 
bid. This further reinforces our expectation that Glasgow offers the best 
hope of obtaining a Scottish nomination. (Campbell, 1986a) 
 
Disregarding support from Allan Stewart for Glasgow, Michael Ancram continued 
to argue Edinburgh’s case until it gained traction at a meeting of Scottish Office 
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ministers on 25 June 1986. Minutes of this meeting offer an extraordinary insight 
into how pressure might produce a perverse result:  
 
Summing up a brief discussion the Secretary of State [Malcolm Rifkind] said 
that at the end of the day, the quality of the nominations75 by the 
competing cities was unlikely to be the determining factor and that 
Edinburgh was likely to be regarded – rightly or wrongly – as a more 
credible candidate. Minsters had, therefore, decided that the Scottish 
Office should back Edinburgh’s nomination. (Scottish Ministers, 1986: 2)  
 
Those in Glasgow’s bid coalition who suspected their bid would be met with 
prejudice were indeed right to do so. However, due to the strength of Glasgow’s 
submission, the civil service ensured that the Scottish Office and its Secretary of 
State supported Glasgow’s bid, alongside the appearance of support for 
Edinburgh. A ‘PS Minute’ sent by David A. Campbell to Robert Gordon, Malcolm 
Rifkind’s Private Secretary, stated:  
 
There is no reason why the short list should not include two Scottish cities 
and, as a matter of tactics, this would appear to be a safer aim than asking 
for a substitution of Edinburgh for Glasgow. Edinburgh may well be able to 
tighten up their bid: but a weak Edinburgh bid would almost certainly let in 
Bath or Bristol, over both of whom Glasgow probably has a slight edge. OAL 
officials, to whom we have spoken, have indicated that it would help 
obtain a concession in Edinburgh’s favour if we indicated a readiness to 
compromise if Edinburgh fail to substantiate their bid more convincingly.  
(Campbell, 1986b) 
 
In his response to Richard Luce, drafted by David A. Campbell, Malcolm Rifkind 
stated that he agreed ‘that Glasgow has produced an impressive submission and 
am sure they would provide strong contenders for the nomination’ (Rifkind, 
1986). Rifkind pressed for Edinburgh to be added to the shortlist alongside 
Glasgow as, ‘[t]heir case is relatively weak but this is only a question of 
presentation.’ Furthermore,  
 
In a European context however, Edinburgh would probably have a stronger 
chance of success than Glasgow or, indeed, any of the other cities you have 
short-listed. If we are to stand the best chance of a British nomination it 
would therefore make sense to examine Edinburgh’s case more seriously.  
(Rifkind, 1986) 
 
                                               
75 ‘Nominations’ in this context meant submissions.  
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This reflects a concern held by some Scottish Office ministers which went 
beyond political bias: their belief that Glasgow would be unlikely to be awarded 
the title by EC ministers due to the misalignment of its image with that of the 
ECOC predecessors.  
 
Scottish Office ministers were not the only government ministers consulted to 
demonstrate in their responses preconceived ideas of what an ECOC should be: 
an idea that was based entirely on the image and reputation of the previous 
cities to hold the ECOC title. In his response to Richard Luce’s letter of 10 June 
1986, which asked for views on the proposed shortlist of four cities, Geoffrey 
Howe, Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, stated:  
 
From a European point of view we would have to support Bath. It is an old 
and attractive city with an established reputation in the arts. More than 
the other shortlisted candidates it ranks with the European cities which 
have already been selected. (Howe, 1986) 
 
Howe appears to have placed Glasgow and Leeds in an entirely different league:  
 
The efforts of Leeds and Glasgow to improve the cultural life of their cities 
will no doubt be borne in mind. Any gesture in their direction would be 
well received as recognition of a commitment to the regeneration of the 
inner cities. (Howe, 1986) 
 
In his response to Richard Luce, David Young, Secretary of State for 
Employment, did not support a Glasgow nomination. Instead he joined Geoffrey 
Howe in opting for Bath, citing almost identical reasons:  
 
I should very much like to see Bath nominated as the UK candidate for 
1990. It is an old and attractive city with an established image of heritage 
and culture. (Young, 1986) 
 
The idea that in order to rank as an ECOC, candidates should be an ‘old and 
attractive city with an established image of heritage and culture’ was not based 
on any EC parameters nor government guidance. At no point is the image or 
reputation of a city stated as grounds for its selection in the EC resolution on 
which the ECOC programme was founded. However, foremost in ministers’ 
consultation responses was likely to have been a perception that the proposed 
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city’s image would be the determining factor at a European level, given the 
ratification process. In breaking with tradition there was – to reiterate the 
Scottish Office ministers’ argument in prioritising Edinburgh over Glasgow – ‘no 
guarantee that in competition with the other European countries the UK could 
secure the nomination’. Indeed, such concerns were not entirely without 
foundation.76 
 
In addition, it is possible that the only government office to give any extended 
consideration to the potential opportunities presented by a break in tradition 
was the OAL. Archive documents and interviews with key actors suggest that the 
OAL was the only government office to advocate for Glasgow’s place as a UK 
ECOC candidate during this period in the selection process. It was also the office 
that recognised the opportunity to promote an alternative idea of what an ECOC 
could be to other EC member states: a post-industrial city going through a rapid 
period of socio-economic change, and which until recently had not been 
promoted as a major tourist destination, but which was equally a European city 
of culture. 
 
Ultimately, Edinburgh was added to the shortlist, not on the basis of the quality 
of its case but for political reasons, as Richard Luce subsequently reflected: 
 
If they hadn’t been considered and I appointed Glasgow then that would 
have been wrong, or that would have caused a storm and it wasn’t 
necessary to have a storm, it could be avoided.  
(Richard Luce, interview, 24 March 2015) 
 
By September 1986, officials from the OAL had visited each of the five 
shortlisted cities to discuss their ECOC bids, and had received supplementary 
                                               
76 Melina Mercouri was reportedly in favour of Edinburgh rather than Glasgow being awarded the 
ECOC title. Richard Luce stated in his interview on 24 March 2015: ‘Now when I told Melina 
Mercouri, she said, “Who’ve you chosen?” I said, “I’ve chosen Glasgow.” She said, “You don’t 
mean Glasgow, darling,” – she always said “darling” like Dickie Attenborough – “You don’t mean 
Glasgow, darling.” “I do.” And I said, “You think I mean Edinburgh don’t you?” [laughter] She 
said, “Of course I do!” I said, “Look, you come to the opening.” That’s why she came. “You 
come to the opening, which the Queen will do, and you’ll see why, ok?” She was dying of cancer 
and she had her nurse with her and she came to the opening and in the line up I introduced the 
Queen to her, and I said, “This is Melina Mercouri, the Greek Minister who invented the 
concept.” And she just said to her, “He’s right you know!” And she looked rather startled, and I 
said, “Oh thank you very much!” [laughter] She realised.’ 
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submissions requested from Edinburgh and Glasgow to address areas of 
discussion.  
 
Glasgow’s supplementary submission (GDC, 1986c) reinforced its already-strong 
case. It focused on issues of business, financial investment, image and 
regeneration. It dispensed with the voice of the city’s arts organisations and 
raised those of its business leaders, suggesting the city felt these were its most 
persuasive advocates to central government. Where Glasgow’s submission 
intimated that the ECOC would form an element in the completion of a broader 
process of urban renewal, the supplementary submission articulated it boldly. It 
established the distance travelled in transforming the city’s economic fortunes – 
and image – over the preceding five years, and how the ECOC could further this 
trajectory of economic development through public-private partnerships.  
 
Edinburgh’s supplementary submission (Edinburgh District Council, 1986b) was 
an improvement on the city’s original submission, in that it proposed, albeit 
sketchily, ‘the kind of events under consideration’ that might constitute its 
ECOC programme – something overlooked in the first bid document. However, its 
case remained reliant on its long-established self-stated reputation as ‘The 
Athens of the North’, quoting Robert Louis Stephenson’s description of Edinburgh 
as ‘the dream of masonry and living rock, a city in the world of everyday 
reality’.  The fact that Louis Stephenson had died almost a century prior to the 
writing of the supplementary submission reflected a broader weakness in 
Edinburgh’s ECOC bid strategy: the emphasis was on the past, with no coherent 
case for how the ECOC title and event would shape the city’s future. 
 
By late September 1986, support for Edinburgh’s nomination within the Scottish 
Office was losing traction. Scottish Office documents reported that Richard 
Luce’s ‘idea of a joint nomination of Edinburgh and Glasgow’ was ‘floated’ then 
‘quickly dropped’ following his visit to Scotland in August 1986 (Campbell, 
1986c) and after meetings with the Scottish Arts Council.77 Crucially, Edinburgh’s 
                                               
77 Scottish Office documents show that Richard Luce met the Scottish Arts Council (SAC) on 13 
August 1986 prior to attending an Edinburgh Festival reception the following day. They note that 
the SAC responded to Luce’s suggestion of a joint Glasgow/Edinburgh nomination thus: ‘SAC 
were unhappy with this compromise, which they felt would be undermined by civic rivalries. The 
unanimous SAC view was in favour of Glasgow’ (Campbell, 1986d). This contrasts with the SAC’s 
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mismanagement of the 1986 Commonwealth Games, during July and August, was 
viewed by the Scottish Office as having exposed the ‘weaknesses in the 
recreation department’ on which ‘support for the arts amongst Edinburgh 
Councillors and officials is centred’ and ‘which is not in the forefront of that 
ruling group’s priorities’ (Campbell, 1986c).  
 
Glasgow succeeded in being awarded the nomination not only because of the 
strengths of its case, but also due to the comparative weaknesses of competing 
bids. One of the determining factors in Glasgow being awarded the nomination – 
a factor in which it outshone the competition – was the dynamism of its 
approach. Reflecting in 2015 on the shortlisted cities, Richard Luce stated:  
 
We looked and I think Bristol, Bath and Leeds all had something to offer. 
Leeds of course had the piano competition, Bristol the theatres, Bath the 
theatres too, but it wasn’t broad enough, wasn’t dynamic enough. It was 
good, that was why they were on the shortlist, but none of them were 
quite as dynamic as Glasgow. (Richard Luce, interview, 24 March 2015) 
 
This dynamism hinged upon the partnerships between the public and private 
sector leaders driving the bid. Luce (interview, 24 March 2015) singled out 
Norman Macfarlane and Pat Lally as ‘dynamic chaps who played a leading role in 
it’. He remarked on finding Pat Lally ‘very persuasive’ and Norman Macfarlane 
as,   
 
leading the business sector, with enthusiasm, and I think in a study of this 
his contribution ought to be noted because it was that sort of support that 
enthused me. Everyone was getting together, forgetting about their 
differences and getting on with things and I thought that was just splendid. 
(Richard Luce, interview, 24 March 2015) 
 
This is particularly striking given that politically, Macfarlane was a Tory, 
knighted by Thatcher, and Lally was a Labour council leader orientated towards 
the left wing of his party.  
 
The dynamism of Glasgow’s bid and the pragmatic partnerships driving it were 
characteristic facilitating factors in the process of change in the city outlined 
                                                                                                                                              
formal opinion, expressed in a letter from its Chair Alan Peacock to Malcolm Rifkind, that ‘The 
Scottish Arts Council is naturally warmly supportive of both Scottish bids and recognises the 
strength in each of these two very good candidates.’ (Peacock, 1986: 1)  
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thus far in this thesis. The severe socio-economic problems and associated image 
issues faced by Glasgow – which rendered its cultural assets invisible to many 
outside the city – as well as the opportunities presented by the ECOC and the 
challenge represented by Glasgow’s rivals to the nomination, acted as prompting 
factors in the development of the city’s coherent, strategic approach to the 
ECOC competition.  
 
This approach was unique amongst competing cities facing similar socio-
economic challenges, such as Liverpool, whose local authority had not developed 
a similarly dynamic partnership approach to working with the private sector at a 
time when the council had been infiltrated by the Militant Tendency. Richard 
Luce commented:   
 
Because Michael Heseltine was really trying to do something about 
Liverpool I was keen on them but they didn’t produce a good enough bid at 
that stage. (Richard Luce, interview, 24 March 2015) 
 
Edinburgh, in comparison, whose cultural assets were not overshadowed by its 
socio-economic problems, had not been presented with such spurs as those 
facing Glasgow to act as a driving force for its bid. Consequently, Edinburgh’s 
bid was wholly reliant on the city’s image aligning with the previous ECOC 
incumbents.  
 
Glasgow’s bid coalition leadership were justified in their approach of basing the 
city’s bid on a coherent strategy of economic development, in order to appeal to 
the policies of the Thatcher government and to counter the challenge 
represented by its rivals and win the nomination. By reinforcing its cultural 
status in Europe through association with the prestigious ECOC initiative, 
Glasgow was the first ECOC to use the title to make its cultural assets visible to 
its home nation.  
 
6.6 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has examined the strategies employed by GDC and its coalition 
partners in developing its ECOC bid; how the city of Glasgow mobilised the 
requisite expertise; and how it assessed the challenge represented by its rivals 
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and countered that challenge. It has also examined the decision-making process 
and considered the roles played by key actors in central government which 
resulted in Glasgow winning the nomination. 
 
This chapter has argued that the construction and reception of Glasgow’s ECOC 
bid was shaped by a combination of prestige, prejudice and public relations. It 
was the prestige of the ECOC which would enable Glasgow to reposition its 
image and thereby support the development of the city’s service sector 
economy, which was reliant the city’s image for success. Glasgow’s bid was an 
excellent work of public relations, developed in response to the anticipation of 
potential prejudice based on the fact that the city’s image did not align with the 
prestigious centres of culture and established international tourist destinations 
to have previously held the title. As Rifkind, Howe and Young’s respective 
responses to Glasgow’s submission demonstrated, this approach was entirely 
justified. The key actors within Glasgow’s bid coalition realised a coherent 
strategy was required to underpin its bid in order to compete with UK cities that 
did not share its challenges around image.  
 
Despite the severe socio-economic problems facing the city – and the lack of 
formal cultural policy – Glasgow had a well-established cultural infrastructure 
that continued to thrive during the 1970s and 1980s. However, the economic 
development planning activity that took place in the city between the mid-late 
1970s and 1986 was clearly not ‘culture-led’. Rather, culture was a peripheral 
aspect of the city’s service sector economy, a means of improving the city’s 
image, of drawing into the city residents, visitors and their associated spending 
power. Between 1981 and 1986, economic development policy and strategy in 
Glasgow developed at a rapid pace – without culture as a central pillar – whilst a 
formal and coherent cultural policy for the city did not.  
 
When the opportunity arose to bid for the ECOC 1990 nomination in early 1986, 
the lack of formal, coherent cultural policy in Glasgow created a vacuum that 
could be filled by the formal and increasingly coherent economic development 
strategies developed for the city in the preceding years, into which culture was 
being incorporated. The bid being based on economic, rather than cultural, 
goals ensured that, when formal strategies for culture were developed for the 
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delivery of the Year of Culture following Glasgow’s nomination, the economic 
became embedded as the foundation of Glasgow’s emerging cultural policy. It 
could therefore be argued that rather than culture leading regeneration, 
regeneration led culture. The development of Glasgow’s cultural policy was led 
by the development of the city’s economy. 
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CHAPTER 7 1987 TO 1989: TOWARDS A FORMAL 
CULTURAL POLICY  
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will consider developments during the period 1987 to 1989 – the 
years between Glasgow being awarded the ECOC 1990 title and the event taking 
place – as Glasgow moved towards a formal cultural policy. Two contrasting 
political axes shape the period: 1987 marked the commencement of the third 
term of the Thatcher government; whilst at local government level, Labour led 
both GDC and SRC – a situation that was far from unique in metropolitan 
authorities in the UK. It was a period which saw the development of a national 
political and economic climate in which public policies related to the ‘inner 
cities’ and culture became increasingly connected. It was also a period in which 
some commentators observed Glasgow was becoming a ‘dual city’.  
 
Glasgow bidding for and winning the ECOC title in 1986 was undoubtedly both a 
critical event and a facilitating factor in the cultural turn in the city’s policy 
making. The ECOC 1990 event dominated the cultural landscape in Glasgow, 
prompting and absorbing a significant increase in public funding for the arts and 
culture in the city in the years between 1987 and 1990. In addition to an 
increase in programme activity funding, the ECOC acted as a focal point for the 
development of infrastructure for the consumption of culture in the city – 
including both the completion of major capital projects already underway, such 
as the Royal Concert Hall, in time for 1990, as well as the development of new 
venues such as Tramway and The Arches. As a consequence of this approach, 
there was also a significant increase in participation in the arts and culture 
during this period. 
 
However, as well as acting as a prompting and facilitating factor for the 
emergence of Glasgow’s cultural policy, the ECOC can also be interpreted as an 
obstacle to its development. Whereas several other UK cities (largely Labour-led 
metropolitan authorities comparable to Glasgow) were concurrently developing 
arts and culture strategies encompassing both the consumption and production 
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of culture in the latter half of the 1980s, Glasgow was not. It was set on a 
strategic trajectory resulting from its approach to its ECOC bid which privileged 
the consumption of the arts and culture over its production, as a means of 
supporting the shift of the base of the city economy towards the service 
industries and consumer services. It was not until the catalytic events of the 
1990s to follow the ECOC – such as the 1999 Year of Architecture and Design – 
that Glasgow shifted its strategic focus towards the development of 
infrastructure to support the production of culture alongside its consumption. 
 
Within this context, this chapter will compare the roles of John Myerscough and 
Nicholas Garnham as key advisors in shaping emergent cultural policy in Glasgow 
and London respectively, with particular reference to the 1988 report, The 
Economic Importance of the Arts in Britain (Myerscough, 1988a), and its Glasgow 
case study (Myerscough, 1988b). It will then examine the contrasting strategic 
approaches to the ECOC that developed within Glasgow’s district and regional 
authorities and how the economic and social value of ‘Glasgow’s culture’ was 
articulated within those responses. Finally, it will discuss the position of the arts 
and culture in GDC’s economic development activity and examine to what 
extent a ‘Glasgow model’ of culture-led regeneration emerged during the years 
leading up to 1990.  
 
The research findings challenge the idea that such a model emerged in Glasgow 
during this period. However, the developments discussed in this chapter are 
connected by an emerging tendency, articulated in the city during this period to 
varying degrees of formality, which valued the city’s culture in instrumental 
terms. This tendency conforms to Belfiore and Bennett’s interpretation of M. H. 
Abrams’ ‘pragmatic’ theories of art, which view:   
 
the work of art as a means to an end, an instrument to get something done, 
and […] judge its value according to its success in achieving that aim. 
(Belfiore and Bennett, 2010: 146) 
 
The dominance of the ECOC and the strategic trajectory established in Glasgow’s 
1986 bid to host the event reflected the way in which the city’s authorities 
predominantly valued the arts and culture for their economic – and to a lesser 
extent, social – potential in an emerging implicit cultural policy. 
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7.2 The production and consumption of culture: cities and their advisors 
 
During the 1980s, two expert advisors played influential roles in the 
development of emerging cultural policies in two UK cities: Nicholas Garnham in 
London and John Myerscough in Glasgow. After establishing the wider context 
and Garnham’s role as an advisor in the development of the GLC and GLEB’s 
cultural industries strategy in London during the early to mid-1980s, this section 
will examine the role played by Myerscough in Glasgow later in the decade. It 
will discuss Myerscough’s influential 1988 report, The Economic Importance of 
the Arts in Britain, and, in particular, its Glasgow case study. In arguing that the 
dominance of the strategic direction set in Glasgow’s ECOC bid – that is, 
developing culture as a consumption activity within the service sector economy – 
initially acted as an obstacle to the development of the cultural industries in 
Glasgow, this section will examine how  Myerscough’s 1988 report both 
reinforced Glasgow’s strategic trajectory and established recommendations to 
broaden its scope beyond consumption alone to a balance between production 
and consumption of culture.  
 
In comparing the relationships between the two advisors and their respective 
local authorities, this section will ultimately argue that while Garnham was 
concerned with creating a new democratic cultural policy, Myerscough and GDC 
were not. Myerscough’s pragmatic approach, based on measuring the economic 
impact of the arts and recommending ways in which it could be exploited by the 
city’s authorities, aligned with the broader economic development aims of GDC 
and its partners, laying the foundations of a longer-term advisory relationship 
between Myerscough and the City of Glasgow, which has continued. This 
provides a marked contrast to Garnham’s ideologically-driven advice to the GLC 
and GLEB, which, although ground-breaking, was severely modified in the 
authorities’ resultant strategy which, although influential, was not realised in 
practice.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, over the course of the 1980s, local authorities played 
an increasingly significant role in the UK arts and culture funding landscape. 
During this period, the arts and culture at a local level were subject to an 
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increasingly politicised approach to local government from the left and the 
right. Gray has discussed the influence on Labour-led local councils of the new 
urban left and the influence of the new suburban right on Conservative-led 
councils, with the result that: 
 
Major Labour-dominated urban authorities began to utilise the arts for 
political purposes and to understand the arts as tools for political ends; 
Conservative authorities continued to question the role of the state in 
producing arts policies and tended to support market-led solutions to issues 
of arts provision. (Gray, 2000: 168) 
 
In addition, for Labour-led councils the opportunity presented by the 
comparative lack of central government regulation of the arts and culture 
enabled them to use its development as a tool for countering perceived central 
government disempowerment (O’Neill, 2006: 32). 
 
As the 1980s progressed, local authorities – and particularly Labour-led urban 
councils – increasingly developed formal arts and cultural policies, to the extent 
that by 1990, the Association of Metropolitan Authorities (AMA) produced 
guidelines ‘within a broad framework which may be adapted as appropriate to 
local circumstances and priorities’, which discussed ‘issues such as access to arts 
and culture, equal opportunities, education and training, economic importance 
of the arts, and the reasons for having an arts and culture policy’ (LEDIS, 1992a). 
 
This period saw the development and promotion of local authority cultural policy 
‘models’, which were inherently instrumental. Glasgow was far from alone in 
positioning the economic importance of the arts in an increasingly strategic role 
in its provision of public funding for culture.     
 
Over the course of the 1980s, the increasingly formal arts and cultural policies of 
metropolitan authorities were premised upon a strategic balance – which varied 
between authorities – of the production and consumption of culture. This was 
reflected in such vehicles as the cultural industries, cultural quarters and 
cultural tourism. Sheffield’s pioneering approach during the early 1980s in 
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developing its cultural quarter – which focused entirely on the production of 
culture without facilitating its consumption78 – is one influential example.  
 
Despite the GLC having been abolished in 1986 by the ‘hostile Tory government’ 
(Garnham, 1990: 154), its work with Nicholas Garnham and the GLEB – notably 
the cultural industries strategy in the 1985 London Industrial Strategy – is widely 
regarded as ground-breaking. It is significant not only, as Justin O’Connor (2010: 
27) has commented, as ‘the first cultural industries strategy at a local level’, but 
also as ‘a series of sketches for a contemporary democratic cultural policy’. 
O’Connor has remarked that the impact of the GLC’s cultural industries strategy 
on subsequent local and cultural strategies was ‘very high’, as:  
 
It represented an attempt to break out of a cultural policy centred on the 
‘arts’; and on subsidies to artists and producing institutions as the 
foundation of that policy. (O’Connor, 2010: 28) 
 
The underlying premise of Garnham’s account of the cultural industries, which 
to a great extent provided a theoretical base for the GLC and GLEB’s strategy, is 
summarised in a paper titled Concepts of Culture: Public Policy and the Cultural 
Industries (Garnham, 1987).79 In his analysis of the evolution of contemporary 
public cultural policies, and promotion of an alternative approach, Garnham 
declaimed:  
 
To mobilize the concept of the cultural industries as central to an analysis 
of cultural activity and of public cultural policy is to take a stand against a 
whole tradition of idealist cultural analysis. (Garnham, 1987: 24) 
 
Garnham rejected Raymond Williams’ definition in Culture and Society of 
culture ‘as a realm separate from, and often actively opposed to, the realm of 
material production and economic activity’, which he interpreted as the 
tradition from which current cultural policies had evolved. Garnham was critical 
                                               
78 Moss (2002: 215) has described the emphasis of Sheffield’s cultural quarter as being on ‘job 
creation in cultural production’ with ‘little attention paid to consumption, the form of café 
culture, retail outlets for cultural goods, or even cultural institutions open to the public’. The 
socialist approach of Sheffield’s local authority towards the development of its cultural quarter 
as a means of challenging the role of local government during the early 1980s was discussed in 
Chapter 2. 
79 Garnham has noted this paper was ‘originally written for a conference on the cultural 
industries in London in December 1983 and published as a pamphlet by the GLC’ (Garnham, 
1987: 23). 
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of the three grounds he identified on which ‘public intervention, in the form of 
subsidy, is justified’: 
 
(1) that culture possesses inherent values, of life enhancement or 
whatever, which are fundamentally opposed to and in danger of damage by 
commercial forces; (2) that the need for these values is universal, 
uncontaminated by questions of class, gender and ethnic origin; and (3) 
that the market cannot satisfy this need. (Garnham, 1987: 24) 
 
Garnham’s paper promoting a new democratic cultural policy acted as a starting 
point for the development of the GLC and GLEB’s cultural industries strategy, 
which formed a chapter of their joint 1985 London Industrial Strategy (GLC and 
GLEB, 1985). Like Garnham’s paper, this document set out a ‘wider definition of 
culture, including particularly the electronic forms of cultural production and 
distribution – radio, television, records and video – and the diverse range of 
popular culture which exist in London today’ (GLC and GLEB, 1985: 169). It was 
critical of state intervention since the Second World War, which, it stated,  
 
has largely taken the form of subsidy to the traditional art forms – dance, 
classical music, opera, the visual arts, theatre, and literature. It has also 
tended to serve elite rather than popular cultures.  
(GLC and GLEB, 1985: 169) 
 
This was an explicit, coherent strategy in which both the production and 
consumption of culture were addressed.  
 
However, Garnham’s theoretical input was severely modified by the GLC and 
GLEB to the extent that the resultant strategy became detached from the 
underlying premise of the theory. Rather than being driven by an intention to 
democratise culture, the GLC and GLEB’s cultural industries strategy aimed 
primarily to alleviate the interconnected problems of unemployment and 
deindustrialisation in the city.80 It became subsumed as but one component in 
the city’s industrial strategy, culture being utilised first and foremost for 
economic development purposes, not least job creation.  
 
                                               
80 In the London Industrial Strategy, the GLC and GLEB connected Garnham’s theories of the 
cultural industries to the severe challenges presented to London by the ‘three great issues’ of 
‘deindustrialisation, the economic collapse of Britain’s major cities, and the conditions of life 
and labour of Britain’s working people’ (GLC and GLEB, 1985: 3).  
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The GLC and GLEB’s strategy also differed to Garnham’s theory in the type of 
intervention that was deemed to be required. The London Industrial Strategy 
recognised that ‘the market is a very inadequate means of meeting cultural 
needs or of guaranteeing opportunities for people to work in this area’ (GLC and 
GLEB, 1985: 184). However, its proposed solution was ‘to work both in and 
against the market’ (GLC and GLEB, 1985: 184), using ‘new forms of intervention 
– investment and loan finance – in addition to traditional forms of subsidy and 
grant-aid’ (GLC and GLEB, 1985: 169). O’Connor has highlighted how Garnham’s 
theoretical focus   
 
was not on local economic production strategy but on developing a 
democratic cultural policy based on an educated and informed audience 
demand to which publicly-owned distribution companies and cultural 
producers alike could respond. It was explicitly not about that support for 
local cultural producers with which the GLC is most identified and which he 
associates with encouraging supply for which there is no demand.  
(O’Connor, 2010: 27) 
 
The nature of the advisory role played by John Myerscough to GDC in Glasgow 
provides a contrast to that of Garnham and the GLC and GLEB in London. In 
1988, the Policy Studies Institute published The Economic Importance of the Arts 
in Britain by John Myerscough (1988a). Glasgow was one of three case studies 
which formed the basis of this report, the others being Liverpool and Ipswich. 
Each of these three case studies was also published as its own separate report, 
in Glasgow’s case under the title, The Economic Importance of the Arts in 
Glasgow (Myerscough, 1988b). Much as its title suggests, the report focused 
entirely on the economic impact of the arts and, to an extent, culture more 
broadly, at a time when such an approach had not yet been universally 
established as the bedrock of cultural policy and a primary justification for 
public funding for the arts across the UK. The Economic Importance of the Arts 
in Britain was seminal in the development of cultural policy, not only in Glasgow 
but across the UK more broadly. Although not uncontroversial when it was first 
published,81 it has since set a long-term agenda, stretching into creative 
industries policy.82  
                                               
81 Myerscough’s methodological approach and findings attracted criticism from economist Gordon 
Hughes in a 1989 Policy Studies article (Hughes, 1989). Hughes was critical of Myerscough’s broad 
interpretation of the arts sector, the inclusion of ancillary expenditure (such as refreshments 
and hotels) and related use of multiplier analysis to estimate the indirect employment impact of 
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The 1988 report is also significant in initiating what became a longer-term 
advisory relationship between Myerscough and Glasgow, particularly the city 
council. The Economic Importance of the Arts in Glasgow was followed in 1991 
by Myerscough’s report for GDC, Monitoring Glasgow 1990 (Myerscough, 1991), 
which studied the socio-economic impact of the ECOC in the city. A series of 
influential reports have since been produced by Myerscough for the city. The 
late 1980s were a critical time in establishing Myerscough’s éminence grise role 
as he became an influential actor in the development of Glasgow’s cultural 
policy in the decades that followed.83  
 
Unlike Garnham, Myerscough did not attempt to ‘take a stand against a whole 
tradition of cultural analysis’, nor did he set out to establish a new democratic 
cultural policy for Glasgow. Myerscough’s concern with supply and demand was 
fact-based rather than ideologically-focused. Myerscough’s 1988 report 
reinforced the strategic approach Glasgow was already taking in its 
implementation of the McKinsey strategy and its absorbing the arts into 
economic development activity. This is exemplified not least in the report’s 
empirical research focus on the middle managers and senior executives Glasgow 
was aiming to attract – an aspect of research that was unique to the Glasgow 
case study.  
 
Two facilitating factors in this complementary development of The Economic 
Importance of the Arts in Glasgow alongside strategic developments in the city 
were the report’s timing and the involvement of key actors in the leadership of 
                                                                                                                                              
arts expenditure and contribution of the arts to the economy more broadly. Hughes also 
highlighted a limitation of the study that it did not acknowledge the problem that additional jobs 
created through arts-related activities may be offset by jobs lost elsewhere in the economy. 
(Hughes, 1989: 35-38) 
82 Sara Selwood (2012) has noted that the study was ‘enormously influential’ as ‘the first serious 
attempt to address economic impact in the UK’. Part of Myerscough’s agenda, argued Selwood, 
‘was to persuade the Treasury to increase funding to the arts’. In a central government funding 
context in which ‘traditional arguments were losing their potency […] Myerscough arguably 
established economic impact assessment as a form of advocacy in the UK’ (Selwood, 2012: 85-
86).  
83 John Myerscough was invited to be interviewed as part of this research project though proved 
elusive and a formal interview did not take place. Maintaining an éminence grise position may 
not be compatible with contributing an interview to an oral history archive. While there are no 
records of speeches made by Myerscough, as there are with other key actors such as Norman 
Macfarlane, Myerscough is afforded a voice in the key documents (The Economic Importance of 
the Arts in Britain/Glasgow) that are the basis of this discussion.  
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the city. Although the final PSI report was published in 1988, GDC’s Director of 
Finance, Bill English, proposed as early as 1985 that ‘the Council commission a 
research study into the economic importance of the Arts in the Glasgow area’ 
(GDC, 1986a).84 Research began in Glasgow in 1985/86 (Myerscough, 1988b: 8), 
shortly after McKinsey and Co. reported its recommendations to the SDA, and 
was undertaken concurrently with Glasgow developing its ECOC bid strategy in 
1986. While the national report was initiated by the Calouste Gulbenkian 
Foundation with funding from the OAL, Museums and Galleries Commission, 
ACGB and the Crafts Council, the Glasgow case study developed with strong 
support from key actors within GDC, SRC and Glasgow Action, as well as the SDA, 
the SAC and the GGTB, amongst others, in the form of a Glasgow Advisory Group 
(Myerscough, 1988b: v). The Glasgow case study not only developed in alignment 
with the strategic trajectory the city was already following with regard to the 
arts and its impact on the city economy, but provided a post hoc rationalisation 
for it – a justification for decisions and directions already taken. 
 
As well as providing evidence of the existing economic impact of the arts, 
Myerscough’s report recommended a connected ‘strategy for growth’ in 
Glasgow. This comprised four specific areas: building up the cultural industries; 
increasing attendance at arts events and attractions; expanding cultural tourism; 
and developing extra elements in Glasgow’s cultural programme (Myerscough, 
1988b: 170). Of these four areas, three were an extension of strategic 
developments already underway in the city, not least the McKinsey strategy and 
the ECOC. Indeed, Myerscough highlighted the way in which extra opportunities 
for the arts related to the existing targets within the McKinsey report, such as 
improving the image of Glasgow and building the tourist industry. Only proposals 
related to the cultural industries reached into new territory.  
 
Myerscough’s report was written at a time when the development of the cultural 
industries was at an embryonic stage in Glasgow. Archival evidence reveals that 
initial thinking and discussion of the cultural industries took place in Glasgow 
                                               
84 At this early stage, there was some discussion in the GDC Finance committee as to whether 
‘the Director of Planning be asked to report on the feasibility of his department carrying out the 
survey, in preference to carrying out the survey in conjunction with the Policy Studies Institute’ 
(GDC, 1986a). Bill English became GDC’s representative on the Glasgow Advisory Group for the 
1988 Myerscough/PSI report (Myerscough, 1988b: v). The significance of the role played by Bill 
English in the development of Glasgow’s cultural policy will be discussed in section 7.3. 
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after the city was awarded the ECOC title in 1986 but prior to the 1988 report. 
This thinking was heavily influenced by the dominant left-wing ideology of 
Garnham and the GLC.  
 
The marginal role of ‘public subsidised’ culture compared to ‘commercial’ was 
discussed in a paper on ‘the cultural industries in Glasgow’ in the summer of 
1987 by Robert Palmer, Director of the newly-established GDC Festivals Unit, for 
discussion with the SDA. This paper defined ‘cultural industries’ as:  
  
those organisations which produce and disseminate cultural goods and 
services, generally as commodities. Periodical and book publishing, music 
publishing, video production and film-making are examples.  
(Palmer, 1987: 1) 
 
‘Culture’ here was conceived in entirely economic terms.85 Whereas – as shall be 
discussed in section 7.3 – GDC Festivals Unit was in the process of developing, 
concurrently, a broad definition of Glasgow’s ‘culture’ as ‘everything that makes 
the city what it is’ (GDC, 1992: 8), in this paper, ‘cultural activities’ were 
described as being ‘produced and distributed within a market by large scale 
organisations which are subject to many of the same structural and economic 
pressures that exist in other sectors of the economy’ (Palmer, 1987: 1).   
 
This understanding of the cultural industries – of culture as a commodity; of the 
primary influence of the market on cultural fields; the marginal role of public 
subsidised culture in relation to commercial culture; and, as the paper later 
proposes, the potential for public sector agencies to develop ‘strategic 
interventions’ – strongly reflects the influence of Garnham, the GLEB and the 
GLC.86  
 
However, as shall be discussed in section 7.3, GDC’s approach during the period 
leading up to ECOC 1990 remained rooted in the tradition that Garnham was 
aiming to escape. It was largely focused on the arts and subsidies to artists and 
                                               
85 Although in this paper Palmer stated, ‘There appear to be compelling cultural as well as 
economic reasons for increased investment in the industries of culture’, there was no discussion 
of any ‘cultural’ reasons for investment. 
86 The influence of Garnham, the GLC and the London Industrial Strategy was articulated 
directly, as well as indirectly, in the discussion paper. 
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producing institutions, though GDC did not, in 1987, have a formal overarching 
cultural policy or strategy through which this approach was articulated.  
 
The discussion paper is significant, however, in its attempt at a formal ‘strategic 
intervention to strengthen what exists and avoid what is sometimes a rather 
piecemeal and idiosyncratic application of public funds’ with regard to the 
cultural industries, even though this was not developed in practice during the 
1980s. 
 
Whilst Myerscough’s Glasgow case study was primarily focused on the arts, it 
extended to what the report recognised as ‘a relatively narrow view of the 
cultural industries’ (Myerscough, 1988b: 37). Myerscough defined ‘the arts 
sector’ as constituting three parts. Firstly, ‘what might be termed the “core” of 
the arts industry, the theatres and concerts, museums and galleries, which were 
the principal providers of arts events and attractions’. Secondly, ‘a world of 
small, often ad hoc companies, community organisations (which may include the 
arts in their activities) and individuals who make a living as visual artists, writers 
or performers.’ And finally, ‘some consideration of the cultural industries, 
sectors which supply artistic products and experiences to the public, but are 
often ignored in any discussion of the arts because they are essentially 
commercial in nature’ (Myerscough, 1988b: 10-11, original emphasis). 
Recognising that ‘the scope of the cultural industries is potentially enormous’, it 
was ‘restricted in this study to independent film and video production, cinema, 
broadcasting, publishing, the music industry and the art trade’ (Myerscough, 
1988b: 11).  
 
Myerscough’s approach to defining the cultural industries reflects a wider – and 
as yet, unresolved – challenge inherent in the use of the term to describe a 
sector of the UK economy. Even at this relatively nascent stage in its 
development and application in cultural policy, ‘the cultural industries’ was a 
slippery term, inherently flexible, with no singular shared definition of what 
aspects of ‘culture’ or ‘industry’ it included and excluded. The restricted scope 
of the cultural industries listed in the PSI study overlaps with, though does not 
entirely duplicate, the definition provided by Garnham or the list drawn up by 
Robert Palmer for discussion with the SDA in 1987.  
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In his analysis, Garnham employed a broader definition:  
 
as a descriptive term, ‘cultural industries’ refers to those institutions in our 
society which employ the characteristic modes of production and 
organization of industrial corporations to produce and disseminate symbols 
in the form of cultural goods and services, generally, although not 
exclusively, as commodities. (Garnham, 1987: 25) 
 
However, despite its comparatively narrow definition of the cultural industries, 
the PSI report’s proposals brought a new breadth to Glasgow’s established 
strategic focus on the arts and culture as a consumption activity. Proposed 
initiatives under the reports recommendation to build the cultural industries 
included, for example, 
 
Developing a Designer Quarter in the Merchant City, with workshops, 
studios, retail space and resource centres, together with other attractions 
(including the proposed Costume Museum as a catalyst and focus). This 
would act as a showcase and a stimulus to retailing; it would also stimulate 
tourist activity, by bringing the market to the maker.87   
(Myerscough, 1988b: 171) 
 
This recommendation built on the cultural quarters model tested elsewhere in 
the UK, recontextualised for Glasgow in its focus on stimulating tourism as well 
as providing a means of extending the city’s existing strategy of economic 
development through the consumption of culture into its production.  
 
In conclusion, Myerscough is revealed to be a very different kind of advisor to 
Glasgow than Garnham to London. Both cities were interested in the economic 
potential of the arts and culture, specifically as a tool for countering 
deindustrialisation and the accompanying rise in unemployment. While this 
became the main focus of the GLC and GLEB’s cultural industries strategy, it was 
not the focus of Garnham’s theoretical input, from which the strategy became 
detached. 
  
                                               
87 This recommendation was well-received by GDC and although the designer quarter in the 
Merchant City was not realised until the 1990s, it was, characteristically, promoted in a 1988 
GDC press release to publicise the publication of the PSI report as a ‘good news’ story (GDC, 
1988a: 4).  
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Myerscough, however, built on economic development strategies already 
emerging in Glasgow to bring a new coherence to cultural planning, at a time 
when, as shall be discussed in 7.3, cultural planning was not approached in an 
entirely coherent way within GDC. Myerscough’s collaboration with the Glasgow 
Advisory Group ensured his report reinforced the strategic trajectory Glasgow 
was following in its approach to the ECOC. The report also proposed a shift away 
from an over-reliance on consumption without production towards a more 
balanced approach in its conception of the cultural industries, albeit it one not 
realised by GDC in the years leading to 1990. Myerscough’s dissection of the 
economic impact of the arts provided external evidence of the validity of the 
instrumental approach to culture emerging in Glasgow, positioning it as a 
pioneer in a national context. That Myerscough’s approach was not theorised in 
Marxist terms but pragmatic – based on identifying facts and new opportunities 
for economic growth – aligned well with a city driven by traditional Labour 
values and without a coherent neoliberal agenda, yet which has retrospectively 
been identified as a site of ‘actually existing neoliberalism’. 
 
7.3 Glasgow’s culture and its value in the dual city 
 
Following a brief discussion of the emerging dual city context, this section will 
compare the strategic structures put in place in GDC and SRC to support the 
delivery of the ECOC and the arts and culture more broadly during the period 
1987 to 1989. It will examine, specifically, the dual approaches taken by the 
local and regional councils to articulating Glasgow’s culture and its value in their 
cultural planning documents during this period.  
 
This section will argue that from 1987, two contrasting strategic approaches 
emerged within Glasgow’s local and regional authorities as each established its 
own mechanisms for delivering the impending ECOC event, which dominated 
both councils’ arts and cultural planning activity in the years leading to 1990.  
 
In GDC, this is significant as the point at which a formal cultural policy began to 
emerge, in that formal objectives, which connected culture to social and 
economic development purposes, were first produced by GDC from a cultural 
planning – rather than economic development planning – perspective. Both GDC 
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and SRC took an inherently instrumental approach to culture in their planning 
for the ECOC event. However, whereas SRC’s emerging cultural policy was 
formally directed and strategically shaped by its pre-existing corporate social 
and economic strategies, GDC’s approach reflects an organisation not entirely at 
ease with the new managerialism.  
 
This section will conclude that despite this initial development – and the new 
coherence brought by Myerscough’s 1988 report – there was no coherent, 
deliberate, explicit and formal cultural policy for the city as a whole, in which 
the cultural planning activities of both the local and regional authorities were 
combined, in the years leading to 1990. By 1990, Glasgow was a dual city not 
only in terms of its social and spatial polarisation, but also in the polarised 
approaches of the local and regional councils to the same cultural event and to 
cultural planning in the city. 
 
7.3.1  Defining culture and the dual city 
 
Whilst an early task of GDC’s newly-established Festivals Unit was to produce a 
definition of ‘Glasgow’s culture’ for the ECOC, SRC’s was an approach which 
made  no attempt to define what constituted ‘culture’, but which, in contrast, 
very clearly articulated the social and economic value of the arts and culture to 
the council.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 6, culture is a notoriously slippery term and the 
challenges of attempting to define ‘culture’, in and beyond its administration 
are well documented, not least by Raymond Williams (1976: 14 and 87). As will 
be discussed in the context of GDC and SRC’s approaches to articulating the 
social and economic value of Glasgow’s culture, attempting to distinguish 
between the cultural and the social in policy terms can be equally as 
problematic as defining culture itself. Terry Eagleton’s discussion of EB Tyler’s 
definition of culture illustrates the tension between definitions of the cultural 
and the social which were at play in both GDC and SRC’s emerging policy 
approaches: 
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Culture can be loosely summarized as the complex of values, customs, 
beliefs and practices which constitute the way of life of a specific group. It 
is ‘that complex whole’, as the anthropologist E.B. Tyler famously puts it in 
his Primitive Culture, ‘which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law 
custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a 
member of society’. But ‘any other capabilities’ is rather recklessly open-
minded: the cultural and the social then become effectively identical. 
Culture is just everything which is not genetically transmissible’.  
(Eagleton, 2000: 34) 
 
During this period leading to ECOC 1990, GDC’s attempts to define the city’s 
culture – and both councils’ production of documents articulating the social and 
economic value of the city’s culture – were further complicated by 
disagreements between the city’s elected and self-appointed representatives of 
‘the people of Glasgow’ about the ECOC. 
 
Workers City, a group of writers (and as such, a cultural elite) who claimed to 
defend Glasgow’s ‘authentic voice’ and represent the ‘long-standing tradition of 
struggle’ that constituted its culture, declared that ‘Glasgow – the working class 
city par excellence’ was ‘under attack’. Stating that ‘is it difficult to see the 
“culture” tag as being anything other than a sham accolade to help grease the 
wheels of capitalist enterprise and smooth the path for politicians’, Farquhar 
McLay, poet and editor of Workers City’s collected writings, decried the ECOC as 
‘just another EEC/Tory con trick’ that had: 
 
nothing whatever to do with working- or the workless-class poor of Glasgow 
but everything to do with big business and money: to pull in investment for 
inner-city developments which, in the obsessive drive to make the centre 
of the city attractive to tourists, can only work to the further disadvantage 
of the people in the poverty ghettos on the outskirts. (McLay, 1988: 1) 
 
The Workers City’s backlash was dismissed, not only by GDC Leader Pat Lally – a 
target of the writers’ ire, expressed not least in their renaming Glasgow 
‘Lallygrad’, viewing his leadership style as authoritarian – but also by journalist 
Ruth Wishart. Identifying the core of what was becoming a polarised debate 
around the ECOC as: ‘are the arts, “culture”, and participation in the hype of a 
1990-style promotion a vital tool in urban regeneration and civic rebirth or have 
they very little meaning to those many thousands still disenfranchised by 
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unemployment, poor housing and the lack of any obvious escape route from 
endemic poverty?’ (Wishart, 1991: 44), Wishart commented on:   
 
 
an inherent arrogance in the collective assertion of the Workers City group 
that only they are qualified to be keepers of the city’s socialist conscience 
and working-class tradition. There is arrogance too in their becoming the 
self-appointed voice of the people in Glasgow on whom, they argue, the 
regeneration of Glasgow and its refurbished image have never truly 
impinged. (Wishart, 1991: 46) 
 
Furthermore, these strategic developments and debates about Glasgow’s culture 
and its value emerged at a time when academic critics began to observe that 
Glasgow was becoming a dual city.  
 
The dual city metaphor, as discussed in Chapter 3, describes an increasing social 
and spatial segregation between rich and poor. In 1989, Keating (1989: 516) 
applied the term to Glasgow, commenting that the authorities’ approach to 
urban restructuring, focused on the city centre and waterfront, was ‘heightening 
both social and spatial inequalities in a city already characterized by marked 
social segregation’. More recent evidence, such as the 2016 publication of 
research by Walsh et al. into excess mortality in Glasgow, suggests Glasgow was 
undeniably becoming a dual city at this point in its history, due to complex 
factors such as Scottish Office regional policy from the 1950s, local government 
responses to UK government economic policy in the 1980s and the negative 
impact of the so-called ‘democratic deficit’ on an already vulnerable population 
(Walsh et al, 2016: 3-4).88 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, as much as it points to a real phenomenon – and one 
not restricted to Glasgow but prevalent across the Western world – the dual city 
concept is less than nuanced when used to reduce complex geographies into 
binary narratives. This is reflected in what is now an established narrative of 
culture-led regeneration in Glasgow, in which the city’s approach to ECOC 1990 
is viewed as divisive.  
                                               
88 This research summarises all research that has been undertaken into the phenomenon of 
Scotland – and specifically Glasgow – experiencing higher mortality over and above that 
explained by the country’s socio-economic profile. 
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Ideas that the arts and culture, specifically the ECOC, could contribute to what 
were deeply entrenched, structural socio-economic problems – either by 
exacerbating them or ‘solving’ them – began to gain traction just as Glasgow 
became formally identified as a dual city. Concurrently, a duality of approaches 
to the ECOC – both of which were based on the socio-economic 
instrumentalisation of culture – emerged in local and regional government in 
Glasgow.  
 
7.3.2 Glasgow’s culture and its value in GDC and SRC, 1987 to 1989 
 
Glasgow began the period 1987 to 1989 having been awarded the ECOC 1990 title 
by the EC, but without the structures in place in the city to deliver the event. 
This period also began with discussions between GDC and SRC on the role the 
regional authority might take in Glasgow’s ECOC event and ended with SRC’s 
announcement of its contribution of ‘around £20m to confirm the success of the 
1990 celebrations’ (SRC, 1989: 1). 
 
The voice of SRC is notably absent from Glasgow’s ECOC bid documents, which 
were presented as the united front of the city.89 This absence is made all the 
more conspicuous by the stated purpose of the ECOC initiative being ‘to 
celebrate each year the individual culture of a city and its region’ (Office of Arts 
and Libraries, 1986b). Furthermore, in its 21 year existence (between 1975 and 
1996), SRC provided a significant amount of revenue and capital funding and 
resources for the arts and culture in Glasgow. Whilst in its ECOC submission, GDC 
did not explicitly state that SRC would be expected to fund its ECOC 1990 
proposals,90 it would require SRC’s financial support, not least in the proposal 
that ECOC 1990 would be self-financing, based on the city’s existing 
infrastructure and programme, which was supported by SRC. GDC would also 
need SRC’s support for the event to extend beyond the city boundaries into the 
                                               
89 A GDC internal memo for the Town Clerk from the Town Clerk Depute, Mr Fraser, dated 29 Dec 
1986, produced at the apparent request of Steven Hamilton following a letter he received from 
David Macdonald at Glasgow Action regarding SRC’s involvement, suggests that SRC were 
excluded from the bid, though Mr Fraser stated there was ‘no deliberate intention to exclude 
SRC’ rather it was impractical to involve them given the timescale (Fraser, 1986). 
90 Glasgow’s ECOC submission stated that additional finance would come from GDC, Glasgow 
Action, Scottish Arts Council, and, importantly, commercial sponsorship, with approaches to be 
made to the Scottish Office and the British Council.  
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broader Clyde Valley and Strathclyde region as a whole. However, once Glasgow 
had been nominated, and the nomination ratified, it would have been difficult 
for SRC not to support the Glasgow ECOC 1990 project, financially or 
otherwise.91 
 
In 1987, GDC established the Festivals Unit as a means of delivering the ECOC 
event, alongside overseeing the development of other smaller festivals, 
recruiting Robert Palmer and Neil Wallace as its Director and Depute Director 
respectively. As SRC’s plans for the ECOC, and the structures within the council 
to support it, became formalised, so too did SRC’s processes for decision-making 
on support for arts and cultural activity more broadly, interconnected to the 
ECOC. In GDC, however, decision-making on the arts and culture remained 
largely reliant on the individual agency of key actors in the years leading up to 
1990. 
 
The Festivals Unit was established to organise Glasgow’s Year of Culture without 
an agreed formal definition of what the city’s culture constituted. In the city’s 
ECOC bid, Glasgow followed the Office of Arts and Libraries’ steer in conflating 
‘culture’ with ‘the arts, museums and libraries’ by proposing what is essentially 
an arts festival.92  
 
Early tasks of the new GDC Festivals Unit included establishing for ECOC 1990 a 
definition of ‘Glasgow’s culture’ and objectives, which were categorised as 
cultural, economic and social. 
 
Cultural objectives were:  
 
a) to develop the work of existing organisations in Glasgow in relation to 
quality, innovation and distinctiveness; 
b) to provide incentives and encouragement for artists which help improve 
and enhance their work; 
c) to increase exposure to outside cultural influences and work of 
excellence; 
                                               
91 In addition, as SRC’s involvement at an early stage in the bid process would have led to GDC 
losing some control over the contents of the submission, once Glasgow had been nominated, GDC 
was be in a position to direct the ECOC largely on its own terms.  
92 As discussed in Chapter 6, very little direction on how the ECOCs should define culture was 
provided in the 1985 EC resolution that founded the programme.  
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d) to develop a more co-operative and collaborative approach to cultural 
provision on a city-wide basis; 
e) to extend cultural initiatives on an international basis which may be of 
advantage to Glasgow; 
f) to identify and then fill important gaps which currently exist in cultural 
provision in Glasgow, in relation to specific interests, geography and 
demography. (Palmer, 1988) 
 
Economic objectives were:  
 
a) to create employment opportunities; 
b) to increase the number of visitors to the city;  
c) to expand the number of spectators and participants for cultural 
activities; 
d) to improve the image and perception of Glasgow. This will influence the 
attractiveness of the city as a place to live and work, helping to attract 
new business to the city and to maintain a quality workforce that wants to 
remain in Glasgow. (Palmer, 1988) 
 
Social objectives were:  
 
a) to widen the social base of audiences for cultural activities and improve 
access; 
b) to provide increased opportunities for participation in and understanding 
of cultural activities, with an emphasis on groups which are often ignored 
by the mainstream cultural institutions; 
c) to increase civic pride in Glasgow and Glasgow’s individual and broadly 
based culture, by Glasgwegians; 
d) to provide entertainment and fun for the people of Glasgow; 
e) to ensure adequate consideration is given to particular problems, 
interests or needs of special groups, such as the elderly, disabled, children 
and youth, or cultural or social minorities. (Palmer, 1988) 
 
Of the three sets of objectives, it is the economic – rather than the cultural or 
social – group which relates closest to Glasgow’s original ECOC strategy as set 
out in the city’s 1986 bid. In this respect, this establishment of formal economic, 
cultural and social objectives with an implicitly equal weighting can be seen as a 
rebalancing of the private sector and broader civic interests in the city’s 
approach to the ECOC – a ‘revaluing’ of culture.  
 
In its definition of Glasgow’s culture, the Festivals Unit took an inclusive 
approach, which seems at pains to avoid excluding any particular type of 
culture: 
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Culture is individual, collective and diverse, and reflects the particular 
experiences of all of us, including children, youth, the elderly, ethnic 
minorities, the disabled and other groups which may have special needs. 
Accordingly, cultural events and activities will be diverse, covering most 
aspects of our lives. Various fields will be represented in the lead up to 
1990. Some of these are suggested in the following list: Archaeology, 
Architecture, Broadcasting, Crafts, Dance, Design, Education, Environment, 
Fashion, Film, Food, Heritage, History, Housing, Industry, Literature, 
Museums, Music, Opera, Performance, Play, Politics, Publishing, Science, 
Sport, Technology, Theatre, Transport, Video, Visual arts.93  
 
This list was to be expanded with later additions including engineering, 
shipbuilding, religion and ‘everything that makes the city what it is’ (GDC, 1992: 
8). This anthropological approach – akin to Eagleton’s analysis of EB Tyler’s 
definition of culture in which the social and cultural are conflated – is 
problematic when used as the basis of a festival or, indeed, as a founding 
element in an emerging cultural policy.  
 
The city’s definition of its culture was not entirely connected to its objectives 
for the ECOC, which were separated into the three distinct cultural, social and 
economic categories. Whilst at one point the objectives referred to Glasgow’s 
‘broadly based culture’, the ‘cultural’ in the objectives’ terms ‘cultural 
activities’, ‘cultural provision’, ‘cultural initiatives’ and ‘cultural institutions’ no 
longer referred to ‘everything that makes the city what it is’. It is clear that the 
‘cultural activities’ were predominantly arts events and the ‘cultural 
institutions’ referred to arts organisations such as Scottish Opera and the 
Citizens Theatre and not Ferguson Shipbuilders or the Scottish Special Housing 
Association which were equally cultural institutions that made the city what it 
was.  
 
Thus, in practice the city reverted to a conception of culture as the arts, which 
it was seeking to avoid in its definition. The social and economic were distinctly 
separate from the cultural rather than forming constituent parts of it. This 
revealed an inherent tension between Glasgow’s official definition of culture 
                                               
93 This was listed in a document produced by GDC Festivals Unit titled: ‘Glasgow: European City 
of Culture 1990’, which publicised the establishment of the Festivals Office and invited proposals 
for inclusion in its three-year programme leading to 1990. This document is held in GDC 
committee papers box 127 in Glasgow City Archives at the Mitchell Library, Glasgow. 
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and its cultural objectives. Furthermore, GDC’s approach perpetuated the 
tradition that Nicholas Garnham aimed to escape: focusing predominantly on the 
arts, subsidising artists and producing institutions and finding audiences for their 
work.94 
 
However, the strategic significance of the early work of the Festivals Unit in the 
development of cultural policy in Glasgow was the point at which formal 
objectives, which connected culture to social and economic development 
purposes, were first produced by GDC from a cultural planning – rather than 
economic development planning – perspective. They were produced by a GDC 
unit responsible for the development of the arts and culture, rather than the 
city economy. Rather than absorbing the arts and culture into economic 
development plans, the objectives absorbed social and economic development 
activity into arts and cultural development planning.  
 
This can be seen as the point at which a deliberate cultural policy began to 
emerge in GDC, distinct from economic development policy, though to some 
extent informed by it in the inherent instrumentalisation of culture for 
anticipated social and economic outcomes, which broadly followed the strategic 
trajectory set by the city’s 1986 ECOC bid.  
 
However, in contrast to SRC’s cultural policy approach to the ECOC, which was 
formally connected to and strategically shaped by its pre-existing corporate 
social and economic strategies, there is no direct reference in GDC archive 
documents formally and symbiotically connecting the Festival Unit’s objectives 
for the ECOC to any pre-existing formal strategies or policies. Conversely, as 
shall be discussed below, GDC continued to rely heavily on the individual agency 
                                               
94 For example, GDC’s cultural objectives, such as, ‘to provide incentives and encouragement for 
artists which help improve and enhance their work’, reinforced the concept, rejected by 
Garnham, of, ‘the special and central status attributed to the ‘creative artist’ whose aspirations 
and values, seen as stemming from some unfathomable and unquestionable source of genius, 
inspiration or talent, are the source of cultural value’ (Garnham, 1987: 24). Other cultural 
objectives, such as, ‘to identify and then fill important gaps which currently exist in cultural 
provision in Glasgow, in relation to specific interests, geography and demography’, combined 
with economic objectives, such as, ‘to expand the number of spectators and participants for 
cultural activities’, reinforced the problem of the ‘traditional’ approach to cultural policy 
characterised by Garnham thus: ‘When audiences cannot be found, at least at a price and in a 
quantity which will support the creative activity, the market is blamed and the gap is filled by 
subsidy’ (Garnham, 1987: 24). 
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of key actors. Despite this critical event, GDC’s approach to setting objectives 
for the ECOC reflects an organisation not fully at ease with the new 
managerialism. This contrast between GDC and SRC’s approaches is significant 
not least as it led to contrasting outcomes in the nature of activities each 
council supported. 
 
Critical events in SRC show the new managerialism being more readily adopted 
than in GDC. In the period between 1987 and 1989, SRC developed both for the 
ECOC and the arts and culture more broadly: formal criteria; strategies; 
procedures ‘to ensure that the organisations in receipt of grant assistance 
reflected the council’s policies’; policy guidelines ‘against which requests for 
financial assistance from cultural organisations should be’ – and, crucially, were 
consistently – ‘assessed’; and formal processes to develop ‘the necessary 
establishment to service the policy of the Council’ to support SRC’s ECOC 
activity (Calderwood, 1987a, 1987b, 1988, 1989a, 1989b; SRC, 1987a, 1987b, 
1987c, 1987d, 1988). Through this corporate management practice, SRC did not 
define what constituted ‘culture’ but clearly articulated the social and economic 
value of the arts and culture to the council.95  
 
An outcome of this well-embedded new managerial approach was that in order 
to receive financial support from SRC, arts organisations were steered towards 
producing art with social outcomes, specifically social outcomes related to the 
regional authority’s Social Strategy. 
 
SRC’s emerging cultural policy was clearly defined, connected directly to the 
council’s Social Strategy as a ‘master’ document. SRC’s approach to the ECOC 
therefore aligned with its broader arts and cultural strategy and policy, one 
which privileged social value and economic value through a ‘social’ lens, whilst 
marginalising cultural value, directing arts organisations towards producing art 
with social outcomes. Once SRC’s policies and formal strategies were put in 
place, decisions were made on that basis, apparently unhindered by any 
reversion to patronage of the kind found in GDC during this period. 
 
                                               
95 SRC took this approach not least because it was responsible for social work and education in 
Glasgow and its surrounding region.  
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Despite efforts to establish a more formal strategic approach to arts and culture 
within GDC, such as developing a shared definition of Glasgow’s culture and 
formal written objectives for the ECOC, in the late 1980s Glasgow’s cultural 
policy did not exist formally on paper, but largely in the heads of key actors. In 
contrast to SRC, GDC did not, during this period, develop and adhere to any 
comparable formal policy guidelines in its decision-making on culture. 
Conversely, the consistent factor in decision-making was the reliance on key 
individuals, such as Director of Finance, Bill English, and Council Leader, Pat 
Lally. Reflecting on GDC’s approach to the financing of the arts and culture 
during this period, Jimmy Andrews, then Senior Depute Director of Finance, 
stated that there was ‘no written policy – Pat Lally and Bill English drove it 
forward’ (Jimmy Andrews, interview, 18 August 2014). 
 
This is evident in the way in which some key developments in Glasgow’s cultural 
infrastructure were realised during this period. For example, Pat Lally ensured 
that the building of Glasgow Royal Concert Hall – or ‘Lally’s Palais’ as it became 
known colloquially – was completed in time for it to be opened as a centrepiece 
of the 1990 celebrations. This was not an inconsiderable achievement given that 
in 1987 the project faced a budget deficit of £10m and significant issues related 
to the redevelopment of the Buchanan Street site were unresolved. 
 
In addition, as Director of Finance, Bill English continued in his informal proxy 
role as ‘head of culture’ during this period, maintaining a strategic overview of 
GDC’s expenditure on the arts and culture and directing the council’s decision-
making on it. Throughout this period, the various GDC committees at which arts 
and culture grants were presented continued to operate without any formal 
guiding principles to direct decision-making, of the kind adopted by SRC. 
Instead, decisions were reliant on the personally-held guiding principles of the 
individuals within the committee, following the recommendations of the 
Director of Finance. That this decision-making process relied upon the key actor 
of Bill English, rather than formal policy principles, is underlined in the decision 
taken by one council committee in November 1988 to agree with English’s 
recommendation that, in order to address the problem of the lack of co-
ordination between grant-making committees,  
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no grant or subsidy application from any artistic body or for any artistic or 
cultural purpose should be submitted to any committee of the Council, or 
determined under delegated powers, without having previously been drawn 
to the attention of the Director of Finance.96 (GDC, 1988b) 
 
The reliance on the individual agency of key actors within the city’s leadership 
at both councillor and officer levels reflects the tension between established 
approaches and the new managerialism in GDC, which was not apparent in the 
corporate approach of SRC.  
 
Although this period saw GDC and SRC develop diverging strategic approaches to 
the ECOC, and the arts and culture more broadly, area-specific projects in 
Glasgow were one area in which their work converged around the instrumental 
use of the arts. For example, in 1988 a community arts strategy, which involved 
both authorities, was developed for Easterhouse by the Greater Easterhouse 
Initiative. Here, the arts were deployed in anticipation of social outcomes, at a 
time when the considerable economic investment in the city centre had 
bypassed peripheral estates such as Easterhouse, which were a locus of a range 
of socio-economic problems.  
 
The deployment of community arts in Easterhouse contrasts sharply with 
Glasgow Action’s commissioning, in 1987, of a public art strategy for the city 
centre,97 driven overtly by the economic development objectives of the 
McKinsey strategy: to make the city centre more attractive for living and for 
business, and to improve its image, in order to build the services industries and 
consumer services.    
 
During the period leading to 1990, a patchwork of arts strategies was pursued 
across the city. Some, as Glasgow became an increasingly spatially- and socio-
economically-divided dual city, were formal and area-specific; others were more 
informal or even nebulous. A connecting factor between these strategies was the 
instrumentalisation of the arts and culture for their social and economic value.  
                                               
96 This decision arose following an application from the West End Theatre for £100 to purchase a 
typewriter being presented at the finance sub-committee on grants – an incident which exposed 
one aspect in which GDC’s systems for funding the arts lacked strategic coherence, given the 
range of funding applications appearing at different committees and sub-committees.  
97 Glasgow Action was, of course, another area where SRC and GDC worked together jointly. A 
Public Art Strategy for Glasgow City Centre: a report by Peter Booth and David Harding was 
published by Glasgow Action in December 1987. 
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However, by the end of the decade, the city still lacked a co-ordinated approach 
to arts and culture. GDC’s policy position was neatly summarised in a paper 
titled Cultural Development After 1990,98 produced in 1990 by the Director of 
Festivals for the Town Clerk, Depute Town Clerk and Director of Finance: 
 
At the present time, the city’s policy on arts, culture, festivals, media, and 
economic development related to cultural initiatives is implicit, rather than 
explicit. Currently there is no single focus within the Council for cultural 
activities. The Arts and Culture Committee deals with grant-aid to 
Glasgow’s arts organisations; the Economic Development Committee is 
concerned with media developments and tourism; the Area Management 
Committees assume part-responsibilities for local and community arts 
initiatives. Over the past four years, the Festivals Committee has 
concentrated on arts development projects and special events. The Council 
does not have a co-ordinated approach to planning, to the support of 
initiatives, or to the City’s relative role as a direct arts provider, as against 
the role of Glasgow’s flourishing independent arts sector. (Palmer, 1990) 
 
Ultimately, the increase in cultural planning activity – and burgeoning arts sector 
– did not bring with it a coherent, explicit cultural policy for the city as a whole 
in the years leading to 1990 – or indeed, during 1990 itself. 
 
7.4 An emerging model of culture-led regeneration? 
 
Thus far, this chapter has discussed the inherent instrumentality in the city’s 
approach to the ECOC and the development of arts and culture more broadly – 
how its value was articulated in predominantly economic but also social, and to 
a lesser extent, cultural terms during the late 1980s. It has also demonstrated 
that a formal, explicit cultural policy for Glasgow as a whole did not emerge in 
the years leading to 1990. This section will examine the extent to which a 
replicable ‘Glasgow model’ of culture-led regeneration emerged in the period 
leading to 1990.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, in the decades that have followed 1990, the idea of 
culture-led urban regeneration has become established as what Paddison and 
                                               
98 In this paper, The Director of Festivals, Robert Palmer, set out proposals for the future of 
cultural development from 1991/92, for consideration by the Town Clerk, Depute Town Clerk 
and Director of Finance, in relation to GDC’s imminent budget setting process for that year.  
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Miles (2007) have termed a ‘new orthodoxy’. Glasgow has been viewed as highly 
influential in the establishment of this orthodoxy, its approach to ECOC 1990 
having been characterised a model of culture-led regeneration which could be 
replicated in other cities, for example in relation to Liverpool (Garcia, 2005: 
4844-846; Garcia, 2007: 4-6; Garcia, 2017: 2 and 14). 
 
This section will discuss, in particular, the position of the arts and culture in 
GDC’s economic development activity during the late 1980s, within the context 
of growing national and transnational narratives of cities as models of arts-led 
urban regeneration. It will argue that the arts and culture were not the main 
drivers of Glasgow’s economic development activity at this time, despite the 
increased visibility and public funding afforded by the ECOC and the well-
received publication of The Economic Importance of the Arts in Glasgow.  
 
This section will also examine the conception of major cultural events, such as 
the 1988 Glasgow Garden Festival and the ECOC, as ‘pacing devices’ in a long-
term process of regeneration. It will discuss how during the mid to late-1980s, a 
strategic approach emerged that relied on suitable opportunities arising at the 
right time in order to maintain the momentum generated by the previous major 
cultural event, and that this was an extension of the strategic trajectory of 
culture as a consumption activity within the developing service sector economy.  
 
Ultimately, this section will argue that the shift in Glasgow’s economy since the 
1980s was not led by the arts and culture, and that the research findings 
challenge the idea that a replicable formula or model of culture-led 
regeneration was emerging in the city.  
 
7.4.1 Glasgow’s position in emerging national and transnational narratives of 
models of arts-led urban regeneration99 
 
A decade before the establishment of the DCMS, when its inaugural Secretary of 
State, Chris Smith, made bold claims for the transformative powers of culture 
                                               
99 The phrase ‘culture-led regeneration’ developed during the 1990s and was applied 
retrospectively to Glasgow’s approach to ECOC 1990.  
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(Belfiore, 2009), rhetoric surrounding the position of the arts in urban 
regeneration was gaining currency at a national level in cultural policy in the UK.  
 
The impact of Myerscough’s 1988 PSI report, The Economic Importance of the 
Arts in Britain, was bolstered in the same year in the Arts Council of Great 
Britain inner-city policy document: An Urban Renaissance: The Role of the Arts 
in Urban Regeneration (1988a), which called on politicians, planners and 
developers to consider the arts in their regeneration plans. 
 
The Arts Council’s 1987/88 annual report (1988b) positioned Glasgow and its 
approach to the ECOC firmly at the centre of the UK ‘urban renaissance’ 
narrative, stating: 
 
The most dramatic transformation yet to occur is, of course, Glasgow […] In 
a few years it has moved from being considered Europe’s blackspot to being 
European City of Culture 1990.  
(The Arts Council of Great Britain, 1988b: 29)  
 
The late 1980s also saw an increase in national and transnational knowledge-
sharing on the position of the arts and culture in the regeneration of the inner 
cities, through, for example, a proliferation of conferences, such as The Arts 
and the Changing City British American Arts Association (BAAA) symposium held 
in Glasgow. Such conferences promoted the idea of cities as replicable models 
for urban regeneration – such as the ‘Pittsburgh model’. However, as 
documentation of the BAAA symposium reveals, at that stage, rather than 
constituting a transferable model, Glasgow was a city without a masterplan, but 
which ‘proceeded with a willingness for pragmatic improvisation’ (Keans et al., 
1989: 10). 
 
At this symposium in 1988, GDC Leader, Pat Lally, commented:  
 
At the outset there was no cultural policy, but the city now plans ahead to 
seek out new opportunities for economic development.  
(Keans et al., 1989: 10) 
 
He revealed that the council’s decisions on the arts and culture had not been 
made as a result of masterplanning based on community consultation but, 
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conversely, opportunistically, driven by the instrumental aim of economic 
development.  
 
During the late 1980s, economic development planning continued to be a high 
priority for GDC. This period saw a shift in the strategic position of the arts and 
culture from a reference in the appendices of the Economic Development Plans 
of the early 1980s to a more prominent role. However, despite increasing 
prominence, the arts and culture were by no means central to the city’s 
economic development activity. Minutes of the meetings of the GDC Economic 
Development and Employment Committee overseeing economic development 
activity during this period show that the arts and culture were very rarely 
discussed and decisions remained largely unconnected to the Arts and Culture 
Committee or the Festivals Committee.100  
 
GDC archive documents show that by the end of 1988, the arts and culture 
featured in two main aspects of economic development planning activity, both 
strongly connected to tourism development. Firstly, in order to support business 
promotion:  
 
‘image promotion’ through highly selective trade advertising, populist 
campaigns such as ‘Miles Better’, and intensive promotion of Glasgow as an 
arts/cultural centre. (LEDIS, 1989a) 
 
Secondly, as part of its ‘service sector strategy’, GDC developed ‘an arts and 
culture strategy intended to maximise the economic benefits from these 
activities’, these activities being the ‘improvement of visitor attractions and of 
the marketing and promotion of City attractions’ (LEDIS, 1989a). 
 
Here we see in GDC’s economic development planning activity of the mid to late 
1980s, the arts and culture retained a supporting – rather than leading – role in 
shifting the base of the city economy away from manufacturing towards the 
service industries and consumer services. The arts and culture were utilised as 
promotional tools, to change the city’s image and generate revenue from 
tourism. This did not constitute a strategy for the cultural industries – of the 
                                               
100 Minutes of these GDC committee meetings can be found in boxes GDC 1/2 1985/86-1988/89 in 
Glasgow City Archives. 
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kind discussed earlier in this chapter, which balanced consumption with the 
production of culture – but, conversely, a continuation of the strategy set in 
Glasgow’s 1986 ECOC bid.  
 
Despite the case made by The Economic Importance of the Arts in Glasgow 
report, Glasgow being positioned as a leader in a growing national and 
transnational narrative of cities as models of arts-led urban regeneration, and 
the impending ECOC event prompting greater visibility and a large increase in 
public funding for the arts and culture, the arts and culture were not the main 
drivers of Glasgow’s economic development activity at that time.  
 
7.4.2 Pacing devices, major events and opportunism 
 
One way in which the arts and culture played a supporting role in the city’s 
process of regeneration was through the conception of major events as ‘pacing 
devices’. Pacing devices have been defined by Stuart Gulliver (interview, 9 July 
2014) as periodic events which provide intermittent ‘highs’ to those in the city, 
where they can jointly celebrate civic progress and achievements over a 25 year 
process of transformation. Pacing devices provided a means of building 
confidence in the city, necessary to support the shift in the economy towards 
the service industries and consumer services.  
 
Gulliver (interview, 28 August 2014) has argued that Glasgow used the ECOC as a 
pacing device, because it would enable authorities concerned with economic 
development, such as the SDA, to ‘take stock of where we were, would people 
still like to come here, do investors still want to come here?’. 
 
Retrospectively, the major cultural events of 1983, discussed in Chapter 5, can 
be viewed as the first of these pacing events in the city. However, the extent to 
which they were planned as such in 1983 is debatable: no evidence has emerged 
to suggest the events of 1983 were intended to be the first of a series of 
subsequent pacing devices in a deliberate longer-term plan. However, the 1988 
Glasgow Garden Festival and ECOC 1990 cemented Glasgow’s subsequent 
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strategic course, begun in 1983, which connected high profile events to the 
city’s economic development.101 
 
The 1988 Glasgow Garden Festival acted as a precursor to ECOC 1990 as a major 
cultural event intended to change perceptions of the city.102 Glasgow’s approach 
to using its Garden Festival to reclaim derelict land for redevelopment – the 
original purpose of the British Garden Festivals – was not the most rational.103 
However, in Glasgow, the PR opportunities presented by the festival were 
thoroughly exploited. The timing of the Glasgow Garden Festival was changed 
from 1989 to 1988 to align with the anniversaries of the 1888 Glasgow 
International Exhibition and 1938 Empire Exhibition. Glasgow’s maximising civic 
promotion from the Garden Festival extended to rebranding it altogether from 
its original title of the National Garden Festival. This opportunistic, somewhat 
bullish, approach was repeated in 1990: the awarded title of ‘European City of 
Culture’ not being sufficiently prestigious, Glasgow rebranded itself ‘Cultural 
Capital of Europe’. 
 
This opportunism was an inherent driving force in the city’s 1986 bid to host 
ECOC 1990. David Macdonald, Director of Glasgow Action, has described how 
learning from Garden Festivals held in Liverpool and Stoke led to some in 
leadership roles in Glasgow to conclude that another large-scale event would be 
required to maintain the momentum anticipated to be generated by the 
forthcoming 1988 Glasgow Garden Festival:  
 
We went and had a look at Stoke and we went and had a look at Liverpool, 
and the festivals were great, they were really good, but there was a sense 
of anti-climax at the end of it. So you had this big high point and then… 
there’s a hangover after it. Is that it, you know? And we felt that Glasgow 
                                               
101 This continues in Glasgow today, and is evident in such examples as the 2014 Commonwealth 
Games held in the city. 
102 Indeed, Glasgow’s Garden Festival extended beyond horticulture to include a City Festival 
organised by the Festivals Unit. This encompassed arts events such as Peter Brook’s epic 
Mahabarata in Tramway, and connected to other events such as Mayfest and the recently-
established Jazz Festival over the course of the spring and summer of 1988. As in 1983, this saw 
the building of a critical mass of cultural activity in the years leading to 1990.  
103 Despite there being no shortage of derelict land in public ownership, the Princes Dock site 
chosen by the city authorities (the SDA with GDC and SRC) was already owned by a private 
property developer, Laing Homes Ltd, and therefore already in the process of being regenerated. 
An arrangement was made at great public expense for the site to be ‘borrowed’ for the festival 
from Laing, resulting in delays to Laing’s original timetable for the development of the festival 
site for housing and amenities (Theokas, 2004: 170; Keating, 1988: 186). 
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should not suffer that. So then we wanted something in the bag before the 
Garden Festival took place, so something that would happen in a few years 
after that. So it was tactical. We did not want there to be a dip after the 
Garden Festival. So let’s look around for something else. Now we didn’t 
find it by looking around, I think it sort of… appeared out of the ether.  
(David Macdonald, interview, 8 September 2014) 
 
Thus, Glasgow avoided the ‘dip’ after its 1988 Garden Festival by becoming a 
European City of Culture in 1990. However tactical it may have been, the aim to 
maintain the momentum generated by one prestigious, large-scale event by 
hosting another prestigious, large-scale event did not, at that stage, amount to a 
formal event strategy or policy in Glasgow. Indeed, this approach only postponed 
the inevitable dip from 1989 to 1991 rather than avoiding it entirely. 
 
Gulliver has acknowledged the inherent opportunism in the approach to using 
major events as pacing devices:  
 
We deliberately sought out to try and pace our way through these 25 years, 
things that we thought were important for the city that we could do well 
but would draw attention or continue to stimulate and keep the momentum 
up. So there was a degree of opportunism there.  
(Stuart Gulliver, interview, 28 August 2014) 
 
While this period saw the emergence of a strategic approach which relied on 
suitable opportunities arising at the right time in order to maintain momentum 
in the city, it was also a point at which a pattern emerged which saw major 
events play a catalytic role in the development of cultural policy (whether 
implicit or explicit) in the city.  
 
Although the connection of pacing devices to major events involves the 
application of an economic development tool to the arts and culture, this does 
not constitute a model of culture-led regeneration. Ultimately, the shift in 
Glasgow’s economy since the 1980s was not led by the arts and culture. As 
Stuart Gulliver has argued:  
 
People say, and I’ve read it, that Glasgow’s transformation was a culture-
led transformation. Well that’s wrong. I think that’s, if you like, the tip of 
the iceberg. You can’t change a city in the profound way that this city has 
been changed without it being a much deeper transformational history. 
Glasgow changed its economy. There were a lot of aspects of financial 
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business, financial services and healthcare industries, transaction 
processing, hospitality industries of course, all of which took place as well. 
You can’t be a kind of one trick economy, you know, one sector, one 
segment is never going to be sufficient to turn around economic 
performance. (Stuart Gulliver, interview, 28 August 2014) 
 
Gulliver’s analysis is reflected in the 2002 OECD report, Urban Renaissance 
Glasgow: Lessons for Innovation and Implementation. This report noted the 
dramatic change in Glasgow’s economy, the continued decline in manufacturing 
and the service sector becoming dominant (OECD, 2002: 40 and 45). It stated:  
 
call centres are important to the Glasgow economy, just as they are 
proving to be across Europe and are expected to increase in the city over 
the next 8 years. […] The city employs some 30,000 people in financial 
services sector directly, more than in Edinburgh and ranks tenth in Europe. 
Overall the finance/banking/insurance and business services sector now 
employs some 91,600 people. High value knowledge based industries are 
growing in the city reflecting national and regional trends. The Bioscience 
sector, for example, grew by 25 per cent during this period.  
(OECD, 2002: 45) 
 
Whilst a detailed examination of the factors that determined the changes in 
Glasgow’s economy post-1990 is beyond the scope of this research project, there 
is no doubt that the reasons for these changes are multifarious and complex, and 
cannot be attributed predominantly to the arts and culture.  
 
In broad terms, the economies of Glasgow and other cities have been affected 
by significant global developments in the period since 1990. For example, the 
2002 OECD report highlighted the rise of globalisation – a process it 
characterised by ‘the increasing integration of markets for goods and services 
and markets of production factors such as capital, labour, technology and 
information which has a profound impact at the territorial level’ (OECD, 2002: 
26). 
 
Because the 1980s and 1990s saw a major global economic shift which was not 
restricted to Glasgow, similar changes to Glasgow – the protracted decline in 
manufacturing and growth in the service sector, the rise of financial services, 
call centres and bioscience – also took place in the economies of cities across the 
UK and Europe; cities which had not been hailed as constituting models of 
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culture-led regeneration. In this regard the capability of arts and culture to lead 
Glasgow’s dramatic economic change on this scale has been overstated.  
 
The development of the myth of Glasgow as a model of culture-led regeneration 
can be partially attributed to the arts and culture having a visibility not afforded 
to other factors that have been more influential in the development of the city 
economy, as Gulliver has argued:  
   
If there’s a healthcare company that’s made a breakthrough on a drug or a 
bit of pharmacology or whatever you don’t see that. If it’s exporting a drug 
– which indeed some companies did, based in Glasgow – around the world it 
has an invisibility about it, whereas the arts and culture, you can see it. 
You can see it on the street and you can see it in the galleries and you can 
see it in the concert halls and you can see it on the billboards, and people 
talk about it much more. So that whole kind of grouping of culture, leisure 
became an important image-breaker for Glasgow. 
(Stuart Gulliver, interview, 28 August 2014) 
 
Indeed, substantial steps were made through ECOC 1990 in changing Glasgow’s 
image.104 Whilst changing Glasgow’s image was cited as an important factor in 
the city’s plans to develop the service sector economy during the 1980s (for 
example in the McKinsey strategy), the arts and culture were but one tool in this 
drive. Changing Glasgow’s image was but one aspect of a myriad of economic 
development planning foci and initiatives involving the city during this period. 
The correlation of a highly visible arts and culture festival with a structural shift 
in the city economy does not imply one caused the other.  
 
The change in Glasgow’s economy since the 1980s can therefore be viewed as 
the result of a combination of complex factors, some of which can be connected 
to deliberate economic planning activity, others of which, including major global 
developments, emanated from elsewhere and were beyond the city’s control. 
 
Furthermore, the idea of a Glasgow model is undermined by the fact that no 
easily definable, explicit cultural policy emerged in Glasgow in the years leading 
                                               
104 For example, John Myerscough’s Monitoring Glasgow 1990 report produced in 1991 for GDC, 
SRC and Scottish Enterprise (the public body to have replaced the SDA and Glasgow Action in 
1991) noted: ‘Glasgow 1990 substantially improved perceptions of the City at home and abroad. 
There was a 15 percentage point increase in belief (in London & the South East) that Glasgow 
was “rapidly changing for the better”. But there remains scope for further improvement’ 
(Myerscough, 1991: iv).  
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to 1990.  As such, the research findings challenge the idea that a replicable 
formula or model of culture-led regeneration was emerging in the city.  
 
7.5 Conclusion 
 
Earlier chapters discussed how Glasgow being awarded the ECOC title was not 
preceded by the development of a formal cultural policy. This chapter has 
demonstrated how in the period between Glasgow being awarded the title and 
the event taking place in 1990, despite an increase in cultural planning activity 
and the arts and culture being afforded increased visibility due to the impending 
ECOC event, a deliberate, explicit, coherent cultural policy for the city as a 
whole did not quite emerge.  
 
During this period, a patchwork of strategies for the arts and culture – often 
prompted by ECOC 1990 – developed across the city, some of which were 
connected to joint area-specific projects, some of which were connected (as in 
SRC’s case) to pre-existing corporate social and economic strategies, some of 
which (as in GDC’s case) were confined to the imaginations of key actors 
according to their own guiding principles. A significant characteristic of the 
more formal strategies to develop during this period was the articulation of the 
social and economic value of the arts and culture – the pragmatic 
instrumentalisation of culture in social and economic agendas. 
 
A critical event in the emergence of cultural policy in Glasgow, with the ECOC as 
a facilitating factor, was economic development activity becoming incorporated 
into cultural planning, the arts and culture having been incorporated into 
economic development planning earlier in the decade. Myerscough’s 1988 
report, The Economic Importance of the Arts in Glasgow, brought a new 
coherence to cultural planning in the city, comparable to the coherence 
McKinsey and Co. had brought to economic development planning earlier in the 
1980s.   
 
However, the dominance of the ECOC in Glasgow during this period, 
predominantly conceived as an occasion for cultural consumption, also acted as 
an obstacle to the development of a broader cultural policy which encompassed 
  212 
 
the production of culture as well as its consumption. During the period 1987 to 
1989, GDC and its partners largely followed the strategic trajectory established 
in its 1986 ECOC bid: based on the McKinsey strategy, this approach privileged 
the consumption of culture over its production, as attempts were made to shift 
the base of the city economy from manufacturing to the service sector.  
 
Work on the cultural industries in GDC did not initially develop – before 
Myerscough’s recommendations – beyond thinking and discussion. Myerscough’s 
1988 report both reinforced the strategic trajectory the city was following and 
recommended the cultural industries as an area for development: 
recommendations which relied on the catalytic events of the 1990s for their 
subsequent realisation.  
 
Unlike Garnham’s approach in London, no attempts were made in Glasgow 
during the 1980s to establish a new democratic cultural policy. A comparison of 
Myerscough’s approach in Glasgow with that of Garnham in London has revealed 
an underlying characteristic pragmatism rather than a theorised Marxist 
approach.   
 
The late 1980s saw the emergence of a national and transnational narrative of 
cities as models of ‘arts-led urban regeneration’ (as a precursor to ‘culture-led 
regeneration’) in which Glasgow was positioned, following its designation as 
ECOC 1990, as evidence of the transformative powers of culture. However, 
despite increasing prominence, the arts and culture were not central to 
Glasgow’s economic development activity during the late 1980s. The subsequent 
shift in Glasgow’s economy cannot decisively or solely be attributed to culture.  
 
There is much for other cities to learn from Glasgow’s experience. For example, 
some of the principles within strategies developed in Glasgow – such as the 
McKinsey strategy’s intention to create ‘virtuous cycles’105 of regeneration, and 
the supporting, rather than leading, role that might be played by the arts and 
culture with those cycles, not least in its image-changing potential – may provide 
useful learning for other towns and cities. However, Glasgow as a whole does not 
constitute a replicable model. As much as some of the problems experienced by 
                                               
105 This virtuous cycles strategy is illustrated in the diagram shown on page 159 (Figure 1).  
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Glasgow during the 1980s may be shared by other cities, the cultural (and 
regeneration) policy approach that emerged in Glasgow in the years leading to 
1990 was unique to the city and not replicable elsewhere. It relied heavily on 
Glasgow’s specific historical context and the agency of individual key actors 
within it; on a characteristic tactical opportunism and pragmatic improvisation.   
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION: CULTURE-LED REGENERATION 
OR REGENERATION-LED CULTURE? 
 
8.1 Introduction  
 
The research presented in this thesis has aimed to contribute towards a better 
understanding of the emergence of cultural policy in Glasgow in the period 1970 
to 1989, based on new documentary research and oral history interviews with 
the key surviving decision-makers. The period of study was chosen as the two 
decades leading to 1990, when Glasgow hosted the ECOC. This qualitative study 
was prompted by a gap in existing research, previous literature having focused 
predominantly on the impacts of the ECOC rather than the emergence of 
cultural policy in Glasgow in the years preceding 1990.  
 
This thesis has examined what happened and why, through six research 
questions:  
 
1. What factors prompted the ‘cultural turn’ in Glasgow’s policy 
making?  
2. What factors facilitated the new policy drive?  
3. Who were the key actors involved?  
4. What were the obstacles encountered? 
5. To what extent can the period from 1979-89 be periodised in terms 
of critical events and how are we to understand the significance 
and influence of these events? 
6. What strategies were employed by Glasgow District Council in 
developing its bid to become the European City of Culture? How did 
it mobilise the requisite expertise? How did it assess the challenge 
represented by its rivals and counter that challenge? 
 
The research findings shed new light on the nature of the cultural policy to have 
emerged in Glasgow in the two decades leading to 1990: that is, not an explicit 
‘nominal’ cultural but an implicit, ‘effective’ cultural policy dominated by 
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economic development at a time when the city faced severe socio-economic 
problems.  
 
It has provided new insights into how in 1986, Glasgow came to be awarded the 
prestigious ECOC 1990 title, despite the fundamental obstacle of the lack of 
alignment between the images of the city and the previous title holders. This 
thesis has argued that the construction and reception of Glasgow’s ECOC bid was 
shaped by a combination of prestige, prejudice and public relations.  
  
This thesis has also revealed ECOC 1990 to have been an obstacle as well as an 
enabler in the development of a cultural policy in Glasgow which encompassed 
both the production and consumption of culture.  
 
Furthermore, this thesis challenges the established idea that a replicable model 
of culture-led regeneration emerged in Glasgow in the years leading to 1990.  
 
These points will be discussed below, followed by an outline of the limitations 
and implications of the research and concluding thoughts.  
 
8.2  An implicit, ‘effective’ cultural policy 
 
The research presented in this thesis has established what and where cultural 
policy in Glasgow was between 1970 and 1989.  
 
Chapter 4 discussed the potential for cultural policy to be explicit or implicit. It 
outlined Ahearne’s (2009: 143) distinction between explicit or ‘nominal’ cultural 
policy (‘any cultural policy that a government labels as such’) and implicit or 
‘effective’ cultural policy (‘any political strategy that looks to work on the 
culture of the territory over which it presides (or that of its adversary)’). It 
discussed the further distinction made by Ahearne between the ‘unintended side 
effects of various kinds of policy’ and ‘deliberate courses of action intended to 
shape cultures but which are not expressly thematised as such’ (2009: 144), as 
falling within the realm of implicit or effective cultural policies. Chapter 4 also 
discussed Throsby’s view that ‘some economic policies have a hidden cultural 
purpose and therefore qualify as implicit cultural policy’ (2009: 179). 
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Furthermore, it highlighted Bell and Oakley’s view that the ‘deep and 
interlinking assets’ to be found in cities are ‘only occasionally the results of 
deliberate cultural policy’; conversely, they are 
 
much more often the legacy of education policy, transport policy, planning 
and licencing laws, migration and housing policy, of philanthropy and 
commercial hard sell – mixed together with a variety of cultural assets, 
public and private. (Bell and Oakley, 2015: 80) 
 
This thesis has revealed the emergence of cultural policy in Glasgow during the 
years leading to 1990 to have been more implicit or ‘effective’ than explicit or 
‘nominal’. It has also demonstrated that the extent to which this implicit 
cultural policy was a deliberate cultural policy to be complex and not easily 
identifiable.   
 
Whereas SRC produced a number of nominal cultural policy documents, which 
were the product of an embedded new managerialism, GDC took a divergent, 
idiosyncratic approach, which relied heavily on the agency, imaginations and 
individually-held guiding principles of key actors.  
 
By 1990, there was no explicit cultural policy for the city as a whole; however, 
significant steps forward had been made in the twenty years since 1970 through 
a series of critical events. The foremost critical event was the city’s successful 
1986 bid to host ECOC 1990. This was, as will be discussed below, both an 
enabler and an obstacle in the development of cultural policy in Glasgow. 
Glasgow’s ECOC bid connected the earlier critical events that decade of the 
city’s burgeoning arts and cultural infrastructure and its emergent economic 
development plans, policies and strategies in which aspects of the arts and 
culture had been subsumed and gradually repositioned from a peripheral to a 
more prominent – but by no means central - position. In this respect, the ‘hidden 
cultural purpose’ of Glasgow’s economic development policies developed prior 
to the city’s 1986 ECOC bid reflect Throsby’s definition of implicit cultural 
policy.   
 
Despite developments post-1986, with the establishment of new structures such 
as the Festivals Unit to deliver ECOC 1990 and other events, and an increase in 
  217 
 
cultural planning, the arts and culture remained strategically fragmented within 
GDC by 1990.  
 
However, as discussed in Chapter 7, John Myerscough’s 1988 report, The 
Economic Importance of the Arts in Glasgow, brought a new coherence to 
cultural planning in the city, comparable to some extent with the coherence 
McKinsey and Co. brought to economic development planning earlier in the 
1980s. Myerscough as the city’s choice of key external adviser on arts and 
culture is significant not only as a reflection of the city’s approach being based 
on a characteristic pragmatism rather than theorised Marxism – it was not driven 
by an aim to develop a new democratic cultural policy, as had been Nicholas 
Garnham’s motivation in his work with the GLC. It also set a longer-term agenda 
in which the arts and culture emerged from the ‘hidden cultural purpose’ of 
economic development policy to become explicitly valued for their potential 
economic impact from a cultural planning perspective: a growing and shifting 
instrumentalisation.  
 
That an implicit cultural policy emerged in Glasgow over the course of the 1980s 
within the broader context of the city facing severe socio-economic problems at 
a time of major global change is, as has been emphasised throughout this thesis, 
significant.   
 
During the 1980s, the city authorities in Glasgow produced explicit economic 
development plans, policies and strategies because the consequences for the 
city of not doing so were dire. There was no comparable urgency or motivating 
force driving the development of cultural policy in the city: the arts would 
happen anyway, driven by defining characteristics of the city, shared as much by 
the city’s elected leadership as the arts and cultural community (including the 
constituency identifying themselves as Workers City, who were so opposed to 
the city’s approach to the ECOC): tactical opportunism, pragmatic improvisation 
and the ability to make things happen. One may therefore conclude that during 
the period 1970 to 1989, Glasgow did not develop an explicit, nominal cultural 
policy because it did not need to.  
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8.3  Prestige, prejudice and public relations 
 
This thesis has shed new light on how Glasgow came to be the UK’s city of choice 
to host ECOC 1990.   
 
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, Glasgow’s year as ECOC 1990 is viewed in 
existing literature on the subject as pivotal, the point at which the ECOC 
became a catalyst for culture-led regeneration. It is well-established that 
following Athens, Florence, Amsterdam, Berlin and Paris, Glasgow, as a post-
industrial city without an established international reputation for tourism, was 
an unconventional choice for the title. The research findings in this thesis 
contribute to this body of knowledge in revealing how and why Glasgow was 
selected to be the UK’s nominated city for the ECOC title, based on new primary 
source data generated from some of the key protagonists involved in Glasgow’s 
bid as well as those in central government, alongside new archival research.  
 
This thesis has examined the strategies employed by GDC and its coalition 
partners in developing Glasgow’s ECOC bid; how the city mobilised the requisite 
expertise; and how it assessed the challenge represented by its rivals and 
countered that challenge. It has also examined the decision-making process and 
considered the roles played by key actors in central government which resulted 
in Glasgow winning the nomination. In so doing, this thesis has argued that the 
construction and reception of Glasgow’s ECOC bid was shaped by a combination 
of prestige, prejudice and public relations.  
 
In the years preceding Glasgow’s 1986 ECOC bid came the recognition of how 
crucial the city’s image was to the future of its economy. Glasgow’s entrenched 
poor image was inhibiting the growth of the service industries and consumer 
services. This was significant as by the mid-1980s the service sector had been 
identified as the primary means of rebuilding the city’s economy with the 
recognition that manufacturing, its economic base, was in terminal decline. 
Glasgow needed to change its image to rebuild its economy. By the time the 
opportunity arose to bid to host the ECOC, various image-boosting initiatives, 
such as the 1983 PR campaign, Glasgow’s Miles Better, were already underway.  
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Glasgow’s ECOC bid was therefore driven by prestige. The ECOC presented 
Glasgow with the opportunity to align itself with the prestigious cities that had 
previously held the title: Athens, Florence, Amsterdam, Berlin and Paris, none of 
which were seen as declining post-industrial cities, all of which were undisputed 
European centres of culture. It was the prestige of the ECOC which would allow 
Glasgow to reposition its image and thereby support the development of the 
city’s service sector economy.  
 
However, the existing lack of alignment between Glasgow’s image and that of 
the prestigious group of ECOC title holders presented a problem: Glasgow was 
not in a position to win the title on reputation alone, and it was competing with 
cities in the UK that were. Furthermore, some in Glasgow’s bid coalition 
anticipated (justifiably) their submission being met with prejudice in some 
quarters on the basis of the city’s poor reputation preceding it.  
 
Realising that a coherent strategy was therefore needed to underpin their 
submission to the central government decision-makers, the leaders of Glasgow’s 
bid coalition drew not on a formal, explicit cultural policy – which in 1986 did 
not exist – but on the city’s rapidly developing and increasingly coherent 
economic development plans, policies and strategies.  
 
As a solution, in its bid for the UK’s ECOC nomination, key actors in Glasgow 
worked together to produce an excellent work of public relations. Glasgow’s 
submission demonstrated that it more than met central government’s stated 
criteria and requirements for hosting the event, but also had a broader 
ambitious strategy of economic development and urban renewal, aligned with 
the Conservative government’s agendas, in which the ECOC would play a key 
enabling role. It did so by developing key messages, supported by the selective 
inclusion of facts – all of which reflected the city in a positive light – voiced by 
prominent and credible representatives of each of the city’s relevant sectors. 
Not least of these was influential businessman, Sir Norman Macfarlane, who led 
the involvement of the city’s business community in support of the bid. The 
cultural constituents of the bid – the city’s arts organisations – were brought into 
the bid coalition at short notice as the deadline approached. They did not drive 
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the bid strategy; they were the cultural ‘content providers’ required for the 
strategy to succeed.  
  
The research presented in this thesis has uncovered the prejudice faced by 
Glasgow’s bid that emanated from certain government ministers consulted in the 
decision-making process, notably some in the Scottish Office whose support, 
based on the strength of Glasgow’s case, should have been forthcoming. This 
prejudice was based on a preconceived idea of what an ECOC should be – an 
architype that Glasgow did not fit based on its image – and a concern that the EC 
may not ratify a UK proposal that veered from this ideal. This preconceived idea, 
which had no basis in the 1985 EC resolution on which the ECOC was founded, 
resulted in government ministers including Malcolm Rifkind, Geoffrey Howe and 
David Young recommending the UK’s ECOC should be Edinburgh or Bath – cities 
whose bids were weaker than Glasgow’s. The research has shown how, 
significantly, based on the case made by Glasgow, the Minister for the Arts and 
civil servants in the OAL106 promoted to the EC – and to other government 
departments – an alternative idea of what an ECOC could be. It was this that 
subsequently changed the direction of the ECOC.  
 
Glasgow’s response to the opportunity presented by the competition to host the 
ECOC was that of a city in no position to be complacent about its future (or 
present, for that matter) – and a city well aware that in order to secure the 
nomination, it would have to overcome obstacles not encountered by 
competitors such as Edinburgh, which did not share its ‘image issue’. There was 
no inevitability to Glasgow being awarded the ECOC title.  
 
Through Glasgow’s approach to the ECOC, culture acted as a connecting factor 
between the city’s image and its economy. The research has shown how the 
ECOC became a fundamental driver of Glasgow’s implicit, effective cultural 
policy – an economic development policy with a ‘hidden’ cultural purpose. In 
prioritising the development of the service sector economy, Glasgow’s 1986 
                                               
106 As discussed in Chapter 6, the OAL was the government department to select the UK’s 
nomination for the ECOC – and, crucially, a department which did not view Glasgow’s bid with 
prejudice on the basis of the city’s image, but nominated Glasgow on the basis of the strength of 
its bid.  
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ECOC bid also set the city on a strategic trajectory which, as shall be discussed 
in section 8.4, prioritised the consumption of culture over its production.  
 
8.4 ECOC 1990 as both enabler and obstacle 
 
A perhaps surprising finding of this study is that ECOC 1990 acted as an obstacle 
as well as a facilitating factor in the development of cultural policy in Glasgow.  
 
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, ECOC 1990 is widely regarded in the literature 
as a turning point for the city and the programme. However, that ECOC 1990 
acted as an obstacle as well as a facilitating factor in the development of 
cultural policy in Glasgow has not been identified in the extant literature.  
 
This thesis has shown that Glasgow’s 1986 bid to host ECOC 1990 was clearly a 
turning point for the emergence of cultural policy in the city. It was only when 
the opportunity to bid to host the ECOC arose in 1986 that a cultural policy 
vacuum became evident: the city required a coherent strategy to underpin its 
bid, as it was not in a position to win the ECOC nomination on reputation alone; 
however, the lack of an explicit, nominal cultural policy to provide this direction 
resulted in this strategic vacuum being filled by the city’s increasingly coherent 
economic development plans and strategies. The focus of Glasgow’s ECOC 
strategy was the consumption of culture, reinforcing the aim to shift the base of 
the city’s economy from manufacturing to service industries and consumer 
services.  
 
The scale of the ECOC meant that it dominated the city’s cultural planning 
between 1986 and 1990, facilitating a significant increase in the scale and scope 
of arts and cultural activity and the development of venues for its consumption 
in the city. However, during this period, whilst Glasgow followed the strategic 
trajectory established in its ECOC bid based on the consumption of culture, 
other comparable UK cities concurrently developed their own policies, strategies 
and plans for the arts and culture. These were premised to varying degrees on a 
balance of consumption and production.  
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The GLC and GLEB’s cultural industries strategy for London, though unrealised in 
practice due to the 1986 abolition of the GLC, proved influential in other cities 
in the UK. In this far-reaching strategy, Nicholas Garnham’s theoretical input 
was adapted by the GLC and GLEB as a solution to the problem of 
deindustrialisation and balanced the production of culture with its consumption. 
 
In the years leading to 1990, as discussed in Chapter 7, interest was shown by 
both GDC Festivals Unit and the SDA in how Glasgow might adapt the GLC’s 
cultural industries idea, and Myerscough included recommendations for the 
development of the cultural industries in Glasgow as part of his 1988 report, The 
Economic Importance of the Arts in Glasgow. However, in the years leading to 
1990, the dominance of the ECOC meant that the city’s work on the cultural 
industries – balancing the consumption of culture with its production – was not 
realised in practice until enabled by the catalytic events of the 1990s. These 
included a festival of visual arts held in 1996 – Glasgow having lost the 
competition to host the official Year of the Visual Arts to North East England, 
but deciding to realise its plans nonetheless – and the 1999 Year of Architecture 
and Design.  
 
Thus, as well as acting as a facilitating factor both for the development of the 
arts and culture in the city and for the development of an implicit, effective 
cultural policy, the ECOC acted as an obstacle to the development of an explicit 
cultural policy which balanced the consumption of culture with its production. 
Whilst work to develop the cultural industries progressed in other UK cities 
during the years leading to 1990, the dominance of the ECOC during this period 
prevented Glasgow from broadening its focus to encompass the production of 
culture until the subsequent decade.  
 
8.5 A replicable model of culture-led regeneration? 
 
The research challenges the idea that a replicable model of culture-led 
regeneration emerged in Glasgow in the years leading to 1990. 
 
Chapter 3 outlined the culture-led regeneration orthodoxy and Glasgow’s 
position within it. It discussed the mythology surrounding Glasgow’s approach to 
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ECOC 1990 as being a fully-formed model which can be transferred to and 
replicated by other cities. It also outlined the somewhat contradictory 
established narratives about ECOC 1990 and culture-led regeneration. In the 
first, Glasgow’s culture-led regeneration approach to the ECOC was pioneering, 
pivotal in the history of the ECOC, and socially and economically transformative 
to the city, with cities subsequently wanting the ECOC title in order to replicate 
Glasgow’s success. In the second, ECOC 1990 was divisive and socially and 
economically disastrous for some sections of the city, reinforcing binary dual city 
narratives of a growing polarisation between rich and poor in the city. Chapter 3 
also highlighted problems with measurement and evidence raised in current 
academic debates on culture-led regeneration. It noted the rise of ‘research as 
advocacy’ and that culture-led regeneration as a policy concept has been proven 
to be based on less than robust evidence, but has gained traction nonetheless.  
 
Whilst this research was a Collaborative Doctoral Award project with Glasgow 
Life, Glasgow City Council’s arms-length external organisation responsible for 
the development of culture and sport in the city, this thesis has not taken a 
research as advocacy approach. Its findings reinforce the view that the 
prominent position currently occupied by Glasgow in the culture-led 
regeneration orthodoxy as a fully-formed, transferable and replicable model is 
based more on mythology than evidence.   
 
This thesis has shown that economic development was central to the implicit 
cultural policy to emerge in the city in the years leading to 1990. However, 
whilst highly visible, the arts and culture were not the sole or even dominant 
vehicle for economic development activity in the city.  
 
Whilst the base of Glasgow’s economy has undoubtedly shifted since the 1980s 
from manufacturing to the service sector, as discussed in Chapter 7 this 
transition cannot be described as a culture-led. The correlation of a highly 
visible arts and culture festival with a structural shift in the city economy at a 
time of major global socio-economic change does not imply the former caused 
the latter.  
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Glasgow’s approach to the arts and culture during the 1970s and 1980s did not 
constitute a replicable model which could be transferred to other cities. While 
strategies of varying degrees of formality were developed, there was no 
masterplan or indeed, explicit cultural policy; Glasgow’s approach was largely 
improvised, opportunistic and reliant on the individual agency of key actors.  
 
The 1980s was significant as the decade in which high profile festivals and 
events emerged as a prominent feature in Glasgow’s cultural landscape. From ad 
hoc beginnings in 1983 – which saw arts events becoming connected to public 
relations activity intended to change the city’s image, for example in the 
opening of The Burrell Collection, amongst other festivals, events and launches – 
the scale of ambition grew alongside the city’s infrastructure over the course of 
the 1980s to hosting firstly the 1988 Garden Festival then ECOC 1990. Whilst the 
connection between image and cultural events was highlighted in such strategic 
reports as The Potential of Glasgow City Centre (the McKinsey strategy for the 
economic development of the city centre), in practice the opportunistic and 
somewhat uneven attempts to maintain the momentum of the previous major 
events by hosting further events did not, during the 1980s, constitute an 
explicit, deliberate events strategy. Indeed, the momentum generated by ECOC 
1990 was temporarily lost in the early 1990s.  
 
The idea that a replicable, transferable model emerged in Glasgow is further 
undermined by the specificity of Glasgow’s approach to the arts and culture, as 
well as economic development, in the 1970s and 1980s. Strategies – whether 
formal or informal, explicit or implicit – were developed by key actors in 
response to what were specific problems as well as specific strengths in the city 
at a specific point of major structural change in the city’s history.  
 
Despite Glasgow being labelled as one of a number of post-industrial cities by 
1990, and being one of a number of Labour-led cities facing broadly similar 
socio-economic problems during the Thatcher era, in many ways its approach to 
the arts, culture and economic development was unique to the city and as a 
result, not replicable in what may seem to be comparable cities. One such 
example is Glasgow’s long-established history of partnerships between public 
and private sectors that re-emerged during the Thatcher years – in retrospect an 
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example of ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ at a time before neoliberalism 
became ingrained in cities in the western world. Glasgow’s partnership approach 
was heavily reliant on the individuals involved, a pragmatic rather than idealistic 
local authority and influential businessmen such as Sir Norman Macfarlane. This 
approach could not be packaged as a model to be replicated in other post-
industrial cities that did not have such pre-existing assets or propensities, such 
as Liverpool even after its era of Militant infiltration.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 6, Glasgow was the first ECOC to use the title to make 
its cultural assets visible to its home nation; Glasgow was a surprising choice for 
the prestigious title in some quarters based on the misalignment of the city’s 
image with that of its predecessors, accompanied by a general lack of awareness 
of the strength of its arts and cultural infrastructure. The growing visibility of 
the arts and culture in Glasgow during a major economic shift may perhaps be 
the connecting factor in the established contradictory culture-led regeneration 
narratives that ECOC 1990 was simultaneously a socio-economic saviour and 
disaster for the city. The arts, culture and ECOC 1990 can be viewed as a very 
visible reflection rather than driver of socio-economic change, a symptom rather 
than a cause, more influential developments passing unseen and therefore 
uncredited or uncriticised. This suggests that, regarding Glasgow’s position in 
the culture-led regeneration orthodoxy, the ability of the arts and culture to 
lead significant, large-scale socio-economic change – and for Glasgow’s specific 
experience to be replicated elsewhere – has been overstated.   
 
8.6 Limitations of this study 
 
This study has a number of limitations connected to research design and 
methodology.  
 
A primary limitation has been connected to the choice of a topic and period of 
study which is well within living memory, being viewed several decades in 
retrospect, yet which continues to have repercussions in the present. Hindsight 
bias, discussed in Chapter 4, has been an unavoidable feature of oral history 
interviews. Oral history as a methodology has been attacked due to the 
unreliability of memory, yet, as was also discussed in Chapter 4, ‘all historical 
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sources are suffused with subjectivity’ (Thompson, 1978: 172), whether oral or 
written.  
 
This lack of ‘neutrality’ also extended beyond the interviews to the archival 
material studied. As discussed in Chapter 4, there were a number of gaps in the 
archives: not all documents have been retained in local government archives, 
not all documents had been catalogued and many of the documents viewed had 
been preserved as the result of the depositor’s subjective filtering process.  
 
While access to interviewees was generally good, the oral history interviews 
included in this project have been subject to practical limitations, and not all 
key actors are included for a variety of reasons. In both archival material and 
interviews, some voices dominated over others.  
 
Chapter 4 has outlined the steps taken and conclusions drawn in response to 
these methodological limitations, noting for example that perceived weaknesses 
such as the subjectivity of memory can also be strengths.  
 
A further limitation of this study has been my own inevitably normative 
approach as a researcher to what is a qualitative study. My previous experience 
as an arts bureaucrat has shaped my analysis of the machinations of local and 
central government and agencies outlined in this thesis. However, that I was 
new to Glasgow at the start of the research project meant I brought an 
‘outsider’ perspective not only to the research topic but, crucially, to the 
interviews. That others are likely to have taken different approaches to the 
research project renders, I would hope, the findings no less valid.  
 
8.7 Implications and concluding thoughts  
 
This research has implications for a variety of audiences, including academics, 
policy-makers and practitioners working in such fields as the arts and culture, 
festivals and events, cities and urban studies, cultural economics, social and 
economic development and regeneration, urban tourism, destination marketing 
and public relations.  
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Various avenues for further research stem from this project. This section will 
discuss the implications for such work deriving from the methodological 
approach taken here, followed by those arising from the research findings.  
 
There is a considerable potential for the combination of oral history interviews 
and archival research effected in the present research to provide a 
methodological model for further research into the development of cultural 
policy in other cities during the latter decades of the twentieth century. As 
discussed in Chapter 7, as the 1980s progressed, local authorities in the UK 
increasingly developed formal arts and cultural policies, predicated to varying 
degrees on the consumption and/or production of culture, and on its perceived 
instrumental benefits. In the final decade of the twentieth century, this 
development coincided with the emergence of cultural policy as an academic 
discipline. From a comparative point of view, much could be learned from the 
collection and analysis of new data involving key actors in the development of 
other cities’ cultural policy. 
 
The involvement of an external organisation with connections to some of the key 
actors in the shaping of Glasgow’s cultural development through the ECOC 
together with access to a substantial archival collection has been an enormous 
advantage in shaping the methodological approach taken to this research 
project. It may provide a valuable basis for other studies, particularly of the 
development of cultural policy in local government, towns and cities in the UK.  
 
There are also opportunities to learn from the methodological approach taken to 
the structure of this collaborative project with Glasgow Life as a partner. A 
potential pitfall of the Collaborative Doctoral Award (CDA) approach to PhD 
research, where the external partner organisation is also the object of study, is 
that the research findings may not always be complementary to the organisation 
and may challenge existing institutionally-held beliefs and ways of working – 
something that may be resisted by the organisation and may compromise the 
progression of the project. This is not a pitfall that I experienced during my 
research with Glasgow Life. Throughout my experience in undertaking the CDA, 
Glasgow Life has been nothing but supportive towards my research. This may 
have been due to the involvement of a CDA partner organisation and supervisor 
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that values and understands the nature of research – the pitfalls as well as the 
benefits. The historical distance may also have been beneficial here: GDC was a 
different organisation to the current Glasgow City Council and its arms-length 
body, Glasgow Life; this research project provides one means for Glasgow Life as 
a contemporary organisation to understand its pre-history.  
 
A further benefit may have been the methodological approach taken to Glasgow 
Life’s involvement in the research. It may be thought that the CDA would lead to 
my being embedded within Glasgow Life. This was not the case. Whilst the role 
was never intended to be that of an embedded researcher, I worked in close co-
operation and liaison with Glasgow Life staff as the research developed. While it 
was clear throughout that this was my research project to undertake, I found it 
particularly valuable to have a supervisor at Glasgow Life with unique insights 
into the period and topic of study, Dr Mark O’Neill having begun his career in 
Glasgow Museums during the 1980s. The involvement of Glasgow Life brought 
privileged access to some of the key actors in the period of study, which may not 
have otherwise been available. Glasgow Life has provided suitable venues for 
interviews and support from City Archivist, Dr Irene O’Brien, and teams of 
archivists and librarians at Glasgow City Archives and The Mitchell Library 
Special Collections in locating archival documents. Glasgow Life was keen to 
disseminate what could be learned from my research within the organisation and 
therefore hosted an event at the City Halls in Glasgow for me to discuss my 
findings with a broad range of staff. The presentation was enthusiastically 
received. Feedback from discussion with Glasgow Life staff present at this event 
prompted further research, which fed into my thesis writing.107 The iterative 
aspects of Glasgow Life’s involvement, such as this, proved to be invaluable for 
the development of my research. It was also clearly understood by Glasgow 
Life’s staff that this was my thesis to write.    
 
                                               
107 For example, a member of Glasgow Life staff who had worked at the Citizens Theatre during 
the 1980s told me about the important role played in decision-making on the theatre’s funding 
by GDC Finance Director, Bill English, who made visits to the theatre with councillors. I 
undertook further archival research which provided written evidence of the key role played by 
English in maintaining a strategic overview of GDC’s expenditure on the arts and culture and 
directing the council’s decision-making on it in the years leading to 1990, as discussed in Chapter 
7 of this thesis. 
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This research project was limited to the 1970s and 1980s, and much research 
into cultural policy in Glasgow post-1990 has focused on the impacts of 
Glasgow’s year as the ECOC, 1990 being viewed as a watershed. There is 
therefore the opportunity for further research into the extent to which the 
characteristics of the implicit, effective cultural policy outlined in the findings 
of this research project have continued to play out in the decades since 1990 
and the related implications for the future of cultural policy in Glasgow.   
 
Furthermore, the research findings have broader implications for extant 
literature on Glasgow and ECOC 1990 – and in particular the idea of a ‘Glasgow 
model’ of culture-led regeneration connected to the city’s approach to ECOC 
1990 – notably that such academic accounts should be revisited and perhaps 
revised. As discussed in Chapters 1 and 3, Garcia has demonstrated the influence 
and impact the idea of a Glasgow model of culture-led regeneration connected 
to the ECOC has had on other cities, notably Liverpool (Garcia, 2005: 4844-846; 
Garcia, 2007: 4-6; Garcia, 2017: 2 and 4). This avenue for further research may 
also extend into the growth in the early twenty-first century of toolkits offering 
solutions to beleaguered cities based on creative city models, such as Landry’s 
influential publication, The Creative City: A Toolkit for Urban Innovators (2000), 
in which Glasgow features. As discussed in section 8.5, this thesis challenges the 
idea that a strategically devised, explicit model of culture-led regeneration 
emerged in Glasgow in the years leading to 1990. The research findings show 
that no simple formula developed in Glasgow in the years leading to 1990 that 
could be transferred to other cities and other contexts. But this has not stopped 
others from reading the Glasgow experience in that way. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, Bell and Oakley determined in 2015 that urban 
cultural policy was a relatively new concept, dating back around thirty years 
(2015: 78). In the decades since 1990, policy mobility has become a growing area 
of academic study. As discussed in Chapter 4, drawing on McCann and Ward 
(2010), the concepts of policy-making as territorial and relational were applied 
to the investigative approach taken in this research project to cultural policy in 
Glasgow during the 1970s and 1980s – that is, the extent to which a cultural 
policy emerged which was restricted to the city of Glasgow (territorial) and the 
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extent to which it connected to policy areas other than ‘culture’, to policy 
development in other cities or countries and to specific key actors (relational).  
As the research presented in this thesis has shown, the 1980s were a time when 
policy ideas were moving between cities. For Glasgow in the years leading to 
1990, policy inspiration often came from cities in America. Boyle, McWilliams 
and Rice (2008: 316) have highlighted how in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
local councillors from Glasgow visited US ‘rustbelt’ cities such as Minneapolis, 
Baltimore and Pittsburgh, to learn about these cities’ experiences of 
regeneration during a period of deindustrialisation.  Michael Kelly’s testimony, 
discussed in Chapter 5, highlighted the influence of New York in Glasgow’s 
attempts to change its image during the early 1980s. Taking as inspiration the ‘I 
Love New York’ campaign – and the recognition that ‘social problems were 
really, really deep in New York and yet that didn’t seem to bother visitors 
because they concentrated on the positive aspects’ of the city (Michael Kelly, 
interview, 23 June 2014) – key actors in Glasgow imported new public relations 
tactics in order to transform the city’s image and hence its economy. As Kelly 
stated, these distraction-based tactics involved focusing on the positive aspects 
of the city and ‘blatantly ignoring’ the social problems. Glasgow’s approach to 
economic development drew heavily on the experience of other cities, not least 
through the involvement of McKinsey and Co., an American company which by 
the 1980s was developing a growing global presence. The McKinsey strategy 
discussed in this thesis took ideas from cities such as Baltimore in its proposals 
for Glasgow.108  
 
As discussed in Chapter 7, by the late 1980s, Glasgow was positioning itself 
within a growing context of national and transnational narratives of cities as 
                                               
108 For example, the McKinsey strategy proposed Glasgow follow Baltimore in building an 
aquarium in the city centre (something that was not, however, realised), stating: ‘Although 
Glasgow has a number of internationally renowned attractions, such as the Burrell Collection, 
they appeal to a narrow segment of the tourist market. To capture a larger segment of the 
tourist market, Glasgow needs an outstanding tourist attraction with a broad-based appeal. A 
review of tourist attractions worldwide to identify suitable opportunities for Glasgow selected 
three that merit detailed evaluation. 1. A world class aquarium: Baltimore’s new aquarium has 
undoubtedly done more than anything else to bring tourists to the city. In its first year of 
operation upwards of 1.5 million people – more than twice the projected number – came to see 
it. It has succeeded magnificently because it appeals to all sorts of people, it is a striking 
building and there has been no compromise on quality. Europe has no world-class aquarium, so 
Glasgow has the chance to get in first. An aquarium is an attractive option for Glasgow: it would 
require very little space; it would be an all-weather, all-seasons attraction; and its breadth of 
appeal would be particularly important in an area with a low population.’ (Cullen, 1985: 29) 
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models of arts-led urban regeneration. The new proliferation of international 
conferences and symposia on arts-led urban renewal during the late 1980s – such 
as the BAAA Arts and the Changing City symposium hosted in Glasgow in 1988 – 
were driven by the British interest in US success stories as well as the gathering 
pace of regeneration projects in major UK cities (Keans et al, 1989: 9). 
However, it was already apparent in the late 1980s that even when comparable 
approaches are taken between cities – such as the use of cultural districts as a 
means of regeneration – the results were by no means replicable.109     
 
There continues to be much for cities to learn from each other, in the field of 
cultural policy as in other disciplines. Cities can be testbeds for policy ideas – 
indeed it is standard practice for government to pilot new policies before they 
are rolled out in other areas. However, it is inherently risky for cities to attempt 
to transfer and replicate what may be perceived to be successful models, when 
the conditions that created the model’s perceived success may not exist 
elsewhere – particularly when the ‘model’ itself is essentially a myth.  
 
The extant lack of robust evidence and difficulties in measurement in relation to 
culture-led regeneration, combined with the rise of advocacy research and 
continued assertions that culture is playing a regenerative role regardless or in 
opposition to evidence (Campbell et al., 2016), were highlighted in Chapter 3.  
 
Within this broad policy context, the research presented in this thesis shows the 
importance of building robust methods of research and evaluation into culture-
led regeneration initiatives and strategies, particularly those reliant on policy 
mobility. There is a particular need for longitudinal studies providing more 
robust evidence on the place-based relationship between culture and 
regeneration. There is a particular opportunity for policy-makers and civic 
leaders to build and invest in academic relationships which may enable this to 
happen, and provide a greater understanding of the role culture can (and 
cannot) play in regenerating their towns and cities.  
 
                                               
109 The BAAA Arts and the Changing City symposium included a comparison of Liverpool and 
Pittsburgh as cities in which ‘redevelopment has been spearheaded with the capital-intensive 
redevelopment of a cultural district’ (in Liverpool’s case, the Albert Dock and Tate Gallery) yet 
with stark contrasts (Keans et al., 1989: 9-10).  
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Finally, the findings of this research project also have implications for current 
debates concerning the economic, social and cultural value of the arts and 
culture.  
 
In the thirty years that have passed since the publication of The Economic 
Importance of the Arts in Britain/Glasgow, Glasgow has become situated in a 
national (in both senses of Scotland and the UK) climate in which economic 
impact has become a primary or default justification for public ‘investment’ in 
the arts and culture. Notably, the changing rhetoric surrounding the public 
funding of the arts and culture reflects the growing instrumentalism of culture 
to have taken place: the ‘subsidy’ of the 1970s and 1980s has been replaced 
with the contemporary ‘investment’, the implication being the anticipation of a 
return, financial or otherwise. While economic impact arguments may generate 
funding for culture which might otherwise not be readily available, they have 
also led to those working in the arts and culture becoming accountable for 
economic outcomes. As we enter a new era of uncertainty brought about by the 
impending Brexit, facing the confirmed consequence that UK cities will be 
precluded from hosting the ECOC in the future, the culture-led regeneration 
orthodoxy and its perceived economic benefits remains a basis for the UK 
government’s support of high profile cultural events, particularly in towns and 
cities deemed ‘left behind’.110  
 
Recently, there has been something of a backlash against the dominance of the 
economic value of culture in arguments for its public funding and support and a 
shift towards articulating the cultural value of culture. The 2016 AHRC Cultural 
Value Project (Crossick and Kaszynska, 2016) attempted to define and provide 
                                               
110 In November 2017, the European Commission confirmed that despite five UK cities having 
submitted their final bids to host ECOC 2023 in October 2017, the UK would not be eligible to 
host the ECOC as a result of its impending exit from the EU. In response to a parliamentary 
question on the subject at Prime Ministers Questions on 29 November 2017, Damian Green MP, 
standing in for Theresa May, stated: ‘After British cities, including some in Scotland, were 
invited to be part of the process, it is extremely disappointing that the Commission has decided 
that they cannot apply. We are in urgent talks with the Commission about that, and we are 
ensuring that all the cities that applied can continue with their cultural development, which has 
been shown to be an extremely good basis for the regeneration of cities and towns across the 
United Kingdom’ (Green, 2017). This response reflects the ingrained culture-led regeneration 
orthodoxy within the government: that cultural development in its own right is an insufficient 
reason to host the ECOC without acting as the basis of regeneration of the host city. This 
orthodoxy can also be found in the government’s UK City of Culture initiative, designed in 
anticipation of predominantly social and economic outcomes based on the perceived success of 
Glasgow 1990 and Liverpool 2008.  
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evidence of the components of cultural value, distinct from economic value; 
whilst the 2015 Warwick Commission on the Future of Cultural Value aimed to 
produce a ‘blueprint’ for the future development of the cultural and creative 
industries in which growth is not defined solely in terms of economic impact.  
 
In this current climate, in which the dominance of the economic impact of 
culture is concurrently entrenched, promoted and contested, this thesis 
challenges aspects of the established narratives on which policy decisions are 
made. Ultimately, this thesis has shown that the term ‘culture-led regeneration’ 
is not helpful or accurate in describing the development of cultural policy in 
Glasgow between 1970 and 1989. Glasgow’s approach was not one of culture-led 
regeneration but regeneration-led culture: an implicit, effective cultural policy 
emerged in which the development of the arts and culture was led by the 
development of the city economy, rather than vice versa. A further potential 
area for research is therefore the extent to which the culture-led regeneration 
orthodoxy more broadly should be viewed, conversely, as regeneration-led 
culture. 
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A LIST OF ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEWS 
 
 
Name of 
interviewee 
 
Position during 
the period of 
study: 1970-1989 
Date and 
location of 
interview  
 
Comments on interview 
Jimmy 
Andrews 
Depute Director of 
Finance, 1976-86, 
then Senior 
Depute Finance 
Director 1986-94, 
at Glasgow 
District Council. 
18 August 
2014, 
Kelvingrove 
Museum and 
Art Gallery, 
Glasgow. 
The interview covers the period 
1970-2003. Duration of 
interview [00:42:24]. Interview 
obtained via Jean McFadden. 
Jimmy Andrews referred at one 
point in the interview to a short 
list he’d prepared, though his 
responses to my questions did 
not appear to be scripted or 
rehearsed. Andrews willingly 
answered my questions and did 
not appear evasive in his 
responses. The interview 
mainly concerned the finances 
and roles of key councillors and 
officers within Glasgow District 
Council. Some of the key 
figures named by Andrews were 
other interviewees, such as 
Jean McFadden and Steve Inch, 
whilst others I was unable to 
interview, such as Bill English 
(GDC Director of Finance during 
the 1980s, whom Andrews 
worked alongside) and Pat Lally 
(GDC Council Leader). Andrews 
did not appear to intentionally 
omit any key figures from his 
testimony. The interview also 
extended to the period 
following local government 
reorganisation in the 1990s, 
when Andrews was Finance 
Director then Chief Executive 
of the new Glasgow City 
Council, and covered topics 
such as GCC’s approach to 
education and housing, which 
were beyond the direct scope 
of the research project but 
provided the interviewee’s 
personal perspective on the 
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broader council context.  
 
Alasdair 
Auld 
Assistant Curator, 
Glasgow Museums 
and Art Galleries 
(Kelvingrove Art 
Gallery and 
Museum), 1956-
68; Curator at 
Pollock House, 
1968-72; Keeper 
of Fine Art at 
Kelvingrove Art 
Gallery and 
Museum, 1972-76; 
Depute Director 
Glasgow Museums 
and Art Galleries 
Department, 
1976-79; Acting 
Director, Glasgow 
Museums and Art 
Galleries Dept, 
1979; Director of 
Glasgow Museums 
and Art Galleries, 
1979-88.  
25 February 
2015, 
interviewee’s 
home. 
The interview covers the period 
1956-1988. Duration of 
interview [00:37:00]. Interview 
obtained via Dr Mark O’Neill 
(Glasgow Life). Alasdair Auld 
discussed most topics in general 
terms and often did not go into 
a great amount of detail. I got 
the impression that there was 
much Auld was not saying on 
some topics, either due to it 
not being at the forefront of his 
memory (given it covered 
events that took place 30-50 
years ago) or for diplomatic 
reasons. Alasdair Auld did not 
refer to any notes. A theme 
that ran through the interview 
was the lack of a formal plan 
during his time at the museums 
service, though his confidence 
that things worked well without 
one, the lack of change in the 
museums service and an 
opportunistic approach. The 
200% increase in the number of 
local authority museums 
between 1963-83 was described 
as ‘just opportunity’ – this is 
something that is reflected in 
individual cases (such as Pollok 
House being gifted to the city). 
Alasdair Auld’s response to 
questions on museum 
collections and acquisitions also 
described an approach that was 
more opportunistic than 
strategic but not unguided.  
    
Patrick 
Fallon 
Civil servant 
(working on 
international 
relations, 
including the 
ECOC) in the 
Office of Arts and 
Libraries, London, 
during the 1980s; 
Head of Museums 
Policy Branch, 
11 March 
2015, 
interviewee’s 
home. 
The interview covers the period 
1985-1990. Duration of 
interview [00:57:11]. Interview 
obtained via Joy Parry. I 
identified Patrick Fallon as a 
potential interviewee through 
letters he wrote from the OAL 
to Glasgow, held in Glasgow 
City Archives (see Chapter 6). 
Patrick Fallon and Joy Parry 
were the two officials to visit 
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Department of 
National Heritage 
1992-97. 
Glasgow in 1986 as part of the 
ECOC selection process, and 
made recommendations to the 
Arts Minister, Richard Luce. 
Similarly to Joy Parry, Patrick 
Fallon agreed to be interviewed 
on the basis that the interview 
would be used for this research 
project only and not included in 
the public archive. During the 
interview, Fallon answered my 
questions directly. He 
described his role and areas of 
work at the OAL, the 
differences between the 
approaches of the UK and other 
EC member states towards the 
arts and culture (such as the 
arms-length approach). He also 
discussed the OAL’s view of the 
EC as a purely economic 
community (eg. stating there 
was no justification for cultural 
activities in the Treaty of Rome 
– see Chapter 6), the 
government’s initial resistance 
to the ECOC and subsequent 
decision to support it. Other 
themes covered by Fallon in the 
interview included the ECOC 
bidding process, other cities in 
the UK, Glasgow’s image and 
the ECOC 1990 event itself. 
During the interview Fallon 
referred to the list of cities 
that submitted bids in April 
1986 for the UK nomination for 
ECOC 1990 that I had brought 
to the interview (see Appendix 
D) and reflected upon it. He did 
not otherwise refer to any 
notes in his responses. 
Following the interview, Patrick 
Fallon approved the resultant 
transcript for use in this 
research project only.  
 
Eddie Friel
  
Various roles at 
Northern Ireland 
Tourist Board, 
1971-1982; 
Director of 
18 June 
2015, The 
Mitchell 
Library, 
Glasgow. 
The interview mainly covers the 
period 1982-1991 when the 
interviewee worked at Scottish 
Opera and Greater Glasgow 
Tourist Board. Duration of 
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Marketing and 
Public Relations, 
Scottish Opera, 
1982-83; Chief 
Executive, 
Greater Glasgow 
Tourist Board, 
1983-1991; 
Member of the 
board of 
Directors, Scottish 
Opera, 1985-91; 
Chairman of the 
board of 
Directors, Theatre 
Royal Glasgow, 
1985-91; Visiting 
Professor, 
University of 
Strathclyde, 1988-
2005 
interview [01:48:04]. Interview 
obtained via Dr Mark O’Neill 
(Glasgow Life). This was the 
longest interview undertaken 
for the project. It was one of 
the less structured interviews, 
though broadly chronological, 
covering a range of topics in 
the interviewee’s life in 
Glasgow from his move to the 
city in 1982 to 1991 when he 
left Glasgow to work in 
Northern Ireland. Friel did not 
refer to any notes and provided 
general reflections and opinions 
on topics such as post-industrial 
decline and poverty in Glasgow, 
the development of tourism 
and partnerships in the city, 
Glasgow’s ECOC bid, Scottish 
Opera and rivalry between 
Glasgow and Edinburgh. Some 
of Friel’s recollections of 
events that took place 
approximately thirty years 
before the interview did not 
fully align with archival 
records. However, archival 
records and other interviews 
show that Friel was a 
significant figure in Glasgow’s 
ECOC bid and the development 
of tourism.   
 
Stuart 
Gulliver 
Joined Scottish 
Development 
Agency (SDA) in 
1978; Regional 
Director for 
Glasgow and 
Strathclyde North, 
SDA, 1979-90. 
28 August 
2014,  
following a 
meeting on 9 
July 2014,  
office in 
central 
Glasgow. 
The interview focuses on the 
period 1978-1990 with 
reference to the broader 
timescale of the 1960s to 2014. 
Duration of interview 
[01:35:26]. Interview obtained 
via Dr Mark O’Neill (Glasgow 
Life). The interview followed 
an initial meeting, where we 
discussed the possibility of a 
formal, recorded interview and 
Gulliver suggested some 
reading on the cultural 
industries. The interview itself 
is broad in scope, beginning 
with Gulliver’s own education 
and career prior to his joining 
the SDA, before focusing mainly 
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on the 1970s and 1980s. 
Gulliver reflected on the 
broader national political and 
economic development 
context, specific events in 
Glasgow during the 1970s and 
1980s, key individuals within 
central and local government, 
Glasgow Action, the McKinsey 
strategy, the SDA and the 
GLEB, as well as concepts such 
as pacing devices and 
competitive advantage. Whilst 
Gulliver answered my questions 
directly and did not appear 
evasive, as with other 
interviewees his position was 
not that of the detached 
observer: Gulliver highlighted 
and advocated for 
achievements made by Glasgow 
over the course of the 1980s 
and into the 1990s and the 
strengthening of Glasgow’s 
competitive position in 
comparison to other UK cities, 
though also willingly 
commented on some of the 
limitations of the idea of a 
culture-led approach to 
regeneration. Following the 
interview, as well as putting me 
in touch with David Macdonald, 
Gulliver also provided contact 
with Robert Palmer (Director of 
GDC’s Festivals Unit and ECOC 
1990). Palmer agreed to be 
interviewed but unfortunately 
we were unable to schedule a 
suitable appointment due to 
Palmer’s work commitments 
abroad. As Palmer was a key 
figure in this research topic, I 
ensured this was acknowledged 
and his voice was included in 
the thesis via archival material 
from the period.  
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Steven 
Hamilton 
Senior Solicitor, 
Principal Solicitor 
then Town Clerk 
Depute, Glasgow 
Corporation in the 
years leading to 
1975; Director of 
Administration 
and Legal 
Services, Glasgow 
District Council, 
1975-78; Acting 
Town Clerk and 
Chief Executive, 
Glasgow District 
Council, 1978-79; 
Town Clerk and 
Chief Executive, 
Glasgow District 
Council, 1979-
1991. 
Interview 3 
July 2014 and 
follow-up 
discussion on 
19 August 
2014, 
University of 
Glasgow.  
The interview covers the period 
1948-1991. This covers Steven 
Hamilton’s working life at 
Glasgow Corporation, then 
GDC, having joined straight 
from school in 1948. Duration 
of interview [01:20:45]. 
Interview obtained via Jean 
McFadden. The interview 
covered a great deal of ground, 
from his personal history at the 
council, to the scope of the 
council’s remit, structural 
changes from Glasgow 
Corporation to GDC and SRC, 
corporate management and 
committees, key reports, the 
relationship with the Scottish 
Office, partnerships, ECOC 1990 
etc. At one point Steven 
Hamilton referred to a list of 
cultural venues and assets as an 
aide memoire (St Andrews Hall, 
the Mitchell Library, the 
universities, Kelvingrove 
Museum and Art Gallery, The 
Burrell Collection, St Mungo’s 
Museum, The Transport 
Museum) though he did not 
have a prepared script. A 
further discussion took place 
following the interview, after 
Steven Hamilton had read the 
transcript and provided further 
contextual information to the 
main interview. This further 
information was added as 
footnotes to the transcript and 
where elaborated on, as a post-
script to the transcript. Themes 
for further information 
included the idea that changes 
in the 1970s and 1980s had 
their roots in previous decades, 
the idea of Glasgow 
Corporation as the ‘all purpose’ 
authority, building of 
motorways and parking 
legislation, pedestrianisation of 
Buchanan Street, Glasgow 
Airport, Glasgow Action and 
links between the business 
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community and council, 
planning applications, the 
Building Works Department, 
Glasgow Corporation/GDC as a 
social landlord, GDC Estates 
Department, the SECC and SDA, 
House for an Art Lover, 
Cathedral, St Mungo’s Museum 
and Martha Street, City Halls, 
schools, and finding legal ways 
to get things done. Steven 
Hamilton provided a broad 
picture of the remit and roles 
and responsibilities of the 
council and the Chief 
Executive, and the context 
from which Glasgow’s cultural 
policy emerged. 
      
Steve Inch Researcher, 
Strategic Policy 
Unit, Scottish 
Development 
Agency, 1977-78; 
Planning Officer, 
Cumbria County 
Council, 1978-81; 
Planning Officer, 
Glasgow District 
Council (GDC), 
1981-86; Head of 
Regeneration 
Unit, GDC, 1986-
95. 
6 August 
2014, 
University of 
Glasgow.  
The interview covers the period 
1976-2014. Duration of 
interview [01:16:54]. Interview 
obtained via Dr Mark O’Neill 
(Glasgow Life). Whilst the 
interview mainly focused on the 
1980s, it also included Inch’s 
reflections on the XX 
Commonwealth Games, which 
took place in Glasgow between 
23 July-3 August 2014, prior to 
the interview on 6 August 2014. 
Inch worked at GDC and 
subsequently Glasgow City 
Council from 1981 until his 
retirement as Executive 
Director of Development and 
Regeneration Services in 2010, 
the Commonwealth Games 
being a key project in his area 
of work. The interview focused 
on the emergence of economic 
development as a council-wide 
programme priority and how 
GDC’s economic development 
policy and strategy shifted 
between 1981 and 1991. Inch 
emphasised the collaborative 
approach taken during the 
1980s, naming and crediting 
other key actors. Inch’s 
responses to my questions did 
not appear rehearsed or 
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scripted though at times Inch 
took an advocacy position, 
highlighting (as Gulliver also 
did) Glasgow’s achievements.   
 
Michael 
Kelly 
Lecturer in 
Economics, 
University of 
Strathclyde, 1967-
80; Labour 
councillor in 
Glasgow 
Corporation, 
1971-75 and 
Glasgow District 
Council, 1979-84; 
Magistrate in 
Glasgow, 1972-75; 
Lord Provost of 
Glasgow and ex-
officio Lord 
Lieutenant, 1980-
84; Managing 
Director of PR 
company Michael 
Kelly Associates, 
1984-present. 
23 June 
2014, 
interviewee’s 
home. 
The interview focuses on the 
period 1980-1984 when Michael 
Kelly was Lord Provost of 
Glasgow. Duration of interview 
[00:25:08]. The interview 
lasted 25 minutes because 
Michael Kelly had 30 minutes 
available. Interview obtained 
via Jean McFadden. During the 
interview, Kelly talked quickly 
and covered a good deal of 
ground in the limited time 
available. Although Kelly did 
not refer to any notes, his 
responses appeared rehearsed. 
Where Jean McFadden had 
emphasised achievements were 
a team effort and gave credit 
to a list of her contemporaries, 
Kelly did not. Kelly was the 
central character in his 
responses, on occasions 
correcting ‘we’ to ‘I’ to assert 
his role in achievements. The 
only other people named in the 
interview were Margaret 
Thatcher, theatre director 
Peter Hall and Edward Koch the 
Mayor of New York, which may 
reflect who he regards as his 
contemporaries and the 
significant figures in framing his 
story during this period. Kelly 
had some strong opinions on 
GDC PR department and the 
staff there. As it was not 
possible for me to interview the 
ex-Head of PR at GDC, I 
undertook documentary 
research to gain other 
perspectives on the subject 
(see Chapter 5). 
 
Erika King Subsidies Officer, 
Arts Council of 
Great Britain, 
London during 
3 June 2015, 
University of 
Glasgow. 
The interview covers the period 
1975-1990. Duration of 
interview [00:50:03]. Interview 
obtained via Dr Mark O’Neill 
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1970s; 
Administrative 
Director, Third 
Eye Centre 
Glasgow, 1979-
1990. 
(Glasgow Life). The interview 
mainly covered Erika King’s 
time working at the Third Eye 
Centre and the broader arts 
context in Glasgow during the 
1980s. It also touched upon 
King’s time at the Arts Council 
of Great Britain and the 
relationship between ACBG and 
the Scottish Arts Council. King 
gave a great deal of credit to 
Chris Carrell (Director) and Tom 
McGrath, founder of the Third 
Eye Centre, describing the 
ethos of partnership and 
collaboration and the scale of 
ambitions of the centre during 
the 1980s (see Chapter 5). King 
was not evasive and responses 
to my questions did not appear 
rehearsed or scripted.   
 
Richard 
Luce 
Minister of State, 
Foreign and 
Commonwealth 
Office, 1981-82 
and 1983-85; 
Minister of State 
for the Arts and 
Minister of State 
(Privy Council 
Office) 
responsible for 
the Civil Service, 
1985-90; inter 
alia.  
24 March 
2015, Royal 
Over-Seas 
League, 
Royal Over-
Seas League 
House, 
London. 
The interview mainly covers the 
period 1985-1990 when the 
interviewee was Minister for 
the Arts. Duration of interview 
[00:36:10]. Interview obtained 
by writing to Lord Luce at the 
House of Lords. I found that 
Richard Luce answered 
questions directly and was at 
times very frank in his 
responses to questions during 
the interview. He did not bring 
any notes to the interview. He 
did discuss a list of cities that 
submitted bids in April 1986 for 
the UK nomination for ECOC 
1990, and a list of cities 
shortlisted in July 1986 (now in 
Appendices D and E of this 
thesis) which I had brought to 
the interview, in his reflections 
on the ECOC nomination 
selection process (see Chapter 
6). He discussed his background 
as Arts Minister, the 
relationship with the EC and 
Melina Mercouri in particular, 
the ECOC programme in the 
1980s, the strengths of 
Glasgow’s ECOC bid (describing 
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it as quite exceptional), ECOC 
bids from Leeds, Bristol, Bath 
and Edinburgh, conversations 
with Malcolm Rifkind in relation 
to Scottish bids, his opinions of 
Norman Macfarlane (who he 
described as leading the 
business sector with 
enthusiasm, and whose support 
enthused him) and Pat Lally 
(who he said he found very 
persuasive) describing the 
dynamism of Glasgow’s bid.  
 
David 
Macdonald 
Various posts 
including Head of 
the Services 
Industries 
Division, Scottish 
Development 
Agency, 1983-85; 
Director, Glasgow 
Action, 1985-91. 
8 September 
2014, 
interviewee’s 
home. 
The interview covers the period 
1983-1991. Duration of 
interview [00:51:46]. Interview 
obtained via Stuart Gulliver. I 
identified David Macdonald as a 
potential interviewee through 
archival research – as the 
Director of Glasgow Action, 
Macdonald featured in archival 
material held in both Glasgow 
City Archives and the National 
Records of Scotland – as well as 
through conversations with 
other interviewees such as 
Gulliver. David Macdonald did 
not refer to any written notes 
during his interview. Based on 
Macdonald’s responses to initial 
questions I took the approach 
advocated by oral historian 
George Ewart Evans (discussed 
in Chapter 4) to ‘let the 
interview run […] never 
attempt to dominate it. The 
least one can do is to guide it’ 
(Thompson, 1978: 227), asking 
probing questions where 
required to glean further 
information. The interview 
covered topics including 
Glasgow’s ECOC 1990 bid, the 
McKinsey strategy, the work of 
the SDA and Glasgow Action 
and the role of Norman 
Macfarlane. Macdonald 
provided me with copies of 
Glasgow Action documents from 
his own archive, which are 
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referenced in the thesis 
bibliography. In reviewing the 
interview transcript I found 
that Macdonald’s recollections 
both aligned with and 
illuminated GDC and National 
Records of Scotland archival 
material from the 1980s and 
showed Macdonald to be a 
reliable witness.  
 
Jean 
McFadden 
Glasgow District 
Council Leader, 
1979-86 (and 
1992-94); City 
Treasurer, 
Glasgow District 
Council, 1986-92; 
Vice Lord 
Lieutenant, City 
of Glasgow, 1981-
92. (Also: Teacher 
in Glasgow and 
Lanarkshire; 
Senior Lecturer in 
Law at University 
of Strathclyde). 
24 March 
2014, 
interviewee’s 
home. 
The interview covers the period 
1971-1990. Duration of 
interview [00:41:32]. Interview 
obtained via Dr Mark O’Neill 
(Glasgow Life). The interview 
covered Jean McFadden’s 
background as a teacher and 
motivation for becoming a 
councillor (to change schools 
policy), local government 
reorganisation in the 1970s, the 
1977 local election and 
becoming Leader of the Labour 
group and the period in 
opposition, the lack of arts or 
cultural policy, the priorities 
for the council (housing, 
unemployment), becoming 
Leader of the council and the 
change of direction in 1980 
when Labour restored their 
majority, Glasgow’s changing 
image, Mayfest, the 
relationship between local and 
central government, and the 
influence of Norman Macfarlane 
in Glasgow’s ECOC bid. I was 
struck by how much credit Jean 
McFadden gave to others (eg 
Michael Kelly, Norman 
Macfarlane, Jane MacKay) and 
how frequently she described 
advances as having happened 
through a team effort, rather 
than positioning herself front 
and centre as the key 
instigator. Responses did not 
appear scripted but carefully 
worded. There was notably no 
mention of Pat Lally in any of 
Jean McFadden’s responses – a 
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key figure in Glasgow during 
this period (Jean McFadden lost 
the GDC leadership to Lally, for 
example) with whom Jean 
McFadden had some well 
documented disagreements. It 
could be interpreted that 
McFadden made a concerted 
effort not to include Pat Lally 
in her story, despite his 
historical prominence in other 
sources. Following the 
interview, Jean McFadden 
provided me with copies of her 
own private archival material, 
which included a draft chapter 
of her autobiography, 
correspondence and copies of 
council meeting minutes. She 
also put me in touch with some 
of her colleagues from the 
period of study for further 
interviews (Michael Kelly, 
Steven Hamilton etc). It should 
be noted that I requested an 
interview with Pat Lally, which 
he willingly agreed to, but was 
unable to undertake due to his 
being ill. I therefore ensured 
his voice was included in the 
thesis through other records.    
   
Joy Parry Senior Executive 
Officer at the 
Office of Arts and 
Libraries, London, 
1985-89, inter 
alia. 
 
11 December 
2014, 
National 
Theatre, 
London. 
The interview covers the period 
1984-1990. Duration of 
interview [00:32:01]. I 
identified Joy Parry as a 
potential interviewee through 
reviewing archival material – 
Joy Parry was named as a 
contact in correspondence 
between the OAL and GDC (see 
Chapter 6). Joy Parry and 
Patrick Fallon were the two 
officials to visit Glasgow in 
1986 as part of the ECOC 
selection process, and made 
recommendations to the Arts 
Minister, Richard Luce. Through 
research I discovered that Joy 
Parry had worked as a Lecturer 
in Cultural Policy at the 
University of Warwick. I 
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obtained the interview via Prof 
Jeremy Ahearne and Prof Oliver 
Bennett at the University of 
Warwick. Joy Parry gave 
permission for the recorded 
material to be used for this 
research project only and not 
to be included in the public 
archive. Parry explained the 
government’s position on the 
EC and the ECOC during the 
1980s. When asked about the 
Foreign Office, Treasury and 
Scottish Office, Parry was 
careful not to say much at all. 
However, Joy Parry answered 
questions about the OAL’s 
approach to cultural policy, the 
EC and how Glasgow came to 
be awarded the ECOC 
nomination by the OAL directly. 
She did not refer to any written 
notes or script as a prompt, 
though referred to a copy of 
the 1985 EC resolution on the 
ECOC. Following this interview, 
Joy Parry approved the 
transcript for use in this 
research project only.   
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APPENDIX B INTERVIEWEES’ BIOGRAPHICAL TIMELINES: 
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE 
 
As outlined in Chapter 4, for each interview I produced a brief biographical 
timeline, which included the interviewee’s roles or job titles and key dates. 
Before the interview, I checked this biographical information with each 
interviewee to ensure that all the information was correct and to complete any 
gaps. This ensured that during the interview, questions related to the 
interviewees’ occupations could be anchored to specific dates. It also formed 
the basis of the ‘Occupation’ section of the cover page of the written interview 
transcript and summary (which was based on a template from The British 
Library/Oral History Society).   
 
This appendix provides the biographical timeline produced for the Michael Kelly 
interview and the cover page of the interview transcript and summary as an 
illustrative example. In this example, I researched the information compiled in 
the timeline prior to the interview, discussed it with Michael Kelly prior to the 
start of the interview to confirm whether the details were correct, and following 
the interview, added the list of Dr Kelly’s occupations during the period covered 
by the interview to the ‘Occupation’ section of the transcript cover page. I then 
sent the completed transcript (along with the audio recording) to Michael Kelly, 
who re-confirmed his consent for it to be used for this research project and 
shared in a public archive. The amount of publicly-available information on 
interviewees’ occupations varied between interviewees; there was usually more 
information available for more visible public figures, such as Kelly, than those, 
such as civil servants, who worked mainly ‘behind the scenes’. The timeline 
prepared for the Michael Kelly interview therefore contained more information 
than those prepared for most of the other interviewees.  
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Dr Michael Kelly timeline  
 
Dr Michael Kelly, CBE, DL (Deputy Lieutenant)  
 
Born 1940 
 
Dates?  Studies Economics at University of London (BSc) and University of 
Strathclyde (PhD) 
Dates?  Assistant Lecturer in Economics at University of Aberdeen  
1967-80 Lecturer in Economics at University of Strathclyde  
1971-75 
and 1979-
84 
Labour councillor in Glasgow   
1972-75 Magistrate in Glasgow  
1980-
1984 
Lord Provost of Glasgow (and ex-officio Lord Lieutenant)  
1983 CBE 
1983 Honorary Mayor of Tombstone Arizona; Kentucky Colonel.  
1983 Scot of the Year Award  
1984-
1987 
Lord Rector of Glasgow University.  
Becomes first Lord Provost to become rector of the University of Glasgow 
1984 Awarded Honorary LLB University of Glasgow  
1984- Managing Director of the PR company Michael Kelly Associates  
1984 Order of St John 
1984 British Tourism Authority Medal for Services to Tourism 
1984 Robert Burns Award from University of Old Dominion, Virginia, for services to 
Scottish culture.  
1986-89 President of Strathclyde Branch Institute of Marketing 
1986-90 Member: Scottish ABSA (Association of Business Sponsorship and the Arts, 
rebranded Arts and Business 1999)  
1987-96 Chairman RSSPCC (Royal Scottish Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Children, now Children 1st)  
1990-94 Director of Celtic FC  
1990-94 Member: Scottish Committee National Art Collections Fund  
1995-
2000 
Secretary, Scottish Industry Forum  
1998 Knight's Cross Order of Merit (Poland) 
2000- Columnist for The Scotsman 
2001-05 Member: External Relations Advisory Group ESRC 
2002- Scottish convenor, Socialist Civil Liberties Association  
2004- Chairman Glasgow Central CLP (Constituency Labour Party)  
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PhD CULTURAL POLICY IN GLASGOW 1970-1989  
Collaborative Doctoral Award with Glasgow Life  
University of Glasgow  
 
INTERVIEW SUMMARY AND TRANSCRIPT  
 
 
Reference: Kelly-140623 
 
 
Interviewee’s surname: Kelly 
 
Interviewee’s forenames: Michael   
 
Title: Dr 
 
Sex: M 
 
Occupation: Lecturer in Economics, University of Strathclyde 1967-80; Labour 
councillor in Glasgow Corporation 1971-75 and in Glasgow District Council 1979-
84; Magistrate in Glasgow 1972-75; Lord Provost of Glasgow and ex-officio Lord 
Lieutenant 1980-84; Managing Director of PR company Michael Kelly Associates 
1984-present. 
 
Date of recording:  23 June 2014  
 
Location of interview: Interviewee’s home, Glasgow  
 
Type of recorder: Zoom H1 
 
Total number of tracks: 1   
 
Recording format: Wav 16 bit 48khz 
 
Mono or stereo: Stereo  
 
Total duration [HH:MM:SS]: [00:25:08] 
 
 
Additional material: None 
 
 
Interviewer’s name: Clare Edwards 
 
Interviewer’s comments: The interview focuses on the period 1980-1984, when 
Michael Kelly was Lord Provost of Glasgow.   
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APPENDIX C LIST OF EUROPEAN CITIES/CAPITALS OF 
CULTURE, 1985 TO 2018 
 
1985 Athens (Greece) 
1986 Florence (Italy) 
1987 Amsterdam (Netherlands) 
1988 Berlin (West Germany) 
1989 Paris (France) 
1990 Glasgow (UK)  
1991 Dublin (Ireland)  
1992 Madrid (Spain) 
1993 Antwerp (Belgium)  
1994 Lisbon (Portugal)  
1995 Luxembourg (Luxembourg) 
1996 Copenhagen (Denmark)  
1997 Thessalonika (Greece)  
1998 Stockholm (Sweden) 
1999 Weimar (Germany) 
2000 Avignon (France), Bergen (Norway), Bologna (Italy), Brussels (Belgium), 
Helsinki (Finland), Krakow (Poland), Prague (Czech Republic), Santiago de 
Compostela (Spain), Reykjavik (Iceland) 
2001 Porto (Portugal), Rotterdam (Netherlands)  
2002 Bruges (Belgium), Salamanca (Spain)  
2003  Graz (Austria)  
2004  Genoa (Italy), Lille (France)  
2005  Cork (Ireland)  
2006 Patras (Greece)    
2007  Luxembourg (Luxembourg), Sibui (Romania)  
2008 Liverpool (UK, Stavanger (Norway)  
2009 Linz (Austria), Vilnius (Lithuania)  
2010 Essen (Germany), Istanbul (Turkey), Pécs (Hungary) 
2011 Tallinn (Estonia), Turku (Finland) 
2012  Guimarães (Portugal), Maribor (Slovenia)  
2013  Kosice (Slovenia), Marseille (France)  
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2014  Riga (Latvia), Umea (Sweden) 
2015  Mons (Belgium), Plzen (Czech Republic) 
2016 Donostia-San Sebastián (Spain), Wroclaw (Poland) 
2017 Aarhus (Denmark), Paphos (Cyprus) 
2018 Leeuwarden (Netherlands), Valetta (Malta)  
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APPENDIX D LIST OF CITIES THAT SUBMITTED BIDS IN  
APRIL 1986 FOR THE UK NOMINATION FOR 
ECOC 1990  
 
Bath  
 
Bristol 
 
Cambridge 
 
Cardiff 
 
Edinburgh 
 
Glasgow  
 
Leeds  
 
Liverpool 
 
Swansea 
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APPENDIX E LIST OF CITIES SHORTLISTED IN JULY 1986 
FOR THE UK NOMINATION FOR ECOC 1990  
 
Bath  
 
Bristol 
 
Edinburgh 
 
Glasgow  
 
Leeds 
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